abuse of discretion standard in Delaware

2026In Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 , 253-54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Aronson, to the extent those precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested deferential appellate review.

2026In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven decisions, including Aronson, to the extent those precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested deferential appellate review. 746 A.2d 244 , 253 n.13 (Del. 2000).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2023Mar. 15, 1999). 6 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 202 (Del. 1991) (cleaned up).2 The second line of authority addresses a scenario in which a party seeks leave to supplement the record with newly discovered evidence after the close of the evidence at trial but before a judgment has been entered.3 Rule 60(b)(2) does not strictly apply in that 2 In Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 , 253–54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Levine, to the extent that they reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwi

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2025Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004) (“The key principle upon which this area of our jurisprudence is based is that the directors are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their 68 In Brehm, the Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), to the extent those precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested a deferential appellate review.

2024Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 ; see Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d at 1063-64 94 In Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-54, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Aronson, to the extent those precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested a deferential appellate review.

2002Liu *1123 v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Del.1993); Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 308 (Del.1989).

1993Gregory v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1992); Alston v. State, Del.Supr., 554 A.2d 304, 308 (1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 , 109 S.Ct. 2455 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1989).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2024Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999) (“[T]he law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case,” and the determination of whether to admit or exclude expert testimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review). 20 Defendants’ Application at 18. 8 lenient Daubert standard is incorrect and inaccurate as a matter of law.

2010Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 522 ("[A]n appellate court must apply an abuse of discretion standard when 'it reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.’ ” (quoting General Elec.

2022The court instructed the jurors to “disregard any testimony that you’ve heard relating . . . to [Harris’s] son or any situation involving the son.”32 This Court has held that a prompt curative instruction is “presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.”33 In addition, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”34 We find that the judge’s prompt instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by Harris’s statements, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Seeney’s motion for a mistrial. 28 MacDonald v.

2017As a result, he argues, the failure to declare a mistrial denied him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial panel ofjurors (9) This Court reviews a “trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard.”"' “The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether a mistrial should be granted.'8 “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of publicjustice would be otherwise defeated.”’19 “A mistrial is mandated only When there are ‘no meaningful and practical alternatives’ to that remedy.”20 ls ld.

2022The court instructed the jurors to “disregard any testimony that you’ve heard relating . . . to [Harris’s] son or any situation involving the son.”32 This Court has held that a prompt curative instruction is “presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.”33 In addition, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”34 We find that the judge’s prompt instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by Harris’s statements, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Seeney’s motion for a mistrial. 28 MacDonald v.

2017As a result, he argues, the failure to declare a mistrial denied him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial panel ofjurors (9) This Court reviews a “trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard.”"' “The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether a mistrial should be granted.'8 “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of publicjustice would be otherwise defeated.”’19 “A mistrial is mandated only When there are ‘no meaningful and practical alternatives’ to that remedy.”20 ls ld.

2020See id. 1 In Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 , 253-54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Aronson, to the extent that they reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested deferential appellate review.

2020See id. 1 In Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 , 253–54 (Del. 2000), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including Aronson, to the extent they reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested deferential appellate review.

2019Under the circumstances, we conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children. (8) This Court’s review of a custody order of the Family Court includes both a review of the law and the facts.8 If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion standard.9 The Family Court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.10 When the determination of the facts turns on the credibility of the witnes

2015The Husband asserts that the Family Court should have attributed him with his base yearly salary of $44,616. (4) On appeal from a Family Court decision regarding alimony, this Court reviews both the law and the facts, as well as the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge. 2 We review conclusions of law de novo.3 If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion standard. 4 The Family Court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless those findings are clearly wrong and justice 2 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202,

2019Under the circumstances, we conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children. (8) This Court’s review of a custody order of the Family Court includes both a review of the law and the facts.8 If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion standard.9 The Family Court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.10 When the determination of the facts turns on the credibility of the witnes

2019Under the circumstances, we conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children. (8) This Court’s review of a custody order of the Family Court includes both a review of the law and the facts.8 If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion standard.9 The Family Court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.10 When the determination of the facts turns on the credibility of the witnes

2001See Gregory v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1992).

1993Gregory v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (1992); Alston v. State, Del.Supr., 554 A.2d 304, 308 (1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 , 109 S.Ct. 2455 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1989).

2001See Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 354 (1998).

1999Williamson v. State, Del.Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 354 (1998).

2025Super. 1960). 27 Amalfitano, 794 A.2d at 577 ; Storey, 401 A.2d at 465 . 28 Steele v. State, 319 A.3d 267 , 2024 WL 1696794 , at *3 (Del.

2025R. 33. 8 review a denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.25 Historically, Delaware courts have exercised their power to grant a new trial with caution and extreme deference to the jury’s findings.26 A court will not set aside a jury’s verdict unless “the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not have reached the result.”27 “[W]hen the determination hinges on witness credibility, we do not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.”28 Second-degree murder requires the State to prove that the defendan

2022The court instructed the jurors to “disregard any testimony that you’ve heard relating . . . to [Harris’s] son or any situation involving the son.”32 This Court has held that a prompt curative instruction is “presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.”33 In addition, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”34 We find that the judge’s prompt instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by Harris’s statements, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Seeney’s motion for a mistrial. 28 MacDonald v.

2017As a result, he argues, the failure to declare a mistrial denied him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial panel ofjurors (9) This Court reviews a “trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard.”"' “The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether a mistrial should be granted.'8 “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of publicjustice would be otherwise defeated.”’19 “A mistrial is mandated only When there are ‘no meaningful and practical alternatives’ to that remedy.”20 ls ld.

2026See Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 2008) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on an area of law is reviewed de novo, but a request for the court to give a “particular” instruction by changing the “form, content or language” is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). 36 McKenzie v. Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160, 163 (Del. 1996) (citations omitted) (“The [plaintiffs] may not insist upon a particular jury instruction, but they do ‘have the unqualified right to have the jury instructed with a correct statement of the substance of the law.’ The instructions need not be perfect, and

2025Answering Br. at 5 (citing Hankins v. State, 976 A.2d 839, 840 (Del. 2009)). 28 Hankins, 976 A.2d at 840 ; see also Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751 , 755–56 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates whether the proffered instruction was legally correct, whether or not it was substantially covered by other instructions, and whether its omission prejudiced the defendant.”)). 29 Wright, 953 A.2d at 148 (applying de novo review for failure to instruct on statutory defenses such as justifi

2025F. Props., LLC v. McCann, 2009 WL 1163494 at *1 (Del. Super.) quoting Disabatino v. State, 808 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Del. Super. 2022). 17 Id. 18 Id. inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed

2025F. Props., LLC v. McCann, 2009 WL 1163494 at *1 (Del. Super.) quoting Disabatino v. State, 808 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Del. Super. 2022). 17 Id. 18 Id. inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed

2024Trial court review gives the parties “a fair chance to address arguments at the trial court.”6 It is also “prudent for the development of the law that appellate courts have the benefits that come with a full record and input from learned trial judges.”7 In other words, “fair presentation facilitates the process by which the application of rights in an individual case affects others in other cases and society in general.”8 Here, McGuiness did not fairly raise the Count III/Count IV prejudicial spillover issue in the Superior Court.9 In a criminal appeal where the appellant did not raise the iss

2024Second, Burrell argues that the redaction of the shooter’s name hampered his ability to present a defense because it gave him less information with which to impeach Church.103 The State argues that Burrell agreed to the redactions, 101 See supra Section III(A)(1)(a). 102 See supra Section III(A)(1)(a)–(c). 103 App. to Opening Br. at A30. 24 defense counsel was able to impeach Church or clarify the shooter’s identity if he felt it was necessary to do so, and the shooter’s name was not material to impeaching Church.104 We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an

2024IV, § 4(1)(b). 2 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997) (“Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts,”); Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1993) (“Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court will disturb a discretionary ruling of the trial court only when the ruling is based upon unreasonable or capricious grounds.”); Nat’l Ass’n v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 294 A.3d 1062 , 1071 (Del. 2023) (“This Court reviews questions of law de novo.”). 3 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006) (“Where defense counsel fails to raise a timely and per

2000See Young v. Frase, Del.Supr., 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1997).

2024IV, § 4(1)(b). 2 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997) (“Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts,”); Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1993) (“Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court will disturb a discretionary ruling of the trial court only when the ruling is based upon unreasonable or capricious grounds.”); Nat’l Ass’n v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 294 A.3d 1062 , 1071 (Del. 2023) (“This Court reviews questions of law de novo.”). 3 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006) (“Where defense counsel fails to raise a timely and per

2021Thus, appellate review of the trial court’s decision is limited.”); cf., Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1993) (“Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court will disturb a discretionary ruling of the trial court only when the ruling is based on unreasonable or capricious grounds.”). 15 that the likely benefits of interlocutory review outweigh the probable costs, such that interlocutory appellate review is in the interests of justice.

2022The court instructed the jurors to “disregard any testimony that you’ve heard relating . . . to [Harris’s] son or any situation involving the son.”32 This Court has held that a prompt curative instruction is “presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.”33 In addition, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”34 We find that the judge’s prompt instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by Harris’s statements, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Seeney’s motion for a mistrial. 28 MacDonald v.

2020July 25, 2017) (TABLE) (quoting MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del. 2003)). 45 Ray, at *4 (citing Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974)). 46 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1987)). 47 Id. 48 See Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002) (citation omitted). 49 Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410 (Del. 1986). 10 an abuse of the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in making that determination, this Court will not disturb that decision.50 By contras

2022The court instructed the jurors to “disregard any testimony that you’ve heard relating . . . to [Harris’s] son or any situation involving the son.”32 This Court has held that a prompt curative instruction is “presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper statements.”33 In addition, “[j]uries are presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.”34 We find that the judge’s prompt instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by Harris’s statements, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Seeney’s motion for a mistrial. 28 MacDonald v.

2020July 25, 2017) (TABLE) (quoting MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del. 2003)). 45 Ray, at *4 (citing Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974)). 46 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1987)). 47 Id. 48 See Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002) (citation omitted). 49 Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410 (Del. 1986). 10 an abuse of the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in making that determination, this Court will not disturb that decision.50 By contras

2020Violation of traffic laws constitutes reasonable suspicion.”). 37 Holden v. State, 23 A.3d 843, 847 (Del. 2011). 7 and his partner could remove Calm and the driver from the vehicle after the driver consented to a search of the vehicle.38 “During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer may order both the driver and passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the traffic stop.”39 The only dispute is whether, after the driver’s consent was given, Corporal O’Connor was justified in initiating a search of Calm’s person immediately upon Calm’s exit of the vehicle.40 An “officer’s purpose in

2003Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1055 (Del.2001).

2018Our Supreme Court has explained that a decision will not be overturned as an abuse of discretion if the decision “was based upon conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness.”130 Stated another way, a court will 128 Dkt. 1229 (Pincus Aff. ¶ 21). 129 See, e.g., Tr. at 102 (Elting’s lead trial counsel) (Jan. 17, 2018). 130 Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 695 (Del. 1968). 42 overturn a decision for abuse of discretion only if it was “arbitrary or capricious”131 or “exceeds the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances.”132 This is the standard I will apply in reviewing

1993See Chavin v. Cope, Del.Supr., 243 A.2d 694, 699 (1968); Pitts v. White, Del.Supr., 109 A.2d 786, 788 (1954).

2024See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 ; Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 , 72-73 (Del. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 22, 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 , 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); and Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 , 624-25 (Del. 1984)).

2022See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-54 (overruling prior precedent that the Court of Chancery’s decision under Rule 23.1 is reviewed by the Supreme Court under an abuse of discretion standard). 102 Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990); see also Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219 (“If a demand is made and rejected, the board rejecting the demand is entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule unless the stockholder can allege facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt that the board is entitled to the benefit of the presumption.”). 32 the subject of the litigation demand or wh

2020ANALYSIS “We review the trial court’s refusal to grant the motion to suppress evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.”33 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in making factual findings, we ask whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings, and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.34 Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.35 Here, there is no dispute that O’Connor and his partner made a legal traffic stop, given that the vehicle in question was speeding and had tinted windows without the required waiver.36 “A police officer who observes a

2015State v. Abel, 68 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Del.2012) (“In general, we review the trial judge’s grant of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.” (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del.2008))); Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Del.1997) (“An appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review.” (citing Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 996-97 (Del.1987))). 9 .Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 382 (Del.2011) (citing Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del.2010)). 10 .