rationale underlying doctrine in Maryland

2014In discussing whether the title search companies were liable for those damages, the Court outlined case law discussing the rationale behind the “intimate nexus” rule: We explained in [Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645 , 762 A.2d 582 (2000) ] that “the rationale underlying the requirement of privity or its equivalent as a condition of liability for negligent conduct ... resulting in economic damages ... [is] to avoid ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’ ” A defendant can protect itself from such unpredictable and unl

2014In discussing whether the title search companies were liable for those damages, the Court outlined case law discussing the rationale behind the “intimate nexus” rule: We explained in [Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645 , 762 A.2d 582 (2000) ] that “the rationale underlying the requirement of privity or its equivalent as a condition of liability for negligent conduct ... resulting in economic damages ... [is] to avoid ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’ ” A defendant can protect itself from such unpredictable and unl

2021To be faithful to the rationale underlying the rule discussed in Stringfellow, I would modify its application where Kazadi-type voir dire questions are concerned.1 In Kazadi, 467 Md. at 48 , 223 A.3d at 582 , this Court made clear that not asking voir dire questions, on request, concerning fundamental principles is reversible error.

2021To be faithful to the rationale underlying the rule discussed in Stringfellow, I would modify its application where Kazadi-type voir dire questions are concerned.1 In Kazadi, 467 Md. at 48 , 223 A.3d at 582 , this Court made clear that not asking voir dire questions, on request, concerning fundamental principles is reversible error.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2011Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 531 , 620 A.2d 894 (1993); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375 , 424 A.2d 761 (1981); James v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505 , 290 A.2d 490 (1972); Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364-65 , 160 A.2d 609 (1960). 9 The Court of Appeals explained the rationale underlying the doctrine of acknowledgment in Barney v. Smith, 4 H. & J. 485, 495-96 (1819): [T]he Act of Limitations does not operate to extinguish the debt, but to bar the remedy.

2008“The rationale underlying the requirement of an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition of liability for negligent conduct creating only a risk of economic damages is to avoid ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’ ” Simmons v. Lennon, 139 Md.App. 15, 36 , 773 A.2d 1064 (2001) (citing Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 671 , 762 A.2d 582 (2000)).

2008“The rationale underlying the requirement of an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition of liability for negligent conduct creating only a risk of economic damages is to avoid ‘liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’ ” Simmons v. Lennon, 139 Md.App. 15, 36 , 773 A.2d 1064 (2001) (citing Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 671 , 762 A.2d 582 (2000)).

2007The rationale underlying the doctrine of subrogation is to prevent the party primarily liable on the debt from being unjustly enriched when someone pays his debt. *743 Riemer, 358 Md. at 231-32 , 747 A.2d 677 (internal citations omitted).

2007The rationale underlying the doctrine of subrogation is to prevent the party primarily liable on the debt from being unjustly enriched when someone pays his debt. *743 Riemer, 358 Md. at 231-32 , 747 A.2d 677 (internal citations omitted).

2003Id. at 314 , 648 A.2d 439 .

2003Id. at 314 , 648 A.2d 439 .

2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)).

2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)).

2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)).

2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)).

2002To prevail on the defense of assumption of the risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: “(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger.” Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985).

2002To prevail on the defense of assumption of the risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: “(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger.” Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985).

1999“The admissibility of evidence under this exception is, therefore, judged by the spontaneity of the declarant’s statement and an analysis of whether it was the result of thoughtful consideration or the product of the exciting event.” Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697 , 452 A.2d 661 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 569 , 629 A.2d 633 (1993).

1999“The admissibility of evidence under this exception is, therefore, judged by the spontaneity of the declarant’s statement and an analysis of whether it was the result of thoughtful consideration or the product of the exciting event.” Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697 , 452 A.2d 661 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 569 , 629 A.2d 633 (1993).

1999“The admissibility of evidence under this exception is, therefore, judged by the spontaneity of the declarant’s statement and an analysis of whether it was the result of thoughtful consideration or the product of the exciting event.” Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697 , 452 A.2d 661 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 569 , 629 A.2d 633 (1993).

1999“The admissibility of evidence under this exception is, therefore, judged by the spontaneity of the declarant’s statement and an analysis of whether it was the result of thoughtful consideration or the product of the exciting event.” Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697 , 452 A.2d 661 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 569 , 629 A.2d 633 (1993).

1996Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188 , 148 A.2d 387 (1959). 3 .

1996Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188 , 148 A.2d 387 (1959). 3 .

1995Fully recognizing the state of the law, see 337 Md. at 229-233 , 652 A.2d at 1123-1125 , but noting that “Maryland cases concerning fraud or deceit have typically involved the form of the tort which is characterized by the defendant’s deliberate deception of the plaintiff by means of a representation which he knows to be false,” the majority nevertheless “refines” the actual knowledge prong of the tort, to include only that situation.

1995Fully recognizing the state of the law, see 337 Md. at 229-233 , 652 A.2d at 1123-1125 , but noting that “Maryland cases concerning fraud or deceit have typically involved the form of the tort which is characterized by the defendant’s deliberate deception of the plaintiff by means of a representation which he knows to be false,” the majority nevertheless “refines” the actual knowledge prong of the tort, to include only that situation.

1992As more fully explained by Chief Judge Murphy (now Chief Judge of this Court), when writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Regle v. State, 9 Md.App. 346 , 264 A.2d 119 (1970), the rationale underlying this rule is that: “it is illogical to acquit all but one of a purported partnership in crime; that acquittal of all persons with whom a defendant is alleged to have conspired is repugnant to the existence of the requisite corrupt agreement; and that regardless of the criminal animus of the one defendant, there must be someone with whom he confected his corrupt agreement, and where all his a

1992As more fully explained by Chief Judge Murphy (now Chief Judge of this Court), when writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Regle v. State, 9 Md.App. 346 , 264 A.2d 119 (1970), the rationale underlying this rule is that: “it is illogical to acquit all but one of a purported partnership in crime; that acquittal of all persons with whom a defendant is alleged to have conspired is repugnant to the existence of the requisite corrupt agreement; and that regardless of the criminal animus of the one defendant, there must be someone with whom he confected his corrupt agreement, and where all his a

1989The rationale underlying this rule “provides that retrospective application, which attempts to determine the legal significance of acts that occurred prior to the statute’s effective date, increases the potential for interference with persons’ substantive rights.” Id.

1989After a thorough review of the history of § 18-402, the Court of Special Appeals, in Roberts v. Suburban Hospital, *713 73 Md.App. 1 , 532 A.2d 1081 (1988) held that there was no indication that the Legislature in its 1986 amendment to § 18-402, intended that it be retroactive.

1989After a thorough review of the history of § 18-402, the Court of Special Appeals, in Roberts v. Suburban Hospital, *713 73 Md.App. 1 , 532 A.2d 1081 (1988) held that there was no indication that the Legislature in its 1986 amendment to § 18-402, intended that it be retroactive.

1984We further recognized that the rationale underlying the principle that inconsistent verdicts can stand was expressed in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 , 52 S.Ct. 189, 190-91 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), where Justice Holmes, writing for the United States Supreme Court, said: “Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.

1984We further recognized that the rationale underlying the principle that inconsistent verdicts can stand was expressed in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 , 52 S.Ct. 189, 190-91 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), where Justice Holmes, writing for the United States Supreme Court, said: “Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.