7 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barrett v. Wedgeworthgreen2 sentences2016See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity, dispute); Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. 2002See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity dispute); Ex parte *764 Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927 , 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Tierce v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2016See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity, dispute); Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. 2002See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity dispute); Ex parte *764 Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927 , 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Grubbsgreen2 sentences2016See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity, dispute); Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. 2002See Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553, 554-55 (Ala.1993) (applying the rule to a paternity dispute); Ex parte *764 Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927 , 930-31 (Ala.1989) (applying the rule in the context of a civil-rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Ala.1987) (applying the rule to bar a claim that a divorce judgment had been procured by fraud); Ballenger v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Shannon v. Mowergreen2 sentences1994The rationale underlying this rule is that “ ‘the principle [of quasi estoppel by election] ... prevents a party from drawing a judgment into question to the prejudice of his adversary after he has coerced its execution or accepted its benefits.’ ” Rice, 578 So.2d at 1064-65 , quoting Shannon v. Mower, 186 Ala. 472, 474 , 65 So. 338, 339 (1914). 1994The rationale underlying this rule is that “ ‘the principle [of quasi estoppel by election] ... prevents a party from drawing a judgment into question to the prejudice of his adversary after he has coerced its execution or accepted its benefits.’ ” Rice, 578 So.2d at 1064-65 , quoting Shannon v. Mower, 186 Ala. 472, 474 , 65 So. 338, 339 (1914). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. McVeighgreen1 sentence2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Ayersgreen1 sentence2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Rafael Abello-Silvagreen1 sentence2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
Patton v. Yountgreen2 sentences2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mu'Min v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 2014The rationale underlying the principle of presumed prejudice is that defendants and judges “simply cannot rely on ‘“jurors’ claims that they can be impartial.” ’ ” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), quoting in turn Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Adverse pretrial publicity can create süch á presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rice v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence1994The rationale underlying this rule is that “ ‘the principle [of quasi estoppel by election] ... prevents a party from drawing a judgment into question to the prejudice of his adversary after he has coerced its execution or accepted its benefits.’ ” Rice, 578 So.2d at 1064-65 , quoting Shannon v. Mower, 186 Ala. 472, 474 , 65 So. 338, 339 (1914). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Norton v. Shelby County
green
2 sentences1989It is for all purposes as though it had never been passed.' "It is held by the United States Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County , 118 U.S. 425 , 442 , 6 Sup.Ct. 1121 , 1125 ( 30 L.Ed. 178 ), that — " 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' "Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) at page 259, lays down the rule thus: " 'When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never bee 1989It is for all purposes as though it had never been passed.' "It is held by the United States Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County , 118 U.S. 425 , 442 , 6 Sup.Ct. 1121 , 1125 ( 30 L.Ed. 178 ), that — " 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' "Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) at page 259, lays down the rule thus: " 'When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never bee | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Finders v. Bodle
green
2 sentences1989The rationale underlying such a rule is explained in Whetstone v. Slonaker: "It is held in Finders v. Bodle , 58 Neb. 57 , 78 N.W. 480 , that an act of the Legislature, passed in violation of the Constitution, is void from the date of its enactment, and — *Page 1090 " 'An unconstitutional statute creates no new rights and abrogates no old ones. 1989The rationale underlying such a rule is explained in Whetstone v. Slonaker: "It is held in Finders v. Bodle , 58 Neb. 57 , 78 N.W. 480 , that an act of the Legislature, passed in violation of the Constitution, is void from the date of its enactment, and — *Page 1090 " 'An unconstitutional statute creates no new rights and abrogates no old ones. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. McCarty
green
1 sentence1977Ordinarily therefore, proof of the acts of, or transactions between strangers, or as to independent and disconnected acts or conduct by one of the parties to the suit, or of contracts or other transactions between either of the parties to a suit and strangers, is within the rule of res inter alios acta and is inadmissible.'" The rationale underlying this rule of evidence is that such collateral facts "are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal matter in dispute." State v. McCarty , Iowa, 179 N.W.2d 548 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.