9 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grunewald v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2015“The rationale underlying this rule is that the value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 | 1 | 2 |
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Hoodgreen2 sentences2018See Hartford , 225 N.C. at 362 , 34 S.E.2d at 204 (holding that a trial court cannot exercise its discretion *175 to change venue "until the allegations of the complaint are traversed"). 2018See Hartford , 225 N.C. at 362 , 34 S.E.2d at 204 (holding that a trial court cannot exercise its discretion *175 to change venue "until the allegations of the complaint are traversed"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Laddgreen2 sentences2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCallgreen2 sentences2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 2013“We have consistently held that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent.” If a defendant has been given his Miranda warnings, “his silence may not be used against him.” The rationale underlying this rule is that “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” State v. Moore, _ N.C. _, _, 726 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2012) (citing State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 250 , 555 S.E.2d 251, 264 (2001) (internal citation omitted), and quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283 , 30 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Atkinsongreen2 sentences2001Nonetheless, the rationale underlying the doctrine in criminal cases generally, correcting errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391, 392 , 80 L.Ed. 555, 557 (1936), applies with great force here. 2001Nonetheless, the rationale underlying the doctrine in criminal cases generally, correcting errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391, 392 , 80 L.Ed. 555, 557 (1936), applies with great force here. | 1 | 1 |
Dept. of Transp. v. First Bank of Schaumburggreen1 sentence2000To avoid misleading and confusing the jury, the evidence should be confined to the value directly at issue, which is the value of the improved property as a whole.” Department of Transp. v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 631 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
McPherson v. High Point Memorial Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence1987See McPherson v. Hospital, 43 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Boston
green
1 sentence2015As a result, the extent to which “the State may use a defendant’s silence at trial depends on the circumstances of the defendant’s silence and the purpose for which the State intends to use such silence.” State v. Boston, 191 N.C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fedoronko v. American Defender Life Insurance
green
1 sentence2000So, while the claim of privilege may not be used against defendant [or a witness] in a subsequent criminal prosecution, an inference that his testimony would have been unfavorable to him is available to his opponent in a civil cause in which defendant [or a witness] pleads the privilege.” *495 Fedoronko, 69 N.C. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Mercer
green
2 sentences1989The rationale underlying the defense was explained as follows in State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108 , 165 S.E. 2d 328 (1969), overruled on other grounds, State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266 , 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975), the first case recognizing the defense in this jurisdiction: “The absence of consciousness not only precludes the existence of any specific mental state, but also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without which there can be no criminal liability.” Id. at 116, 165 S.E. 2d at 334 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 50, at 116 (1957)). 1989The rationale underlying the defense was explained as follows in State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108 , 165 S.E. 2d 328 (1969), overruled on other grounds, State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266 , 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975), the first case recognizing the defense in this jurisdiction: “The absence of consciousness not only precludes the existence of any specific mental state, but also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without which there can be no criminal liability.” Id. at 116, 165 S.E. 2d at 334 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 50, at 116 (1957)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Caddell
green
2 sentences1989The rationale underlying the defense was explained as follows in State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108 , 165 S.E. 2d 328 (1969), overruled on other grounds, State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266 , 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975), the first case recognizing the defense in this jurisdiction: “The absence of consciousness not only precludes the existence of any specific mental state, but also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without which there can be no criminal liability.” Id. at 116, 165 S.E. 2d at 334 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 50, at 116 (1957)). 1989The rationale underlying the defense was explained as follows in State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108 , 165 S.E. 2d 328 (1969), overruled on other grounds, State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266 , 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975), the first case recognizing the defense in this jurisdiction: “The absence of consciousness not only precludes the existence of any specific mental state, but also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without which there can be no criminal liability.” Id. at 116, 165 S.E. 2d at 334 (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 50, at 116 (1957)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.