Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Parnigoni v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2017We have held that child victims are unable to meaningfully consent to sexual contact with an older person because they “do not understand what is happening to them.” .See Parnigoni v. District of Columbia, 933 A.2d 823, 827 (D.C. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Guarro, supra, 237 F.2d at 581 . 2017District of'Co/tonbio, 933 A.2d 823, 827 (D.C. 2007] (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Giiorro, sirpro. 237 F.2d at 581 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2013The rationale underlying the presumption of prejudice in this context is that “a requirement that prejudice be shown would in most cases deprive the defendant of the public trial guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.” Waller , 467 U.S at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (structural defects such as public trial right characterized by “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”); Kleinbart, 388 A.2d at 882 . 2013The rationale underlying the presumption of prejudice in this context is that “a requirement that prejudice be shown would in most cases deprive the defendant of the public trial guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.” Waller , 467 U.S at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (structural defects such as public trial right characterized by “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”); Kleinbart, 388 A.2d at 882 . | 1 | 1 |
Odemns v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013The rationale underlying the exception is that the “utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection,” and thus the utterance is considered “particularly trustworthy.” Odemns, 901 A.2d at 778 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 2013Accordingly, in order “to protect litigants from judgments based on unreliable second-hand evidence which is not subject to cross-examination,” it is important “that the declaration was made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon her statement or premeditated or constructed it.” Id. at 777 (alterations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[Spontaneity and lack of opportunity for reflection constitute the key elements,” and “rote recitations that the declarant was upset or excited or afraid” as a resu | 1 | 1 |
Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, Inc.green1 sentence2005See id. at 298-99 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ernesto Guarro v. United States
green
2 sentences2017We have held that child victims are unable to meaningfully consent to sexual contact with an older person because they “do not understand what is happening to them.” .See Parnigoni v. District of Columbia, 933 A.2d 823, 827 (D.C. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Guarro, supra, 237 F.2d at 581 . 2017District of'Co/tonbio, 933 A.2d 823, 827 (D.C. 2007] (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Giiorro, sirpro. 237 F.2d at 581 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Waller v. Georgia
green
1 sentence2013The rationale underlying the presumption of prejudice in this context is that “a requirement that prejudice be shown would in most cases deprive the defendant of the public trial guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.” Waller , 467 U.S at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (structural defects such as public trial right characterized by “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”); Kleinbart, 388 A.2d at 882 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2013The right to a public trial, like the right to a jury trial, is one of those “basic protection^] whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 2013The right to a public trial, like the right to a jury trial, is one of those “basic protection^] whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kleinbart v. United States
green
1 sentence2013The rationale underlying the presumption of prejudice in this context is that “a requirement that prejudice be shown would in most cases deprive the defendant of the public trial guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.” Waller , 467 U.S at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (structural defects such as public trial right characterized by “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”); Kleinbart, 388 A.2d at 882 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gillespie v. Washington
green
1 sentence1997Young, supra note 1, 569 A.2d at 1175 (citing Gillespie, 395 A.2d at 20 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Diamond Ice & Storage Co. v. Klock Produce Co.
green
1 sentence1997Diamond, 189 P. at 260 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Byrd v. United States
green
1 sentence1991The court in Byrd v. United States, 579 A.2d 725 (D.C.1990), explained the rationale underlying the requirement that the government file an indictment or information: An indictment, or other charging instrument, serves three vital constitutional functions. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Johnson
red
2 sentences1989Thus, the Supreme Court specifically noted "the problem with not applying new rules to cases pending on direct review [or non-final cases] is ‘the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary’ of a new rule.” Id. at 714 (quoting United States v. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at 555 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 2590 n. 16 (emphasis in original)). . 1989Thus, the Supreme Court specifically noted "the problem with not applying new rules to cases pending on direct review [or non-final cases] is ‘the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary’ of a new rule.” Id. at 714 (quoting United States v. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at 555 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 2590 n. 16 (emphasis in original)). . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Griffith v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence1989Thus, the Supreme Court specifically noted "the problem with not applying new rules to cases pending on direct review [or non-final cases] is ‘the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary’ of a new rule.” Id. at 714 (quoting United States v. Johnson, supra, 457 U.S. at 555 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 2590 n. 16 (emphasis in original)). . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cady v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Id. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.