rationale underlying doctrine in Pennsylvania

2000Dilliplaine , at 258, 322 A.2d at 116 .

1999Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 *244 A.2d 114 (1974).

2026Taylor, supra. That rationale is absent here.

2025Courts recognize that, in litigation, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a party to disclose opinions that support its position and to ____________________________________________ 3 See also Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083 , 1089 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648 , 12 A.3d 371 (2010) (stating: “This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court.

2025Courts recognize that, in litigation, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a party to disclose opinions that support its position and to ____________________________________________ 3 See also Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083 , 1089 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648 , 12 A.3d 371 (2010) (stating: “This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court.

2025Hammer, 494 A.2d at 1059 .

2025Courts recognize that, in litigation, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a party to disclose opinions that support its position and to ____________________________________________ 3 See also Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083 , 1089 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648 , 12 A.3d 371 (2010) (stating: “This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court.

2022By specifically objecting to any obvious error, the trial court can quickly and easily correct the problem and prevent the need for a new trial.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 641 A.2d 1176, 1184 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation omitted) (holding that, in order to preserve an issue for review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at trial, for this Court will not consider claims on appeal not called to trial court’s attention at a time purported error could have been corrected).

2019The court noted the rationale underlying this doctrine is that an act of production does not involve testimonial communication if the facts conveyed are already known to the government, such that the individual “‘adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government’s information.’” Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/2016, at 9 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 ).

1997As explained in Giffear , the rationale underlying this rule is that “in virtually all pleural plaque and pleural thickening cases, plaintiffs continue to lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering, no loss of the use of an organ or disfigurement due to scarring.” Id. at 339 , 632 A.2d at 887 .

1997As explained in Giffear , the rationale underlying this rule is that “in virtually all pleural plaque and pleural thickening cases, plaintiffs continue to lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering, no loss of the use of an organ or disfigurement due to scarring.” Id. at 339 , 632 A.2d at 887 .

1995The rationale underlying this exception was articulated in Ortiz v. Ra-El Development Corp., 365 Pa.Super. 48 , 528 A.2d 1355 (1987), alloc. den., 517 Pa. 608 , 536 A.2d 1332 : *6 [A]n employer of the independent contractor ought to anticipate a heightened level of risk where the work is specially dangerous or peculiarly risky.

1995The rationale underlying this exception was articulated in Ortiz v. Ra-El Development Corp., 365 Pa.Super. 48 , 528 A.2d 1355 (1987), alloc. den., 517 Pa. 608 , 536 A.2d 1332 : *6 [A]n employer of the independent contractor ought to anticipate a heightened level of risk where the work is specially dangerous or peculiarly risky.

1995Keystone Health Plan West v. Department of Health, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 686, 609 A.2d 612 (1992).

1993Rather, the rationale is that “[i]f the player cannot get any other consideration or reward from the play except the right to play again, his incentive for playing must be a recreational or amusement incentive only.” Id. at 337 , 30 A.2d at 354 .

1993Rather, the rationale is that “[i]f the player cannot get any other consideration or reward from the play except the right to play again, his incentive for playing must be a recreational or amusement incentive only.” Id. at 337 , 30 A.2d at 354 .

1992Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438 , 409 A.2d 848 (1979).

1992Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438 , 409 A.2d 848 (1979).

1992DeMarco v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 513 Pa. 526 , 522 A.2d 26 (1987).

1992DeMarco v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 513 Pa. 526 , 522 A.2d 26 (1987).

1987In Kine v. Forman, 205 Pa.Super. 305 , 209 A.2d 1 (1965), this Court stated: We have held that this Act is subject to limitations and the modern view is that these limitations may be expanded. ‘This privilege has no longer adequate reason for retention.

1987In Kine v. Forman, 205 Pa.Super. 305 , 209 A.2d 1 (1965), this Court stated: We have held that this Act is subject to limitations and the modern view is that these limitations may be expanded. ‘This privilege has no longer adequate reason for retention.

1981The rationale underlying the rule enunciated in Codispoti is that, unlike during trial, at the end of trial there is “no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary rudiments of due process.” Id., 418 U.S. at 515 , 94 S.Ct. at 2692 .

1981The rationale underlying the rule enunciated in Codispoti is that, unlike during trial, at the end of trial there is “no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary rudiments of due process.” Id., 418 U.S. at 515 , 94 S.Ct. at 2692 .

1978Such principles are: (a) where a patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of the patient is “ ‘a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician’ ” and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault (Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa.Super. 192, 195 , 163 A. 341 ; Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 307 , 16 A.2d 15 ); (b) the burden is on plaintiff to prove “that the operation performed, or substantially that operation, was not authorized by him”: Dicenzo v. Berg, supra, 340 Pa. 307 , 16 A.2d 16 .’ ” In Dunha

1978In describing the rationale underlying the doctrine of official immunity, the United States Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), emphasized: “[T]he injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligation of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” Id. at 497 , 98 S.Ct. at 2906 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,

1978In describing the rationale underlying the doctrine of official immunity, the United States Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), emphasized: “[T]he injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligation of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” Id. at 497 , 98 S.Ct. at 2906 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,

1978Such principles are: (a) where a patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of the patient is “ ‘a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician’ ” and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault (Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa.Super. 192, 195 , 163 A. 341 ; Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 307 , 16 A.2d 15 ); (b) the burden is on plaintiff to prove “that the operation performed, or substantially that operation, was not authorized by him”: Dicenzo v. Berg, supra, 340 Pa. 307 , 16 A.2d 16 .’ ” In Dunha

1978Such principles are: (a) where a patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of the patient is “ ‘a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician’ ” and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault (Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa.Super. 192, 195 , 163 A. 341 ; Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 307 , 16 A.2d 15 ); (b) the burden is on plaintiff to prove “that the operation performed, or substantially that operation, was not authorized by him”: Dicenzo v. Berg, supra, 340 Pa. 307 , 16 A.2d 16 .’ ” In Dunha

1978Such principles are: (a) where a patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of the patient is “ ‘a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician’ ” and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault (Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa.Super. 192, 195 , 163 A. 341 ; Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 307 , 16 A.2d 15 ); (b) the burden is on plaintiff to prove “that the operation performed, or substantially that operation, was not authorized by him”: Dicenzo v. Berg, supra, 340 Pa. 307 , 16 A.2d 16 .’ ” In Dunha

1978Such principles are: (a) where a patient is mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of the patient is “ ‘a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician’ ” and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault (Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa.Super. 192, 195 , 163 A. 341 ; Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 307 , 16 A.2d 15 ); (b) the burden is on plaintiff to prove “that the operation performed, or substantially that operation, was not authorized by him”: Dicenzo v. Berg, supra, 340 Pa. 307 , 16 A.2d 16 .’ ” In Dunha

1977Shillitani v. United States, supra; In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 , 6 Wheat. 204, 231 , 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821).

1977Shillitani v. United States, supra; In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 , 6 Wheat. 204, 231 , 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821).

1977Shillitani v. United States, supra; In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 , 6 Wheat. 204, 231 , 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821).

1977Shillitani v. United States, supra; In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 66 S.Ct. 78 , 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 , 6 Wheat. 204, 231 , 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821).