rationale underlying doctrine in Ohio

2025Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those 12 dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves.’” Id., quoting Simmers v. Bentley Constr.

2023Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises 6 will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves.’” Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , ¶ 5, quoting Simmers v. Bentley Constr.

2007Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45 , 42 O.O.2d 96 , 233 N.E.2d 589, approved and followed." Armstrong at syllabus. {¶ 10} The Armstrong court reiterated the rationale behind the open and obvious doctrine, stating: "The rationale underlying this doctrine is `that the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning.

2007Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45 , 42 O.O.2d 96 , 233 N.E.2d 589, approved and followed." Armstrong at syllabus. {¶ 10} The Armstrong court reiterated the rationale behind the open and obvious doctrine, stating: "The rationale underlying this doctrine is `that the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning.

2008Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves." Simmers v. Bentley Constr Co. , 64 Ohio St.3d 642 , 644 , 1992-Ohio-42 , 597 N.E.2d 504 . {¶ 19} A business ordinarily owes its business invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and has the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers.

2007Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves." Simmers v. Bentley Constr Co. , 64 Ohio St.3d 642 , 644 , 1992-Ohio-42 , 597 N.E.2d 504 . {¶ 10} A shopkeeper ordinarily owes its business invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and has the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers.

2025“The rationale underlying this doctrine is that the detection of such contraband involved ‘no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons. . .’” Id., quoting Dickerson at 373 .

2024The rationale underlying this doctrine is that the detection of such contraband involved “no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons * * *.” Id. {¶17} “A second-pat down search has been found to be justified when the officer who conducted the second pat-down search did not observe the first pat down or was concerned with the adequacy of the first pat down.” State v. Garrett, 2018- Ohio-4530, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.).

2005Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 402 , 404 .

2004Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 402 , 404 .

2022Early v. Damon’s Restaurant, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1342, 2006-Ohio-3311, ¶ 7 . 1 A business invitee is one who is upon the premises of another by invitation, express or implied, for some purpose that is beneficial to the owner.

2019“The rationale underlying this doctrine is to maintain consistent results in a case by conclusively settling issues that have previously been litigated.” Id. {¶12} Here, this Court resolved the parties’ prior appeal and cross-appeal on procedural grounds without considering the merits of whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Frys under Option I.

2019Fry, 2017-Ohio-5478, at ¶ 14 .

2014This is true even if there are misstatements and misrepresentations by the seller, so long as such are not "so reprehensible in nature as to constitute fraud." Id., citing Traverse v. Long, 165 Ohio St. 249 , 252 (1956). {¶ 22} The rationale underlying the doctrine is that "a party has no right to rely on certain representations regarding the property when the true facts are equally open to both parties." Huckaby at ¶ 18.

2014This is true even if there are misstatements and misrepresentations by the seller, so long as such are not "so reprehensible in nature as to constitute fraud." Id., citing Traverse v. Long, 165 Ohio St. 249 , 252 (1956). {¶ 22} The rationale underlying the doctrine is that "a party has no right to rely on certain representations regarding the property when the true facts are equally open to both parties." Huckaby at ¶ 18.

2013Degen, citing Hake, 23 Ohio St.2d at 66-67 . {¶ 60} In Hansen v. Wal-Mart, supra, this court recognized the rationale underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and how the theory applies when injuries occur in a public place: “‘The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is founded on an absence of specific proof of acts or omissions constituting negligence, and the particular justice of the doctrine rests upon the foundation that the true cause of the occurrence, whether innocent or culpable, is within the knowledge or access of the defendant and not within the plaintiffs knowledge or accessible to

2013Degen, citing Hake, 23 Ohio St.2d at 66-67 . {¶ 60} In Hansen v. Wal-Mart, supra, this court recognized the rationale underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and how the theory applies when injuries occur in a public place: “‘The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is founded on an absence of specific proof of acts or omissions constituting negligence, and the particular justice of the doctrine rests upon the foundation that the true cause of the occurrence, whether innocent or culpable, is within the knowledge or access of the defendant and not within the plaintiffs knowledge or accessible to

2006Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ; Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 . {¶ 87} The vagueness doctrine is usually applied in criminal law and First Amendment claims, but neither the rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.

2006Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ; Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 . {¶ 87} The vagueness doctrine is usually applied in criminal law and First Amendment claims, but neither the rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.

2006See Jordan v. De George (1951), 341 U.S. 223 , 71 S.Ct. 703 , 95 L.Ed. 886 (applying the doctrine to a deportation statute); Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 .

2006See Jordan v. De George (1951), 341 U.S. 223 , 71 S.Ct. 703 , 95 L.Ed. 886 (applying the doctrine to a deportation statute); Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 .

2006Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ; Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 . {¶ 87} The vagueness doctrine is usually applied in criminal law and First Amendment claims, but neither the rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.

2006Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ; Papachristou v. Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 . {¶ 87} The vagueness doctrine is usually applied in criminal law and First Amendment claims, but neither the rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.

2002As the court explained in Scholler : {¶ 57} "An attorney is immune from liability to third persons arising from his performance as an attorney in good faith on behalf of, and with the knowledge of his client, unless such third person is in privity with the client * * *." Id. ; see, also, Elam v. Hyatt Legal Serv. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 175 , 176 , 541 N.E.2d 616 ; Sayyah v. Cutrell (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 102 , 110 , 757 N.E.2d 779 . {¶ 58} In Simon v. Zipperstein , the court explained the rationale underlying the rule that absent privity, third persons may not sue an attorney for legal malprac

2002To allow indiscriminate third-party actions against attorneys of necessity would create a conflict of interest at all times, so that the attorney might well be reluctant to offer proper representation to his client in fear of some third-party actions against the attorney himself." (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 76 , 512 N.E.2d 636 .

2002To allow indiscriminate third-party actions against attorneys of necessity would create a conflict of interest at all times, so that the attorney might well be reluctant to offer proper representation to his client in fear of some third-party actions against the attorney himself." (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 74 , 76 , 512 N.E.2d 636 .

2002D'Antorio v. State (Alaska 1996), 926 P.2d 1158 , 1166 .

2002As the court explained in Scholler : {¶ 57} "An attorney is immune from liability to third persons arising from his performance as an attorney in good faith on behalf of, and with the knowledge of his client, unless such third person is in privity with the client * * *." Id. ; see, also, Elam v. Hyatt Legal Serv. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 175 , 176 , 541 N.E.2d 616 ; Sayyah v. Cutrell (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 102 , 110 , 757 N.E.2d 779 . {¶ 58} In Simon v. Zipperstein , the court explained the rationale underlying the rule that absent privity, third persons may not sue an attorney for legal malprac

2002As the court explained in Scholler : {¶ 57} "An attorney is immune from liability to third persons arising from his performance as an attorney in good faith on behalf of, and with the knowledge of his client, unless such third person is in privity with the client * * *." Id. ; see, also, Elam v. Hyatt Legal Serv. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 175 , 176 , 541 N.E.2d 616 ; Sayyah v. Cutrell (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 102 , 110 , 757 N.E.2d 779 . {¶ 58} In Simon v. Zipperstein , the court explained the rationale underlying the rule that absent privity, third persons may not sue an attorney for legal malprac

2001Little Forest Medical Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm . (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 76 , 81 .