13 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmongreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., San Diego Bldg Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959) (denying California state court jurisdiction where union picketing giving rise to allegedly tortious acts was arguably encompassed by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 141 et seq.). *75 Causes of action in tort and those causes of action alleging that a telephone company has violated the tariffs or code are not cases in which the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction usually apply. 1997See, e.g., San Diego Bldg Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959) (denying California state court jurisdiction where union picketing giving rise to allegedly tortious acts was arguably encompassed by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 141 et seq.). *75 Causes of action in tort and those causes of action alleging that a telephone company has violated the tariffs or code are not cases in which the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction usually apply. | 1 | 1 |
Nezworski v. Mazanecgreen2 sentences1992See Nezworski v Mazanec, 301 Mich 43, 56 ; 2 NW2d 912 (1942); Smith v Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich 501, 504 ; 27 NW 662 (1886). 1992See Nezworski v Mazanec, 301 Mich 43, 56 ; 2 NW2d 912 (1942); Smith v Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich 501, 504 ; 27 NW 662 (1886). | 1 | 1 |
People v. John Willie Williamsgreen2 sentences1975He may not, however, be asked on cross-examination whether, when confronted with the charge, he made a *668 statement not adduced during the people’s case or referred to during his direct examination because to allow such a question violates either (1) the defendant’s right to have the people introduce during their case in chief all statements claimed to have been made by him before he is put to his proofs, or (2) permits bringing to the jury’s attention evidence that the defendant did not make a statement, which would be an impermissible reflection on his exercise of his right to remain silen 1975He may not, however, be asked on cross-examination whether, when confronted with the charge, he made a *668 statement not adduced during the people’s case or referred to during his direct examination because to allow such a question violates either (1) the defendant’s right to have the people introduce during their case in chief all statements claimed to have been made by him before he is put to his proofs, or (2) permits bringing to the jury’s attention evidence that the defendant did not make a statement, which would be an impermissible reflection on his exercise of his right to remain silen | 1 | 1 |
Cady v. Dombrowskigreen2 sentences1974Cf. Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 439 ; 93 S Ct 2523, 2527 ; 37 L Ed 2d 706, 713 (1973). 1974Cf. Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 439 ; 93 S Ct 2523, 2527 ; 37 L Ed 2d 706, 713 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Merritt v. Nickelson
green
2 sentences2018The rationale underlying this rule is that where a party is in possession, he occupies a position of control, and is “normally best able to prevent any harm to others.” Id. quoting Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544, 552 ; 287 NW2d 178 (1980), in turn quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 57 p 351 (emphasis in original). 2018The rationale underlying this rule is that where a party is in possession, he occupies a position of control, and is “normally best able to prevent any harm to others.” Id. quoting Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544, 552 ; 287 NW2d 178 (1980), in turn quoting Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 57 p 351 (emphasis in original). | 3 | 1984–2018 |
Merrow v. Bofferding
green
2 sentences2021However, the statement in the medical record relating what occurred before the plaintiff’s arm went through the window, i.e., he had a fight with his girlfriend, was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and, thus, falls outside the rationale underlying the exception. [Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 630 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998).] Hence, for purposes of diagnosis and treatment it was necessary to know the abuse encountered by the victim, but not necessarily the identity of the perpetrator. 2021However, the statement in the medical record relating what occurred before the plaintiff’s arm went through the window, i.e., he had a fight with his girlfriend, was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and, thus, falls outside the rationale underlying the exception. [Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 630 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998).] Hence, for purposes of diagnosis and treatment it was necessary to know the abuse encountered by the victim, but not necessarily the identity of the perpetrator. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. DePlanche
green
2 sentences2020Defendant relies on Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 630 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998), where the Supreme Court generally reaffirmed the validity of the hearsay exception for medical records, but held that “the statement in the medical record” that the plaintiff “had a fight with his girlfriend” before suffering the injury for which he sought treatment “was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and, thus, falls outside the rationale underlying the exception.” Similarly, this Court in People v DePlanche, 183 Mich App 685, 690 ; 455 NW2d 395 (1990), held that “the identity of an assaila 2020Defendant relies on Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 630 ; 581 NW2d 696 (1998), where the Supreme Court generally reaffirmed the validity of the hearsay exception for medical records, but held that “the statement in the medical record” that the plaintiff “had a fight with his girlfriend” before suffering the injury for which he sought treatment “was not reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment and, thus, falls outside the rationale underlying the exception.” Similarly, this Court in People v DePlanche, 183 Mich App 685, 690 ; 455 NW2d 395 (1990), held that “the identity of an assaila | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Henderson
red
1 sentence2016The rationale underlying this rule is that “one cannot submit to coercion to take the life of a third person, but should risk or sacrifice his own life instead.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Further, invitors "are not absolute insurers of the safety of their invitees." Bertrand, supra at 614 , 537 N.W.2d 185 . 2005Further, invitors “are not absolute insurers of the safety of their invitees.” Bertrand, supra at 614 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. Peninsular Car Works
green
2 sentences1992See Nezworski v Mazanec, 301 Mich 43, 56 ; 2 NW2d 912 (1942); Smith v Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich 501, 504 ; 27 NW 662 (1886). 1992See Nezworski v Mazanec, 301 Mich 43, 56 ; 2 NW2d 912 (1942); Smith v Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich 501, 504 ; 27 NW 662 (1886). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hackley v. Hackley
green
1 sentence1988As pointed out by our Supreme Court, there is a strong public policy behind the finality of divorce judgments and paternity determinations: There is no more forceful example of the rationale underlying the requirement of finality of judgments than the chaos and humiliation which would follow from allowing former husbands to challenge, long after a final judgment has been entered, the legitimacy of children born during their marriages. [Hackley, supra, p 599 .] The defendant did not raise the issue of paternity during the divorce proceedings and cannot raise it now more than one year after the | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Williams v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1986Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should be the same wherever the question arises. [Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 230 ; 65 S Ct 1092 ; 89 L Ed 1577 (1945).] There is no more forceful example of the rationale underlying the requirement of finality of judgments than the chaos and humiliation which would follow from allowing former husbands to challenge, long after a final judgment has been entered, the legitimacy of children born during their marriages. 1986Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should be the same wherever the question arises. [Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 230 ; 65 S Ct 1092 ; 89 L Ed 1577 (1945).] There is no more forceful example of the rationale underlying the requirement of finality of judgments than the chaos and humiliation which would follow from allowing former husbands to challenge, long after a final judgment has been entered, the legitimacy of children born during their marriages. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.