rationale underlying rule in Texas

2015“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the Allen - 5 parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (stating that for controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that actually will be resolved by the judicial relief sought); Dow Chem.

2015“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.1994) (orig. proceeding) (stating that for controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that actually will be resolved by the judicial relief sought); Dow Chem.

2015“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the Allen - 5 parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (stating that for controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that actually will be resolved by the judicial relief sought); Dow Chem.

2015“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding); see also State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.1994) (orig. proceeding) (stating that for controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that actually will be resolved by the judicial relief sought); Dow Chem.

2006The rationale underlying the rule that the cause of action for temporary damages accrues at the time the damages occur is that "[a] cause of action for damaging land does not lie for anticipated future damages that have not yet occurred." Allen v. City of Tex. City , 775 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); see Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co. , 821 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

2004The rationale underlying the rule that the cause of action for temporary damages accrues at the time the damages occur is that “[a] cause of action for damaging land does not lie for anticipated future damages that have not yet occurred.” Allen v. City of Tex. City, 775 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); see Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 821 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

2006The rationale underlying the rule that the cause of action for temporary damages accrues at the time the damages occur is that "[a] cause of action for damaging land does not lie for anticipated future damages that have not yet occurred." Allen v. City of Tex. City , 775 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); see Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co. , 821 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

2004The rationale underlying the rule that the cause of action for temporary damages accrues at the time the damages occur is that “[a] cause of action for damaging land does not lie for anticipated future damages that have not yet occurred.” Allen v. City of Tex. City, 775 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); see Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 821 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

2008See Boykin , 818 S.W.2d at 785 .

2008See Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785 .

2012See Gupta v. East Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981); Thomas, 2 S.W.3d at 738 .5 However, the rationale underlying this exception is not applicable when the alleged retaliation occurred before the filing of the EEOC charge, Eberle v. Gonzales, 240 Fed.

2012See Gupta v. East Tex. State Univ. , 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981); Thomas , 2 S.W.3d at 738 . (5) However, the rationale underlying this exception is not applicable when the alleged retaliation occurred before the filing of the EEOC charge, Eberle v. Gonzales , 240 Fed.

2008Gohring v. State, supra, at 461; Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676, 683-84 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1998, pet. ref'd); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188-89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d); Puderbaugh v. State, supra, at 685; Wilder v. State, supra, at 256-57; Ho rner v. State, supra, at 219; Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 82-83 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.). .

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child’s out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.—Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was “reasonably pertinent” to diagnosis or treatment). 68 That is, first, whether the declarant’s motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the r

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child’s out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.—Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was “reasonably pertinent” to diagnosis or treatment). 68 That is, first, whether the declarant’s motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the r

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2008Gohring v. State, supra, at 461; Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676, 683-84 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1998, pet. ref'd); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188-89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d); Puderbaugh v. State, supra, at 685; Wilder v. State, supra, at 256-57; Ho rner v. State, supra, at 219; Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 82-83 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.). .

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child’s out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex. App.—Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was “reasonably pertinent” to diagnosis or treatment). 68 That is, first, whether the declarant’s motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the r

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2008Gohring v. State, supra, at 461; Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676, 683-84 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1998, pet. ref'd); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188-89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d); Puderbaugh v. State, supra, at 685; Wilder v. State, supra, at 256-57; Ho rner v. State, supra, at 219; Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 82-83 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.). .

2008See also Mendoza v. State, 69 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ( citing, inter alia, Tissier, supra, in support of holding that child's out-of-court statement to nurse identifying defendant as her abuser was admissible under Rule 803(4); Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306, 308-09 (Tex.App.-Waco, no pet.) (citing Tissier to hold that statement of fourteen-year-old identifying the defendant as her abuser was "reasonably pertinent" to diagnosis or treatment). [68] That is, first, whether the declarant's motive in making the out-of-court statement was consistent with the

2007See Langlet, 283 N.W.2d at 333 . 4 In consideration of the fact that the blood sample was destroyed long before Vasquez’s request for independent testing, the trial court cannot be faulted for finding an absence of bad faith in the instant case.

2007See Langlet, 283 N.W.2d at 333 . [4] In consideration of the fact that the blood sample was destroyed long before Vasquez's request for independent testing, the trial court cannot be faulted for finding an absence of bad faith in the instant case.

2005The rationale underlying the requirement that heirs bringing suit in their own name to recover estate property allege and prove that there is no administration upon the estate and none is necessary was explained in Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732, 749 (1866).

2005The rationale underlying the requirement that heirs bringing suit in their own name to recover estate property allege and prove that there is no administration upon the estate and none is necessary was explained in Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 732, 749 (1866).

2008E.g., Gohring v. State, supra, at 462-63 (even assuming that investigating Child Protective Services social worker was engaged in diagnosis or treatment of declarant (a dubious proposition in the court's view), "it would not be reasonable" in that context "to assume the child would be aware" of it unless explicitly told so); Powell v. State, 88 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.) (3-year-old child was too young to justify "the presumption of reliability that forms the basis for the Rule 803(4) exception" because he could not possibly comprehend "the need to be truthful" even in th

2008E.g., Gohring v. State, supra, at 462-63 (even assuming that investigating Child Protective Services social worker was engaged in diagnosis or treatment of declarant (a dubious proposition in the court's view), "it would not be reasonable" in that context "to assume the child would be aware" of it unless explicitly told so); Powell v. State, 88 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.) (3-year-old child was too young to justify "the presumption of reliability that forms the basis for the Rule 803(4) exception" because he could not possibly comprehend "the need to be truthful" even in th

2017In re Hunter, 827 N.E.2d 269, 274 (N.Y. 2005).

2015The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the expert-report requirement is to “identify frivolous claims and reduce the expense and time to dispose of any that are filed.” Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Tex.2012).

2015The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the expert-report requirement is to “identify frivolous claims and reduce the expense and time to dispose of any 12 that are filed.” Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Tex. 2012).

2015Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex. Crim.

2015In McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex.2013), the Court reaffirmed a long established rule that “[ajgreements to enter into future contracts are enforceable if they contain all material terms.” The Court explained the rationale underlying this rule, noting that while “agreements to enter into future contracts are often unenforceable ... [because] courts have no way to determine what terms would have been agreed to after negotiation^] ... [t]his concern is not present when the agreement to enter into a- future contract already contains all the material terms of the fut

2015In McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex.2013), the Court reaffirmed a long established rule that “[ajgreements to enter into future contracts are enforceable if they contain all material terms.” The Court explained the rationale underlying this rule, noting that while “agreements to enter into future contracts are often unenforceable ... [because] courts have no way to determine what terms would have been agreed to after negotiation^] ... [t]his concern is not present when the agreement to enter into a- future contract already contains all the material terms of the fut

2012See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 15.50; Frankiewicz, 633 S.W.2d at 507 (rejecting argument that a noncompetition agreement lacking reasonable limitations is nevertheless enforceable because the employee “was free to compete as long as he was willing to forego” the post-employment benefits).

2011Pipeline Corp., 916 F.Supp. 187, 190-91 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (same), aff'd, 111 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.1997) (unpublished table decision); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 744 , 125 P.2d 548, 552 (1942) (refusing to look at an excised provision because the contract, considered without reference to that provision, was unambiguous); Kennon v. Shepard, 236 Mass. 57 , 127 N.E. 426, 427 (1920) (''[W]ords eliminated from the contract before its execution cannot be restored; and they cannot be used in its construction."); Gateway Frontier Props., Inc., 974 S.W.2d at 570 ("The rationale

2011Pipeline Corp., 916 F.Supp. 187, 190-91 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (same), aff'd, 111 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.1997) (unpublished table decision); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 744 , 125 P.2d 548, 552 (1942) (refusing to look at an excised provision because the contract, considered without reference to that provision, was unambiguous); Kennon v. Shepard, 236 Mass. 57 , 127 N.E. 426, 427 (1920) (''[W]ords eliminated from the contract before its execution cannot be restored; and they cannot be used in its construction."); Gateway Frontier Props., Inc., 974 S.W.2d at 570 ("The rationale