rationale underlying rule in Georgia

2000Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988 (4th Cir.1987); (2) to require a patient to bring suit against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result, Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285 , 801 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1990); and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice, Cooper v. Kaplan, 78 N.Y.2d 1103 , 578 N.Y.S.2d 124 , 585 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1991).

2000Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988 (4th Cir.1987); (2) to require a patient to bring suit against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result, Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285 , 801 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1990); and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice, Cooper v. Kaplan, 78 N.Y.2d 1103 , 578 N.Y.S.2d 124 , 585 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1991).

2000Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988 (4th Cir.1987); (2) to require a patient to bring suit against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result, Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285 , 801 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1990); and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice, Cooper v. Kaplan, 78 N.Y.2d 1103 , 578 N.Y.S.2d 124 , 585 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1991).

2000Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988 (4th Cir.1987); (2) to require a patient to bring suit against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result, Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285 , 801 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1990); and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice, Cooper v. Kaplan, 78 N.Y.2d 1103 , 578 N.Y.S.2d 124 , 585 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1991).

2004“The rationale underlying the requirement that the objection be sufficiently specific is to insure that the trial judge is afforded an opportunity to correct any error in the instructions prior to verdict so that the necessity of an appeal will be obviated.” (Citations omitted.) Hilliard v. Canton Wholesale Co., 151 Ga. App. 184, 186 (3) ( 259 SE2d 182 ) (1979).

2004“The rationale underlying the requirement that the objection be sufficiently specific is to insure that the trial judge is afforded an opportunity to correct any error in the instructions prior to verdict so that the necessity of an appeal will be obviated.” (Citations omitted.) Hilliard v. Canton Wholesale Co., 151 Ga. App. 184, 186 (3) ( 259 SE2d 182 ) (1979).

2024According 1 See Kapherr v. MFG Chemical, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 112, 112 ( 625 SE2d 513 ) (2005). 5 to Shedeke, because the situation at Garrett’s house was not an emergency, his status was that of an invitee.

2024According 1 See Kapherr v. MFG Chemical, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 112, 112 ( 625 SE2d 513 ) (2005). 5 to Shedeke, because the situation at Garrett’s house was not an emergency, his status was that of an invitee.

2024See Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 190-191 (6) ( 710 SE2d 130 ) (2011) (holding that in a case arising out of petitions for modification of child support and child custody, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an award of attorney fees while the mother’s application for discretionary appeal was pending).The rationale underlying this rule is that a post-judgment order of attorney fees does not represent an amendment of the 2 The amended final judgment was entered on July 6, 2023.

2024See Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 190-191 (6) ( 710 SE2d 130 ) (2011) (holding that in a case arising out of petitions for modification of child support and child custody, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an award of attorney fees while the mother’s application for discretionary appeal was pending).The rationale underlying this rule is that a post-judgment order of attorney fees does not represent an amendment of the 2 The amended final judgment was entered on July 6, 2023.

2011But cf. OCGA § 5-5-24 (a) (requiring an objection “before the jury returns its verdict”), (c) (mandating review in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the lack of proper objection); Whitehead, supra at 245-249 (2) (examining the rationale underlying the requirement to reiterate an objection in order to preserve an issue for appellate review). 13 See Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213, 214 (2) ( 563 SE2d 863 ) (2002) (“A trial court has a duty to charge the jury on the law applicable to issues which are supported by the evidence.

2011But cf. OCGA § 5-5-24 (a) (requiring an objection “before the jury returns its verdict”), (c) (mandating review in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the lack of proper objection); Whitehead, supra at 245-249 (2) (examining the rationale underlying the requirement to reiterate an objection in order to preserve an issue for appellate review). 13 See Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213, 214 (2) ( 563 SE2d 863 ) (2002) (“A trial court has a duty to charge the jury on the law applicable to issues which are supported by the evidence.

2011But cf. OCGA § 5-5-24 (a) (requiring an objection “before the jury returns its verdict”), (c) (mandating review in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the lack of proper objection); Whitehead, supra at 245-249 (2) (examining the rationale underlying the requirement to reiterate an objection in order to preserve an issue for appellate review). 13 See Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213, 214 (2) ( 563 SE2d 863 ) (2002) (“A trial court has a duty to charge the jury on the law applicable to issues which are supported by the evidence.

2000Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988 (4th Cir.1987); (2) to require a patient to bring suit against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result, Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285 , 801 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1990); and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice, Cooper v. Kaplan, 78 N.Y.2d 1103 , 578 N.Y.S.2d 124 , 585 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1991).

1999(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Advanced Drainage Systems v. Lowman, 210 Ga. App. 731, 733-734 (2) ( 437 SE2d 604 ) (1993).

1999(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Advanced Drainage Systems v. Lowman, 210 Ga. App. 731, 733-734 (2) ( 437 SE2d 604 ) (1993).

1993Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, 251 Ga. 383, 387 ( 306 SE2d 253 ) (1983).

1993Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, 251 Ga. 383, 387 ( 306 SE2d 253 ) (1983).

1983See Enelow, supra at 382-83 .

1979Fertilizer Co., 132 Ga. 529, 535 ( 64 SE 650 ): "The profits of a commercial business are dependent on so many hazards and chances, that unless the anticipated profits are capable of ascertainment, and the loss of them traceable directly to the defendant’s wrongful act, they are too *11 speculative to afford a basis for the computation of damages.” Succinctly stated, "[a]n allowance for damages cannot be based on guesswork. [Cits.]” Tendrift Realty Co. v. Hayes, 140 Ga. App. 896 ( 232 SE2d 169 ).

1979Fertilizer Co., 132 Ga. 529, 535 ( 64 SE 650 ): "The profits of a commercial business are dependent on so many hazards and chances, that unless the anticipated profits are capable of ascertainment, and the loss of them traceable directly to the defendant’s wrongful act, they are too *11 speculative to afford a basis for the computation of damages.” Succinctly stated, "[a]n allowance for damages cannot be based on guesswork. [Cits.]” Tendrift Realty Co. v. Hayes, 140 Ga. App. 896 ( 232 SE2d 169 ).

1978Held: Code Ann. § 3-808 provides: "If a plaintiff shall discontinue or dismiss his case, and shall recommence within six months, such renewed case shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original case...” However, in Cutliffe v. Pryse, 187 Ga. 51, 53-54 ( 200 SE 124 ), it was stated that Code Ann. § 3-808 ". . .does not apply to void suits. [Cits.] It will apply to suits that are voidable — not wholly void. [Cits.] The first-mentioned class (suits that are void) includes suits where the petition has been filed but not served upon the defendant. [Cits.]” The rationale unde

1978Held: Code Ann. § 3-808 provides: "If a plaintiff shall discontinue or dismiss his case, and shall recommence within six months, such renewed case shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original case...” However, in Cutliffe v. Pryse, 187 Ga. 51, 53-54 ( 200 SE 124 ), it was stated that Code Ann. § 3-808 ". . .does not apply to void suits. [Cits.] It will apply to suits that are voidable — not wholly void. [Cits.] The first-mentioned class (suits that are void) includes suits where the petition has been filed but not served upon the defendant. [Cits.]” The rationale unde

1978Cooperative, 219 Ga. 1, 4 ( 131 SE2d 541 ), where it was stated that, as to Code Ann. § 3-808: ". . .the mere filing of the petition will not of itself operate to toll the statute of limitation.

1978Cooperative, 219 Ga. 1, 4 ( 131 SE2d 541 ), where it was stated that, as to Code Ann. § 3-808: ". . .the mere filing of the petition will not of itself operate to toll the statute of limitation.