rationale underlying rule in California

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

1974(See People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ]; People v. Griffin, 250 Cal.App.2d 545, 550-551 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 707 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is ‘more than a mere informer.

1974(See People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ]; People v. Griffin, 250 Cal.App.2d 545, 550-551 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 707 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is ‘more than a mere informer.

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

1974(See People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ]; People v. Griffin, 250 Cal.App.2d 545, 550-551 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 707 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is ‘more than a mere informer.

1974(See People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ]; People v. Griffin, 250 Cal.App.2d 545, 550-551 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 707 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is ‘more than a mere informer.

2023(Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757 (Gwartz).) ‘The rationale underlying the doctrine is that a party to an action cannot seek the aid and assistance of an appellate court while standing in an attitude of contempt to the legal orders and processes of the courts of this state. [Citation.] No formal judgment of contempt is required under the doctrine of disentitlement. [Citation.] An appellate court may dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics.’ (Id. at pp. 757–758, fn. omitted.) “In re Marriage of Hof

2023(Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757 .) “An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a party that refuses to comply with a lower court order. [Citation.] This doctrine of disentitlement is not jurisdictional, but is a discretionary tool that may be used to dismiss an appeal when the balance of the equitable concerns makes dismissal an appropriate sanction. [Citation.] The rationale underlying the doctrine is that a party to an action cannot seek the aid and assistance of an appellate court while standing in an attitude of contempt to the legal orders and pro

2023(See People v. Fuentes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 956, 961-962 [declarant asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavailable].) Rather, he contends that Daniel’s statements implicating Elias are not against Daniel’s penal interests.

2022(See People v. Fuentes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 956, 961-962 [declarant asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavailable].) Rather, he contends that Daniel’s statements implicating Elias are not against Daniel’s penal interests.

1979As stated in People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ], certiorari denied 392 U.S. 930 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1388 , 88 S.Ct. 2276 ], “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1979As stated in People v. Thompson (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 85 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 203 ], certiorari denied 392 U.S. 930 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1388 , 88 S.Ct. 2276 ], “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

2015(People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327 (Tobias).) As the court stated, “‘It has long been settled that where a penal statute expressly outlaws conduct against minors, a minor who is a victim of the proscribed conduct is not an accomplice. . . . ’” The court explained, “The rationale underlying this rule is that prosecution of the minor for cooperating with the defendant would be inconsistent with the purpose of the law, which is to protect the minor. . . . [T]he minor, even if a willing participant in the defendant’s conduct, is a victim. . . . ” (Id. at p. 334, italics added.) “[T]he law. .

2015(People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327 (Tobias).) As the court stated, “‘It has long been settled that where a penal statute expressly outlaws conduct against minors, a minor who is a victim of the proscribed conduct is not an accomplice. . . . ’” The court explained, “The rationale underlying this rule is that prosecution of the minor for cooperating with the defendant would be inconsistent with the purpose of the law, which is to protect the minor. . . . [T]he minor, even if a willing participant in the defendant’s conduct, is a victim. . . . ” (Id. at p. 334, italics added.) “[T]he law. .

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2024(See Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 [challenge to order deemed abandoned for failure to address in opening brief].) 6 the appealing party has refused to comply with the orders of the trial court.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265 .) The doctrine “ ‘is a discretionary tool that may be used . . . when the balance of the equitable concerns makes dismissal an appropriate sanction. [Citation.] The rationale underlying the doctrine is that a party to an action cannot seek the aid and assistance of an appellate court whi

2023An appellate court may dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics.” (Id. at pp. 757-758, fn. omitted.) “The disentitlement doctrine ‘is particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order (or orders) the party has disobeyed.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the merits of the appeal are irrelevant to the application of the doctrine.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265 (Ironridge).) In Ironridge, the defendant corporation appealed an ex parte order requir

1973Thus, in People v. Gardner, 252 Cal. App.2d 320, 324-325 [7] [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 321 ], it was said: "In dealing with the problem of informants whose information may or may not be sufficient to create probable cause, it should be noted that a citizen who purports to be the victim of or to have witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even though his reliability has not theretofore been proven or tested. [Citations.] The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is `more than a mere informer.

1973Thus, in People v. Gardner, 252 Cal.App.2d 320, 324-325 [7] [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 321 ], it was said: “In dealing with the problem of informants whose information may or may not be sufficient to create probable cause, it should be noted that a citizen who purports to be the victim of or to have witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even though his reliability has not theretofore been proven or tested. [Citations.] The rationale underlying this principle is that such person is ‘more than a mere informer.

2015It is well settled that “a school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’ [Citations.]” ( C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 869-870.) Because of this special relationship, a school district has obligations to its pupils “beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714.”4 (Id. at p. 870.) As relevant he

2015It is well settled that “a school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’ [Citations.]” ( C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 869-870.) Because of this special relationship, a school district has obligations to its pupils “beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714.”4 (Id. at p. 870.) As relevant he

1964(Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 385 [ 267 P.2d 257 ]; Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal.App.2d 367, 383 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Dolinar v. Pedone, 63 Cal.App.2d 169 [ 146 P.2d 237 ]; Nungaray v. Pleasant Valley etc. Assn., 142 Cal.App.2d 653, 667 [ 300 P.2d 285 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that the allegations of fact in a pleading are presumed to be those of the party, and are therefore accepted as admissions, subject to the right of the party to controvert them by showing that they were not authorized by him or were made inadvertently or unde

1964(Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 385 [ 267 P.2d 257 ]; Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal.App.2d 367, 383 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Dolinar v. Pedone, 63 Cal.App.2d 169 [ 146 P.2d 237 ]; Nungaray v. Pleasant Valley etc. Assn., 142 Cal.App.2d 653, 667 [ 300 P.2d 285 ].) The rationale underlying this principle is that the allegations of fact in a pleading are presumed to be those of the party, and are therefore accepted as admissions, subject to the right of the party to controvert them by showing that they were not authorized by him or were made inadvertently or unde

1991(See People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ] and cases there cited.)” (People v. Jones (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 597, 605 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 28 ].) Unfairness because of lack of notice may often be cured in the trial court by granting the defendant a continuance of the trial to allow a defendant fair opportunity to meet the new evidence.

1991(See People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ] and cases there cited.)” (People v. Jones (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 597, 605 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 28 ].) Unfairness because of lack of notice may often be cured in the trial court by granting the defendant a continuance of the trial to allow a defendant fair opportunity to meet the new evidence.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1978(People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 100 ]; People v. Denne, 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507-510 [ 297 P.2d 451 ]; People v. Quilon, 245 Cal.App.2d 624, 626 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) “The rationale underlying this principle is that a parolee is at all times in custodia legis.

1965(Young v. Blakeman, supra, at p. 482 ; Martin v. Lopes, supra, at pp. 623-624 ; Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 708-709.) In Clapp v. Churchill (1913) 164 Cal. 741, 745 [ 130 P. 1061 ], the rationale underlying this doctrine is stated thusly: “ [T]he doctrine of an agreed boundary line and its binding effects upon the conterminous owners rests fundamentally upon the fact that there is, or is believed by all parties to be, an uncertainty as to the location of the true line.

1965(Young v. Blakeman, supra, at p. 482 ; Martin v. Lopes, supra, at pp. 623-624 ; Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 708-709.) In Clapp v. Churchill (1913) 164 Cal. 741, 745 [ 130 P. 1061 ], the rationale underlying this doctrine is stated thusly: “ [T]he doctrine of an agreed boundary line and its binding effects upon the conterminous owners rests fundamentally upon the fact that there is, or is believed by all parties to be, an uncertainty as to the location of the true line.

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2025One exception allows the admission of any statement that “when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 22 PEOPLE v. JASSO Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) We have explained that, “[a]s applied to

2022Code, § 1230.) As applied to statements against the declarant’s penal interest, in particular, the rationale underlying the exception is that ‘a person’s interest against being criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers usually associated with the admission of out-of-court statements. [Citation.] “To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is admissible as a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was a

2022Code, § 1230.) As applied to statements against the declarant’s penal interest, in particular, the rationale underlying the exception is that ‘a person’s interest against being criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers usually associated with the admission of out-of-court statements. [Citation.] “To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is admissible as a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was a

2014(Dolinar v. Pedone (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 169, 176 .) “The rationale underlying this principle is that the allegations of fact in a pleading are presumed to be those of the party, and are therefore accepted as admissions, subject to the right of the party to controvert them by showing that they were not authorized by him 6 or were made inadvertently or under a mistake of fact. [Citations.]” (Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 707 .) And, because the person against whom the pleading is offered may “explain the admission and thereby, in effec

2010(Jogani, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) For this reason, “ ‘judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.’ ” (Id. at p. 175.) “It is ... a well-established principle in California that a pleading in a prior civil proceeding may be offered as evidence or for the purpose of impeachment in a subsequent proceeding. [Citations.] The rationale underlying this principle is that the allegations of fact in a pleading are presumed to be th