rationale underlying rule in Iowa

2023See State v. Perry, No. 15-1949, 2017 WL 936092, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017). 9 From the outset of his argument, LuCore agrees “[t]he issue of ‘inconsistent verdicts’ was not explicitly raised in the district court” but notes caselaw does not “address what is minimally required to preserve error on this issue.” Because this was a bench trial, LuCore relies on the rationale underlying the exception to the error preservation requirement for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and argues “error need not be preserved on a claim of inconsistent verdicts because in a bench trial the

2023See State v. Perry, No. 15-1949, 2017 WL 936092, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017). 9 From the outset of his argument, LuCore agrees “[t]he issue of ‘inconsistent verdicts’ was not explicitly raised in the district court” but notes caselaw does not “address what is minimally required to preserve error on this issue.” Because this was a bench trial, LuCore relies on the rationale underlying the exception to the error preservation requirement for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and argues “error need not be preserved on a claim of inconsistent verdicts because in a bench trial the

2023See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590 , 600 (Iowa 2021) (stating the rationale underlying the exception for present sense impressions “is that the declarant has no opportunity to fabricate a statement if the statement is made during or ‘immediately’ after the event” (quoting Fratzke v. Meyer, 398 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986)).

2020See Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567 , 573–75 (Iowa 2006) (enumerating the rationale underlying the doctrine of judicial estoppel); United Fire & Cas.

2015Wailes v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 861 N.W.2d 262, 266-67 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). 21 The rationale underlying the doctrine is that the party responsible for maintaining the premises at issue should have a reasonable period of time following the cessation of the weather event to ameliorate the hazards caused by the weather event because any prior action would be impractical or ineffective.

2001See State v. Jackson, 397 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Iowa 1986).

1999This policy was explained in our Stalter case, in which we discussed “[t]he rationale underlying the general rule that one who has transferred ownership and control is no longer held liable.” Stalter by Stalter v. Iowa Resources, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Iowa 1991). 5 In that case we stated that the rationale underlying the rule “is that the former owner [or lessor] no longer has control and thus may not enter the property to cure any deficiency, and, he/she cannot control the entry of persons onto the property to provide safeguards for them.” Id.

1999This policy was explained in our Stalter case, in which we discussed “[t]he rationale underlying the general rule that one who has transferred ownership and control is no longer held liable.” Stalter by Stalter v. Iowa Resources, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Iowa 1991). 5 In that case we stated that the rationale underlying the rule “is that the former owner [or lessor] no longer has control and thus may not enter the property to cure any deficiency, and, he/she cannot control the entry of persons onto the property to provide safeguards for them.” Id.

1995Id. (quoting City of Corning v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 225 Iowa 1380, 1389 , 282 N.W. 791, 796 (1938).

1995Id. (quoting City of Corning v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 225 Iowa 1380, 1389 , 282 N.W. 791, 796 (1938).

1992See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988) (distinguishing state’s failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence from failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, Court held “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”).

1992See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988) (distinguishing state’s failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence from failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, Court held “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”).

1989Id. at 828 citing In re Marriage of Woodward, 229 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Iowa 1975).

1988In so doing we criticized the rationale underlying the test enunciated in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 691-92 , 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978), and cited in M-Z Enterprises and Higgins : We are not nearly as persuaded as the Wisconsin court in Anderson that the rationale which recognizes an ancillary duty of a liability insurer to exercise good faith in the settlement of third party claims is equally applicable and of equal importance when an insured seeks payment of a claim for a property loss from his own casualty insurer.

1988In so doing we criticized the rationale underlying the test enunciated in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 691-92 , 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978), and cited in M-Z Enterprises and Higgins : We are not nearly as persuaded as the Wisconsin court in Anderson that the rationale which recognizes an ancillary duty of a liability insurer to exercise good faith in the settlement of third party claims is equally applicable and of equal importance when an insured seeks payment of a claim for a property loss from his own casualty insurer.