rationale underlying rule in Washington

2015More recently, in Pacific Northwest Conference of the Free Methodist Church of North America v. Barlow, 77 Wn.2d 487, 492 , 463 P.2d 626 (1969), we noted the rationale underlying the rule that exemptions are not to be extended by judicial construction to property other than that which is expressly designated by law.” ¶24 Former RCW 82.45.010(3)(i) exempts from the real estate excise tax “[a]ny transfer or conveyance made pursuant to a deed of trust or an order of sale by the court in any mortgage, deed of trust, or lien foreclosure proceeding or upon execution of a judgment, or deed in lieu of

2015More recently, in Pacific Northwest Conference of the Free Methodist Church of North America v. Barlow, 77 Wn.2d 487, 492 , 463 P.2d 626 (1969), we noted the rationale underlying the rule that exemptions are not to be extended by judicial construction to property other than that which is expressly designated by law.” ¶24 Former RCW 82.45.010(3)(i) exempts from the real estate excise tax “[a]ny transfer or conveyance made pursuant to a deed of trust or an order of sale by the court in any mortgage, deed of trust, or lien foreclosure proceeding or upon execution of a judgment, or deed in lieu of

2016United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 , 104 S. Ct. 1652 , 80 L.

2016United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 , 104 S. Ct. 1652 , 80 L.

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015More recently, in Pacific Northwest Conference of the Free Methodist Church of North America v. Barlow, 77 Wn.2d 487, 492 , 463 P.2d 626 (1969), we noted the rationale underlying the rule that exemptions are not to be extended by judicial construction to property other than that which is expressly designated by law.” ¶24 Former RCW 82.45.010(3)(i) exempts from the real estate excise tax “[a]ny transfer or conveyance made pursuant to a deed of trust or an order of sale by the court in any mortgage, deed of trust, or lien foreclosure proceeding or upon execution of a judgment, or deed in lieu of

2015More recently, in Pacific Northwest Conference of the Free Methodist Church of North America v. Barlow, 77 Wn.2d 487, 492 , 463 P.2d 626 (1969), we noted the rationale underlying the rule that exemptions are not to be extended by judicial construction to property other than that which is expressly designated by law.” ¶24 Former RCW 82.45.010(3)(i) exempts from the real estate excise tax “[a]ny transfer or conveyance made pursuant to a deed of trust or an order of sale by the court in any mortgage, deed of trust, or lien foreclosure proceeding or upon execution of a judgment, or deed in lieu of

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2012We recently adjusted our article I, section 7 analysis for a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest of a recent occupant to bring the exception into conformance with the rationale underlying the exception, just as the United States Supreme Court did in Gant with regard to the Fourth Amendment. [6] ¶ 25 In the Fourth Amendment context, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), had been "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle

2012We recently adjusted our article I, section 7 analysis for a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest of a recent occupant to bring the exception into conformance with the rationale underlying the exception, just as the United States Supreme Court did in Gant with regard to the Fourth Amendment. [6] ¶ 25 In the Fourth Amendment context, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), had been "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle

2012Ed. 2d 768 (1981), had been “widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 341 .

2012We recently adjusted our article I, section 7 analysis for a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest of a recent occupant to bring the exception into conformance with the rationale underlying the exception, just as the United States Supreme Court did in Gant with regard to the Fourth Amendment. [6] ¶ 25 In the Fourth Amendment context, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), had been "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle

1992The rationale underlying this exception was succinctly stated by the court in Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1, 14 , 448 P.2d 490 (1968): The necessity for unhindered communication between attorney and client is outweighed, not so much by society's interest in having the truth disclosed as to crimes already completed, but rather by society's interest in protecting the present and future victims of the client.

1992The rationale underlying this exception was succinctly stated by the court in Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1, 14 , 448 P.2d 490 (1968): The necessity for unhindered communication between attorney and client is outweighed, not so much by society's interest in having the truth disclosed as to crimes already completed, but rather by society's interest in protecting the present and future victims of the client.

1985Hamilton, 77 Wn.2d at 360 .

1980See generally Moses Lake School Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wn.2d 551, 556 , 503 P.2d 86 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 934 , 37 L.Ed.2d 393 , 93 S.Ct. 2776 (1973); Union High School Dist. 1 v. Taxpayers, 26 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 172 P.2d 591 (1946).

1980See generally Moses Lake School Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wn.2d 551, 556 , 503 P.2d 86 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 934 , 37 L.Ed.2d 393 , 93 S.Ct. 2776 (1973); Union High School Dist. 1 v. Taxpayers, 26 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 172 P.2d 591 (1946).

1971App. 853, 856 , 479 P.2d 91 (1970), and cases cited therein; in particular, Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wn.2d 792 , 329 P.2d 184 (1958), which thoroughly discusses the rationale underlying rule 401.

1971App. 853, 856 , 479 P.2d 91 (1970), and cases cited therein; in particular, Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wn.2d 792 , 329 P.2d 184 (1958), which thoroughly discusses the rationale underlying rule 401.

1971App. 853, 856 , 479 P.2d 91 (1970), and cases cited therein; in particular, Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wn.2d 792 , 329 P.2d 184 (1958), which thoroughly discusses the rationale underlying rule 401.