rationale underlying rule in New York

2025"The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again." ( In re Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Myers v Meyers , 121 AD3d 762, 764-65 [2nd Dept. 2014]).

2025"The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again." ( In re Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Myers v Meyers , 121 AD3d 762, 764-65 [2nd Dept. 2014]).

2024(In re Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005] citing O'Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179, 184-185 [2003]; and Gramatan Home Invs. corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485 [1979]).

2024(In re Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005] citing O'Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179, 184-185 [2003]; and Gramatan Home Invs. corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485 [1979]).

2024(In re Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005] citing O'Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179, 184-185 [2003]; and Gramatan Home Invs. corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485 [1979]).

2005The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again (see O’Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179, 184-185 [2003]; Gramatan Home Invs.

2017“The rationale underlying the requirement that a penal statute provide adequate notice is the notion that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed” (Bright, 71 NY2d at 382 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2017"The rationale underlying the requirement that a penal statute provide adequate notice is the notion that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed" ( Bright , 71 NY2d at 382 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2025"The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again." ( In re Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Myers v Meyers , 121 AD3d 762, 764-65 [2nd Dept. 2014]).

2025"The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again." ( In re Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Myers v Meyers , 121 AD3d 762, 764-65 [2nd Dept. 2014]).

2024"The policy against relitigation of adjudicated disputes is strong enough generally to bar a second action even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts." Reilly v. Reid , 379 N.E.2d 172, 175 (NY 1978) (internal citations omitted With reference to the Minnesota foreclosure action, a "judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which were or might have be

2019New York has adopted a "transactional analysis approach" in deciding res judicata issues, whereby "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981], citing Matter of Reilly v Reid , 45 NY2d 24, 29-30 [1978]; see Jacob Marion, LLC v Jones , 168 AD3d 1043 [2019]; Greaves v Ortiz , 65 AD3d 1085 [2009]).

2020New York has adopted a "transactional analysis approach" [*2] in deciding res judicata issues, whereby "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]; see Jacob Marion, LLC v Jones , 168 AD3d 1043 [2019]; Greaves v Ortiz , 65 AD3d 1085 , 1085-1086 [2009]).

2019New York has adopted a "transactional analysis approach" in deciding res judicata issues, whereby "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( O'Brien v City of Syracuse , 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981], citing Matter of Reilly v Reid , 45 NY2d 24, 29-30 [1978]; see Jacob Marion, LLC v Jones , 168 AD3d 1043 [2019]; Greaves v Ortiz , 65 AD3d 1085 [2009]).

2017The second part of the test requires that a “court . . . determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement” (Matter of State of New York, 96 AD3d at 769 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 420 [2003]) so that its enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.

2017The second part of the test requires that a "court [] determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement" ( Matter of State of New York, 96 AD3d at 769 , quoting People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412, 420 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]) so that its enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.

2013In keeping with this rationale, control of the method and means by which the work is to be done is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of tort liability (see Calandrino v Town of Babylon, 95 AD3d at 1055 ; Wecker v Crossland Group, Inc., 92 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]; Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 AD3d 516, 518-519 [2008]).

2013In keeping with this rationale, control of the method and means by which the work is to be done is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of tort liability (see Calandrino v Town of Babylon, 95 AD3d at 1055 ; Wecker v Crossland Group, Inc., 92 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]; Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 AD3d 516, 518-519 [2008]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013The rationale underlying this rule is that “one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor” (Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d at 274 ; see Brothers v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 11 NY3d at 257-258 ; Chainani v Board of Educ. of City of NY., 87 NY2d at 380-381 ).

2013The rationale underlying this rule is that “one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor” (Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d at 274 ; see Brothers v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 11 NY3d at 257-258 ; Chainani v Board of Educ. of City of NY., 87 NY2d at 380-381 ).

2013In keeping with this rationale, control of the method and means by which the work is to be done is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of tort liability (see Calandrino v Town of Babylon, 95 AD3d at 1055 ; Wecker v Crossland Group, Inc., 92 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]; Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 AD3d 516, 518-519 [2008]).

2013In keeping with this rationale, control of the method and means by which the work is to be done is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of tort liability (see Calandrino v Town of Babylon, 95 AD3d at 1055 ; Wecker v Crossland Group, Inc., 92 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]; Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 AD3d 516, 518-519 [2008]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013The rationale underlying the rule “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Graves v United States, 150 US 118, 121 [1893]; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d at 196 ; People v Hovey, 92 NY 554, 559-560 [1883]).

2013At a criminal trial, a party seeking a missing witness instruction bears the initial burden of “showing that the uncalled wit ness could be expected to have knowledge about a material issue and to testify favorably to the opposing party” (People v Kitching, 78 NY2d 532, 536-537 [1991]).

2013At a criminal trial, a party seeking a missing witness instruction bears the initial burden of “showing that the uncalled wit ness could be expected to have knowledge about a material issue and to testify favorably to the opposing party” (People v Kitching, 78 NY2d 532, 536-537 [1991]).

2026The rationale underlying the rule is that "one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor" (<i>Kleeman v Rheingold</i>, 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; <i>see</i> <i>Begley v City of New York</i>, 111 AD3d 5 , 28 [2d Dept 2013], <i>lv denied </i> 23 NY3d 903 [2014]).

2026The rationale underlying the rule is that "one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor" ( Kleeman v Rheingold , 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; see Begley v City of New York , 111 AD3d 5, 28 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 903 [2014]).

2017The second part of the test requires that a “court . . . determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement” (Matter of State of New York, 96 AD3d at 769 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 420 [2003]) so that its enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.

2017The second part of the test requires that a "court [] determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement" ( Matter of State of New York, 96 AD3d at 769 , quoting People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412, 420 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]) so that its enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.

2026The rationale underlying the rule is that "one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor" (<i>Kleeman v Rheingold</i>, 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; <i>see</i> <i>Begley v City of New York</i>, 111 AD3d 5 , 28 [2d Dept 2013], <i>lv denied </i> 23 NY3d 903 [2014]).

2026The rationale underlying the rule is that "one who employs an independent contractor has no right to control the manner in which the work is to be done and, thus, the risk of loss is more sensibly placed on the contractor" ( Kleeman v Rheingold , 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; see Begley v City of New York , 111 AD3d 5, 28 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 903 [2014]).

2026In keeping with that rationale, "[c]ontrol of the method and means by which the work is to be done . . . is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for the purposes of [vicarious] tort liability" (<i>Gfeller v Russo</i>, 45 AD3d 1301, 1302 [4th Dept 2007]; <i>see Begley</i>, 111 AD3d at 28).

2026In keeping with that rationale, "[c]ontrol of the method and means by which the work is to be done . . . is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for the purposes of [vicarious] tort liability" ( Gfeller v Russo , 45 AD3d 1301, 1302 [4th Dept 2007]; see Begley , 111 AD3d at 28).

2024"The policy against relitigation of adjudicated disputes is strong enough generally to bar a second action even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts." Reilly v. Reid , 379 N.E.2d 172, 175 (NY 1978) (internal citations omitted With reference to the Minnesota foreclosure action, a "judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which were or might have be

2021Moreover, the determination as to whether the owner exercised control is generally a question of fact ( see Harjes v Parisio , 1 AD3d 680, 680-681 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 508 [2004]).

2020The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again" ( Matter of Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; see Matter of Feldman v Planning Bd. of the Town of Rochester , 99 AD3d 1161 , 1162-1163 [2012]; Kinsman v Turetsky , 21 AD3d at 1246-1247 ).

2020Thus, "[r]es judicata will bar litigation of a claim that was either raised, or could have been raised, in a prior [action] provided that the party to be barred had a full and fair opportunity to litigate any cause of action arising out of the same transaction and the prior disposition was a final judgment on the merits" ( Matter of Feldman v Planning Bd. of the Town of Rochester , 99 AD3d at 1162-1163 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Hitchcock v Rourke , 130 AD3d 1111, 1112 [2015]).

2020Thus, "[r]es judicata will bar litigation of a claim that was either raised, or could have been raised, in a prior [action] provided that the party to be barred had a full and fair opportunity to litigate any cause of action arising out of the same transaction and the prior disposition was a final judgment on the merits" ( Matter of Feldman v Planning Bd. of the Town of Rochester , 99 AD3d at 1162-1163 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Hitchcock v Rourke , 130 AD3d 1111, 1112 [2015]).

2016The rationale underlying this rule is that a plaintiff who is a joint venturer is not seeking to acquire an interest in real property, but is asserting an interest in joint venture income and assets ( see Walsh v Rechler , 151 AD2d 473, 473 [2d Dept 1989]).

2016The rationale underlying this rule is that a plaintiff who is a joint venturer is not seeking to acquire an interest in real property, but is asserting an interest in joint venture income and assets ( see Walsh v Rechler , 151 AD2d 473, 473 [2d Dept 1989]).