rationale underlying rule in New Jersey

2010The rationale underlying the rule is that “a statute of limitations in a criminal case, unlike such a statute in civil matters, is not merely a statute of repose but creates a bar to prosecution.” Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F. 2d 133, 135-36 (D.C.Cir.1960), cert. denied and rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 209 , 81 S.Ct 1051 , 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961).

2010The rationale underlying the rule is that “a statute of limitations in a criminal case, unlike such a statute in civil matters, is not merely a statute of repose but creates a bar to prosecution.” Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F. 2d 133, 135-36 (D.C.Cir.1960), cert. denied and rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 209 , 81 S.Ct 1051 , 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961).

2010The rationale underlying the rule is that “a statute of limitations in a criminal case, unlike such a statute in civil matters, is not merely a statute of repose but creates a bar to prosecution.” Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F. 2d 133, 135-36 (D.C.Cir.1960), cert. denied and rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 209 , 81 S.Ct 1051 , 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961).

2010The rationale underlying the rule is that "a statute of limitations in a criminal case, unlike such a statute in civil matters, is not merely a statute of repose but creates a bar to prosecution." Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F. 2d 133, 135-36 (D.C.Cir. 1960), cert. denied and rev'd on other *826 grounds, 366 U.S. 209 , 81 S.Ct. 1051 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 233 (1961).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A.2d 685 ] [ (1977) ]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A.2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A.2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A.2d 316 (1993).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A. 2d 685 ] [(1977)]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A. 2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A. 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A. 2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A. 2d 316 (1993).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A.2d 685 ] [ (1977) ]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A.2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A.2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A.2d 316 (1993).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A.2d 685 ] [ (1977) ]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A.2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A.2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A.2d 316 (1993).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A.2d 685 ] [ (1977) ]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A.2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A.2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A.2d 316 (1993).

2010It is well settled in this State that there is an absolute bar to prosecution after the statute has run, State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. [101,] 107[, 380 A.2d 685 ] [ (1977) ]; see In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 17-18 [, 93 A.2d 176 ] (1952); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (E. & A 1881), and, therefore the statute can be asserted at any time, before or after judgment. [ Stillwell, supra, 175 N.J.Super. at 251 , 418 A.2d 267 .] The Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47 , 618 A.2d 316 (1993).

1998I citations omitted] The rationale underlying this rule was given felicitous, cogent expression by Judge Lario in Galloway Tp. v. Petkevis, 2 N.J.Tax 85 (Tax Ct.1980): The policy of applying strict time limitations to tax matters is based upon the very nature of our administrative tax structure.

1986The rationale underlying this rule was given felicitous, cogent expression by Judge Lario in Galloway Tp. v. Petkevis, 2 N.J.Tax 85 (Tax Ct.1980): The policy of applying strict time limitations to tax matters is based upon the very nature of our administrative tax structure.

1991In State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55 , 402 A. 2d 203 (1979), we set forth the rationale underlying that rule of deference: Decisions concerning the potential bias of prospective jurors are primarily subjective in nature.

1991In State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55 , 402 A. 2d 203 (1979), we set forth the rationale underlying that rule of deference: Decisions concerning the potential bias of prospective jurors are primarily subjective in nature.

2025If the evidence would have been obtained lawfully and properly without the misconduct, exclusion of the evidence would put the prosecution in a worse position than if no illegality had transpired. [Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 237 .] A-1206-24 24 To rely on the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence the following: (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances[,] the pursuit of those procedures would have inevit

2025If the evidence would have been obtained lawfully and properly without the misconduct, exclusion of the evidence would put the prosecution in a worse position than if no illegality had transpired. [Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 237 .] A-1206-24 24 To rely on the inevitable discovery doctrine, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence the following: (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances[,] the pursuit of those procedures would have inevit

1995The court stated: "[t]he general rule is that a child becomes emancipated when he enters the military, at least for the period of his military service." (Citations omitted.) The rationale underlying this rule is that "a minor who joins the armed forces places himself under the control of the government and enters into a new relationship that is inconsistent with the parent's control and support of the child." (Citations omitted) Id. 433 A. 2d at 1282 . *602 The New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically rejected the custodial parent's argument that her son was merely a student at the Air Force A

1995The court stated: "[t]he general rule is that a child becomes emancipated when he enters the military, at least for the period of his military service." (Citations omitted.) The rationale underlying this rule is that "a minor who joins the armed forces places himself under the control of the government and enters into a new relationship that is inconsistent with the parent's control and support of the child." (Citations omitted) Id. 433 A. 2d at 1282 . *602 The New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically rejected the custodial parent's argument that her son was merely a student at the Air Force A

1993The rationale underlying this rule was that it would be "unfair to provide a right or remedy to a party if it was unavailable to his adversary." Ibid.

1990The rationale underlying this requirement, derived from its federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., reflects “[congressional efforts to address this nation’s history of discrimination against racial minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched that we presume acts, otherwise unexplained, embody its effect.” Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club Inc., 770 F.2d at 67 .

1990Id. at 63-64 , 561 A. 2d 638 .

1990Id. at 63-64 , 561 A. 2d 638 .

1978The rationale underlying the rule was set forth in Kerr v. Willetts, supra , as follows: The want of conclusiveness of the judgment is not the reason assigned why a prior suit in a foreign jurisdiction shall not abate another. *14 The true reason is that every country is sovereign and unrestricted in its powers — legislative, judicial and executive — and hence does not acknowledge the right of any other nation to hinder its own sovereign acts and proceedings.