Davis defendant in Illinois

2018Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 43. ¶ 17 In People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102 , ¶ 107, 388 Ill.Dec. 834 , 25 N.E.3d 526 , a defendant contending that the mandatory transfer statute was unconstitutional argued that "the combination of the transfer statute and the applicable sentencing provisions is unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide offenders." In rejecting that contention, the supreme court stated that "both this court and the United States Supreme Court have closely limited the application of the rationale expressed in * * * Miller , invoking it only in the context of the most severe of all criminal

2018Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 43. ¶ 17 In People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102 , ¶ 107, 388 Ill.Dec. 834 , 25 N.E.3d 526 , a defendant contending that the mandatory transfer statute was unconstitutional argued that "the combination of the transfer statute and the applicable sentencing provisions is unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide offenders." In rejecting that contention, the supreme court stated that "both this court and the United States Supreme Court have closely limited the application of the rationale expressed in * * * Miller , invoking it only in the context of the most severe of all criminal

2016Id. at 521 , 369 N.E.2d at 1380 .

2016Id. at 521 , 369 N.E.2d at 1380 .

2015Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29 .

2015Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29 .

2010Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 86 .

2010Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 86 .

2010Contrary to Ms. Davis’s claim that Schiff stands for the proposition that an informed consent plaintiff need not prove that the undisclosed risk materialized, Schiff stands for the simple proposition that once aprima facie case is made out, it falls to the jury, as finders of fact, to assess the “credibility of witnesses and *** [resolve the] conflicting evidence.” Schiff, 331 Ill.

2010Contrary to Ms. Davis's claim that Schiff stands for the proposition that an informed consent 20 No. 1-09-1181 plaintiff need not prove that the undisclosed risk materialized, Schiff stands for the simple proposition that once a prima facie case is made out, it falls to the jury, as finders of fact, to assess the "credibility of witnesses and *** [resolve the] conflicting evidence." Schiff, 331 Ill.

2026Our review of the court’s finding that the State proved detention was necessary is de novo, placing us “in the same position as the circuit court.” Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51 .

2025Our supreme court has also described it as “the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 (citing People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 ).

2025Our supreme court has also described it as “the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 (citing People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 24 ).

2025This implies that the appropriate standard is “sufficiently conclusive to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (4th) 110305, ¶ 64 ; see Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97 (citing Davis approvingly); but see People v. Whalen, 2020 IL App (4th) 190171, ¶ 101 (disagreeing with Davis and observing that, despite citing Davis with approval, Coleman did not adopt the Davis standard).

2025This implies that the appropriate standard is “sufficiently conclusive to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (4th) 110305, ¶ 64 ; see Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97 (citing Davis approvingly); but see People v. Whalen, 2020 IL App (4th) 190171, ¶ 101 (disagreeing with Davis and observing that, despite citing Davis with approval, Coleman did not adopt the Davis standard).

2025This court has rejected the same argument, observing “nothing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentences.” People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 . ¶ 24 The factor barring Davis’s claim is that his petition is successive.

2024Oct. 1, 2020) because its statement of facts contains improper argument, misrepresents facts, and fails to include facts “necessary to an understanding of the case.” Rule 341(h)(6) requires a statement of facts to be presented “accurately and fairly without argument or comment.” Id.

2021Davis simply affirmed the vacation of a mandatory life sentence ( 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43 ), and the eventual reduction of the Davis defendant’s life sentence to two concurrent 60-year terms was pursuant to a joint motion for summary disposition, which we do not have in this case. 2 In Smolley, the appellate court held that the trial court did not consider the Miller factors, failing to ever mention defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics, and therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 2018 IL App (3d) 150577, ¶ 22 .

2021Davis simply affirmed the vacation of a mandatory life sentence ( 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43 ), and the eventual reduction of the Davis defendant’s life sentence to two concurrent 60-year terms was pursuant to a joint motion for summary disposition, which we do not have in this case. 2 In Smolley, the appellate court held that the trial court did not consider the Miller factors, failing to ever mention defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics, and therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 2018 IL App (3d) 150577, ¶ 22 .

2020Clair County that granted Davis’s motion for partial class certification and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. ¶ 22 Reversed and remanded. 10 No. 5-19-0380 Cite as: LVNV Funding, LLC v. Davis, 2020 IL App (5th) 190380 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St.

1995The trial court allowed Davis' motion to dismiss the perjury indictments, believing that the dismissal was mandated by the holding in People v. Mason (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 463 , 17 Ill.Dec. 730 , 376 N.E.2d 1059 .

1995The trial court allowed Davis’ motion to dismiss the perjury indictments, believing that the dismissal was mandated by the holding in People v. Mason (1978), 60 Ill.

1993App. 3d 631 , 456 N.E.2d 992 (upholding an officer’s discharge although it was based solely on the transcript of a criminal trial in which the officer was acquitted).) We judge, therefore, that the Commission properly considered Davis’ plea of guilty even though he was subsequently granted supervision.

1990People v. Bond (1989), 178 Ill.

1990People v. Bond (1989), 178 Ill.

1989(Davis, 46 Ill. 2d at 557 .) This court relied upon the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to reject Davis’ claim that Shelby’s statement was inadmissible by reason of Bruton.

1989(Davis, 46 Ill. 2d at 557-59 .) In Davis, the trial court had sustained Davis’ objection to testimony regarding the statement and had instructed the jury not to consider it against Davis.

1986Ed. 2d 861 , 100 S. Ct. 2998 .) The trial court thus properly denied Davis’ motion to suppress.