Davis motion in Texas

2019See id. at 826–27, 126 S. Ct. at 2276–77. 3 The record demonstrates that Duchesneau took Daughter’s phone from her while she was on the phone with the 911 operator. 8 After applying the Davis factors to the recording of Daughter’s call to 911, we conclude that the out-of-court statements on the 911 recording, when viewed objectively, were made informally under circumstances indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to meet an ongoing emergency, rather than to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

2019See id. at 826–27, 126 S. Ct. at 2276–77. 3 The record demonstrates that Duchesneau took Daughter’s phone from her while she was on the phone with the 911 operator. 8 After applying the Davis factors to the recording of Daughter’s call to 911, we conclude that the out-of-court statements on the 911 recording, when viewed objectively, were made informally under circumstances indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to meet an ongoing emergency, rather than to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

2023App. 2013); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Bowman, 533 S.W.3d at 349. 28 Consequently, the standard by which an attorney’s representation is measured recognizes the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that exists, so appellate courts indulge in a strong presumption that favors the attorney whose advice is the subject of a defendant’s ineffective assistance claim. 34 In deciding whether Davis was entitled to a new trial, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that for reasons of trial strategy, the attorney who represented Davis chose not to call the six character

2013See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2015He also responds that no precedent in the relevant jurisdiction specifically authorized the search, which he contends is a necessary condition to applying the Davis exception.* See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 ; see also * Numerous federal courts of appeals have addressed how explicit or settled the appellate precedent must be to trigger the Davis exception.

2015He also responds that no precedent in the relevant jurisdiction specifically authorized the search, which he contends is a necessary condition to applying the Davis exception.* See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 ; see also * Numerous federal courts of appeals have addressed how explicit or settled the appellate precedent must be to trigger the Davis exception.

2015The State concedes that, according to binding precedent, a “search warrant may not be procured lawfully by the use of illegally obtained information.” State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim.

2015The State concedes that, according to binding precedent, a “search warrant may not be procured lawfully by the use of illegally obtained information.” State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim.

2015See State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Tex. Crim.

2015See State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Tex. Crim.

2011See State v. Savage, 933 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding reviewing court can look past labels and order granting motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was functional equivalent of granting of new trial, thereby allowing State to appeal); State v. Evans, 843 S.W.2d 576, 577-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding motion to withdraw or reconsider plea should more aptly have been called a motion for new trial and order granting motion was functionally indistinguishable from order granting a new trial, thereby allowing State to appeal); State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tex.App.-Dallas

2011See State v. Savage, 933 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding reviewing court can look past labels and order granting motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was functional equivalent of granting of new trial, thereby allowing State to appeal); State v. Evans, 843 S.W.2d 576, 577-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding motion to withdraw or reconsider plea should more aptly have been called a motion for new trial and order granting motion was functionally indistinguishable from order granting a new trial, thereby allowing State to appeal); State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tex.App.-Dallas

2011The trial court signed a second judgment imposing the twelve-year sentence on October 19, 2009. 1 “[A] trial court retains plenary power to modify its sentence if a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment is filed within 30 days of sentencing.” 2 State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 697-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2011The trial court signed a second judgment imposing the twelve-year sentence on October 19, 2009. [1] "[A] trial court retains plenary power to modify its sentence if a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment is filed within 30 days of sentencing." [2] State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 697-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2008See McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 7 .

2008See McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 619 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 256 ; York v. State, No. PD-1753-06, 2008 WL 2677368 , at *5 (Tex.Crim.App.

2008See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 256 ; York v. State, No. PD-1753-06, 2008 WL 2677368 , at *5 (Tex.Crim.App.

2010In either case, it is error to exclude the impeachment evidence when a witness's "testimony [is] `crucial' and . . . there [is] a `real possibility' that pursuit of the excluded line of impeachment evidence would [do] `(serious) damage to the strength of the State's case.'" Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ).

2010In either case, it is error to exclude the impeachment evidence when a witness's "testimony [is] `crucial' and . . . there [is] a `real possibility' that pursuit of the excluded line of impeachment evidence would [do] `(serious) damage to the strength of the State's case.'" Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 ).

2009Holmes , 547 U.S. at 329 B 331; Davis , 872 S.W.2d at 749 .

2003App.1994); Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 749 (holding factors that might undermine reliability did not outweigh evidence directly corroborating statement); Fonseca, 9 08 S.W.2d at 523 (holding trial court abused its discretion in excluding statements telling consistent story tending to exonerate defendant); see also State v. Blanco, 953 S.W.2d 799, 803 (TexApp. — Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref d) (finding Brady violation by state in failing to turn over statement of third party that he, not defendant, was perpetrator, which was “strong evidence” for defendant). 12 Considering the Cunningham and Davis fa

2019See Hernandez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (collecting cases).

2019See Hernandez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (collecting cases).

2014See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165-66 (Tex. 2003).

2014See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165-66 (Tex. 2003).

2009See Resendiz v. State , 112 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. Crim.

2008Jackson v. State , 474 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim.

2008Jackson v. State, 474 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim.

2018App.--Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see Keough v. [*19] Live Oak County during a week that was not Cyrus U.S.A., Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.--Houston a jury week.

2010App. P. 33.1; Keough , 204 S.W.3d at 5 . [15] Davis’s motion to reinstate includes a notice of hearing for October 24, 2008.

2017Id.

2000See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2026Prod., 342 S.W.3d at 70 (proof of ouster requires proof of acts “that the possessor took to disseize other cotenants” (emphasis added)); Davis v. Carriker, 536 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“[I]t is well recognized that adverse possession must be established by the strength of Carriker’s title and not by any weakness in Davis’ claim of title.”).

2026Prod., 342 S.W.3d at 70 (proof of ouster requires proof of acts “that the possessor took to disseize other cotenants” (emphasis added)); Davis v. Carriker, 536 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“[I]t is well recognized that adverse possession must be established by the strength of Carriker’s title and not by any weakness in Davis’ claim of title.”).

2024See id. at 950 ; see also Chesser, 356 S.W.3d at 629 ; Reed, 117 S.W.3d at 409 ; Mills, 995 S.W.2d at 267–68.

2024Seizing upon our statement in LaCroix that the plaintiffs claimed “that the hospital had and breached a direct duty to [the patient] . . . [,] not that the hospital [had] negligently supervised [the] anesthesiologists and CRNAs,” 947 S.W.2d at 949 n.6, Harris attempts to distinguish Davis’s claim by portraying it as a negligent-supervision claim.

2024See id. at 950 ; see also Chesser, 356 S.W.3d at 629 ; Reed, 117 S.W.3d at 409 ; Mills, 995 S.W.2d at 267–68.

2023Yet Davis’s trial attorney explained why he didn’t call Garrett in his affidavit and why he believed that strategy would either fail or “cause more harm than good.” According 29See Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 731 (Tex. Crim.

2022“The trial court need never sort through challenged evidence in order to segregate the admissible from the excludable, nor is the trial court required to admit only the former part or exclude only the latter part.” Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 178 (quoting Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tex. Crim.

2021While the evidence is considered as one of the factors in the Davis analysis as described in Almanza, see Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim.

2021In any event, as we observed in Alamo Heights, “[c]arrying out a previously planned 41 573 S.W.3d 475, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019) (substitute opinion). 42 Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69 . 19 employment decision is no evidence of causation”, 43 even if the employment decision was “contemplated[] though not yet definitively determined”. 44 The court of appeals concluded: While not all factors courts use to assess evidence of but-for causation support Davis’s claim, the factors of timing, knowledge of the complaint by the decision- maker, evidence of a negative attitude by Ricotta toward

2021App. 1985) (citing Davis v. State, 13 S.W. 994, 995 (1890)), this is not the traditional sufficiency of the evidence analysis of Jackson v. Virginia.