50 California opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bautista CA4/3green2 sentences2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do 2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do | 2 | 2 |
People v. Suffgreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do 2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do | 2 | 2 |
People v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences2014(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 591, 597-599 .) Second, Davis cannot prevail on his claim that his counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to object because the record supports an implied finding that Davis had the ability to pay. 2013(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 591, 597-599 .) Second, Davis cannot prevail on his claim that his counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to object because the record supports an implied finding that Davis had the ability to pay. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Youn CA2/8green2 sentences2020(People v. Youn (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 .) Rather, where police officers are complying in good faith with the law as it existed at the time, there is no reason to apply the exclusionary rule. 2020(People v. Youn (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 .) Rather, where police officers are complying in good faith with the law as it existed at the time, there is no reason to apply the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 2 |
Hartford Casualty Company v. Aubrey R. Cruse, IIIgreen2 sentences2019Co. v. Cruse (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 601 , 604 [exclusion is limited to property the insured " 'totally and physically manipulates' "].) 6 The Davis rule is further consistent with insurance industry publications cited by McMillin. 2019Co. v. Cruse (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 601 , 604 [exclusion is limited to property the insured " 'totally and physically manipulates' "].) 6 The Davis rule is further consistent with insurance industry publications cited by McMillin. | 1 | 2 |
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2026(See Marsh, supra, 49 Cal. 3d at p. 8 [“the workers’ compensation system encompasses all disputes over coverage and payment,” not just those against the employer].) At its core, Davis’s claim is that her worker’s compensation claim was improperly limited or denied; Davis can pursue that claim through the normal WCA process. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mendezgreen1 sentence2026(See People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1100 [mental competence is a certificate issue, which Court of Appeal must decline to address absent timely certificate of probable cause].) DISCUSSION I. | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2022(See McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1509 [“If a client declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest.”].) In sum, there is no merit to Davis’s claim that his counsel’s strategy at trial—to focus on the enhancement—was contrary to Davis’s personal objective and therefore a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. | 1 | 1 |
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.green1 sentence2022(See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1132 [“The policy of encouraging free access to the courts is so important that the litigation privilege extends beyond claims of defamation to claims of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and to the torts alleged here: interference with contract and prospective economic advantage.”].) 22 Although the litigation privilege generally does not extend to breach of contract claims (Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 288‒289), Davis’s cl | 1 | 1 |
Benach v. County of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2021(See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.”]; Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638 .) Regardless, we have reviewed Davis’s motion for a new trial—which raises many of the same issues we have already addressed with respect to the motions in limine concerning the SEC action and the sufficiency of the evidence—and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 31 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Luster v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2021(See Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1349 [absent the parties’ stipulation, an arbitrator has no statutory power to enforce a judgment because “[s]uch authority would not only conflict with judicial power, but absent carefully prescribed procedures potentially interfere with the respective rights of the parties”].) The superior court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to compel arbitration of her claims relating to judicial enforcement of the judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Riske v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen1 sentence2021(Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 657 (Riske).) Davis’s challenge fails under both standards of review. | 1 | 1 |
Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc.green1 sentence2021(See Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Services, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 332 [“Stated differently, ‘[t]o require arbitration, [a party’s] factual allegations need only “touch matters” covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.’”].) The superior court erred in denying Davis’s motion to compel arbitration of her tort claims.8 8 The parties disagree about where the arbitration should occur, who should be the arbitrator, and what rules should apply. | 1 | 1 |
Eisenbarth v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.green2 sentences2019Co. (Wyo. 1992) 840 P.2d 945, 950 ["total (not 5 National Fire labels the Davis rule as dicta, arguing the crane operator had no control, not shared control. 2019Co. (Wyo. 1992) 840 P.2d 945, 950 ["total (not 5 National Fire labels the Davis rule as dicta, arguing the crane operator had no control, not shared control. | 1 | 1 |
| Denham v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carmonygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Robert Franzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Robbinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brady v. Marylandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curl v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barnett v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Farnamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Michael Joseph Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sauceda-Contrerasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. O'LEARYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Crittendengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Broughton v. Cigna Healthplansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning & the Environment v. Abercrombie
green
2 sentences2020I.C.4., ante.) Whether Davis’s claim or claims fall within the boundaries or language of Government Code section 53511, subdivision (a) involves an assessment of the gravamen of the complaint and the nature of the right sued upon, rather than the form of the action or relief demanded. ( Abercrombie, supra, at p. 308 .) That assessment is undertaken in part III.B.2. of this opinion. 2020I.C.4., ante.) Whether Davis’s claim or claims fall within the boundaries or language of Government Code section 53511, subdivision (a) involves an assessment of the gravamen of the complaint and the nature of the right sued upon, rather than the form of the action or relief demanded. ( Abercrombie, supra, at p. 308 .) That assessment is undertaken in part III.B.2. of this opinion. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court explained, citing United States Supreme Court authority, "the prosecution must always prove the existence of a policy supporting an inventory search." ( Williams , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 138 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 .) As discussed, the trial court denied Davis's motion to suppress without prejudice. 2018The Supreme Court explained, citing United States Supreme Court authority, "the prosecution must always prove the existence of a policy supporting an inventory search." ( Williams , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 138 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 .) As discussed, the trial court denied Davis's motion to suppress without prejudice. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Elizalde
green
2 sentences2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do 2017(See People v. Bautista (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103 [“possession of 50 to 100 days’ worth of heroin gives rise to probable cause that defendant possessed the heroin for sale”].) Because Davis’s intent to sell the prescription pills was “amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of [the] challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 ; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 [“given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the Miranda violation was harmless beyond a reasonable do | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Berghuis v. Thompkins
green
2 sentences2015If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him [or her].” (Id. at pp. 461-462.) In Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. 370 , the United States Supreme Court held the Davis standard for determining whether a suspect has invoked his or her Miranda right to counsel also applies to determining whether a suspect has invoked the related right to remain silent, explaining “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards” for the two inquiries. 2015If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him [or her].” (Id. at pp. 461-462.) In Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. 370 , the United States Supreme Court held the Davis standard for determining whether a suspect has invoked his or her Miranda right to counsel also applies to determining whether a suspect has invoked the related right to remain silent, explaining “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards” for the two inquiries. | 2 | 2012–2015 |
People v. Hyde
green
1 sentence2025(Boyd, at pp. 63-69.) In asserting that this court has jurisdiction to consider his appeal, Davis cites sections 4019 and 1237.1, People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954 , and People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Fares
green
1 sentence2025(Boyd, at pp. 63-69.) In asserting that this court has jurisdiction to consider his appeal, Davis cites sections 4019 and 1237.1, People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954 , and People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
San Francisco Human Services Agency v. Felicia C.
green
1 sentence2025To support the assertion that Judge Rios asked the juvenile court to “adjudicate[ ] a controversy” between herself and the Department when she sought review of the Department’s decision not to commence proceedings and that this act made Judge Rios “a party to that controversy,” Mother relies on In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784 (M.C.). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nelson v. Gaunt
green
2 sentences2021(See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.”]; Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638 .) Regardless, we have reviewed Davis’s motion for a new trial—which raises many of the same issues we have already addressed with respect to the motions in limine concerning the SEC action and the sufficiency of the evidence—and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 31 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 2021(See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.”]; Nelson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 638 .) Regardless, we have reviewed Davis’s motion for a new trial—which raises many of the same issues we have already addressed with respect to the motions in limine concerning the SEC action and the sufficiency of the evidence—and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 31 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2021(See Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 16 pp. 1152-1153 & fn. 10 [under section 1281.4, “‘[i]f the issue which is the controversy subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect to that issue only’”].) DISPOSITION The order denying Davis’s motion to compel arbitration is reversed. 2021(See Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 16 pp. 1152-1153 & fn. 10 [under section 1281.4, “‘[i]f the issue which is the controversy subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect to that issue only’”].) DISPOSITION The order denying Davis’s motion to compel arbitration is reversed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Laabs v. City of Victorville
green
1 sentence2021(Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 ; Evid. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Second, the evidence of Davis’s guilt outweighed the evidentiary value of Davis’s claim he found Miranda’s debit card on the ground. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Second, the evidence of Davis’s guilt outweighed the evidentiary value of Davis’s claim he found Miranda’s debit card on the ground. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kievernagel v. Kievernagel
green
2 sentences2020(Kievernagel, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032 .) Such is the case here.12 Plaintiff contends that, under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) (Health & Saf. 2020(Kievernagel, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032 .) Such is the case here.12 Plaintiff contends that, under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) (Health & Saf. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2020As we will discuss, we would conclude that he has waived this claim under Senior if the standard articulated in that case applied, but we conclude that an even more stringent waiver standard applies, as discussed in, among other cases, People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392 (Murphy). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSN. OF SAN DIEGO, INC. v. City of Oceanside
green
2 sentences2019Proc., § 906 ; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Oceanside (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 744 , 758, fn. 9, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 .) National Fire labels the Davis rule as dicta, arguing the crane operator had no control, not shared control. 2019Proc., § 906 ; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Oceanside (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 744 , 758, fn. 9, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 .) National Fire labels the Davis rule as dicta, arguing the crane operator had no control, not shared control. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hernandez v. Garcetti
green
1 sentence2019Code, § 47, subd. (b)(2), italics added)--an act termed “spoliation” (see Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 )--did not apply, because Ross’s communication to the police did not further the alleged manufacture of evidence in support of his report. 4 DISCUSSION The parties did not address the threshold issue of whether Davis’s plea of no contest to misdemeanor vandalism has any preclusive effect in the present action. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Jameson v. Desta green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Apollo v. Gyaami green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Jordan v. City of Sacramento green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Nwosu v. Uba green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Superior Court (Romero) green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jackson v. Indiana green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Cariveau v. Halferty green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Kelly green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Wende green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Pacific Crown Distributors v. Brotherhood of Teamsters green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Comerica Bank v. Howsam green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Manibusan green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Raymond Nelson v. Daniel McCarthy green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Ring v. Smith green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Walker v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Davis v. United States green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| KIMBALL AVENUE v. Franco green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Davis v. KGO-T v. Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Davis v. Davis green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.