12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Marriage of Rooksgreen2 sentences2019Contra In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 594, ¶ 71 (Colo. 2018) (“[B]ecause . . . the relevant interest at stake is . . . achieving or avoiding genetic parenthood, courts should not consider whether a spouse seeking to use the []embryos to become a genetic parent could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological children.”). ¶30 Other courts have applied the Davis framework. 2019Contra In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 594, ¶ 71 (Colo. 2018) (“[B]ecause . . . the relevant interest at stake is . . . achieving or avoiding genetic parenthood, courts should not consider whether a spouse seeking to use the []embryos to become a genetic parent could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological children.”). ¶30 Other courts have applied the Davis framework. | 2 | 2 |
Ace Automotive Products, Inc. v. Van Duynegreen1 sentence2021Prods., 156 Ariz. at 143 (“It is not incumbent upon the court to develop an argument for a party [that offered no counter- interpretation of the interest provision].”), Davis’s objection not only opposed compound interest but clearly stated that the “interest calculation must be reduced to an annual simple interest rate of exactly $1,386.89 per year.” 7 MESA v. DAVIS Decision of the Court ¶24 Accordingly, on remand the court should calculate prejudgment interest beginning December 1, 2016, using simple interest at a rate of 10% per annum. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuelagreen2 sentences2017As the Court in Davis observed, the reasons for and benefits of exclusion vary based on the culpability of law enforcement, and absent deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent violation of Fourth Amendment rights, grounds for exclusion are weak “when the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909); see also Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 35, 371 P.3d at 638 (applying Davis’s standard in finding good faith reliance on statutory and case authority). 2017As the Court in Davis observed, the reasons for and benefits of exclusion vary based on the culpability of law enforcement, and absent deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent violation of Fourth Amendment rights, grounds for exclusion are weak “when the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909); see also Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 35, 371 P.3d at 638 (applying Davis’s standard in finding good faith reliance on statutory and case authority). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edgar Barraza-Maldonadogreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2013) (“For the good faith exception to apply, officers performing a particular investigatory action ... must strictly comply with binding appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction in which they are acting.”); United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir.2013) (rejecting argument that police could rely on weight of authority around the country rather than on binding precedent in their jurisdiction); State v. Allen, 997 N.E.2d 621 , 626-27 (Ohio App.2013) (applying Davis test strictly and refusing to apply good-fai 2014See United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2013) (“For the good faith exception to apply, officers performing a particular investigatory action ... must strictly comply with binding appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction in which they are acting.”); United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir.2013) (rejecting argument that police could rely on weight of authority around the country rather than on binding precedent in their jurisdiction); State v. Allen, 997 N.E.2d 621 , 626-27 (Ohio App.2013) (applying Davis test strictly and refusing to apply good-fai | 1 | 1 |
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2014Davis now argues the court erred in denying his motion because the record does not justify the verdict. ¶17 The trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial; the court has substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the verdict because it has seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, and “has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); see also Hutcherson v. City of Phx., 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). 2014Davis now argues the court erred in denying his motion because the record does not justify the verdict. ¶17 The trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial; the court has substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the verdict because it has seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, and “has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); see also Hutcherson v. City of Phx., 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Wayne T. Wilson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporationgreen1 sentence2014Wilson v. Burlington N., Inc., 670 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir. 1982); see also Jones v. Consol. | 1 | 1 |
People v. LeFloregreen2 sentences2014“When a law enforcement official conducts a search based *419 on a nonbinding judicial decision, that official is guessing at what the law might be, rather than relying on what a binding legal authority tells him it is.” LeFlore, 374 Ill.Dec. 983 , 996 N.E.2d at 692 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 30 The State also argues that law enforcement’s reliance upon State v. Cramer, 174 Ariz. 522, 525 , 851 P.2d 147, 150 (App. 1992) (holding that the use of an infrared heat measuring device does not constitute a search) and Knotts meets the Davis test. 2014“When a law enforcement official conducts a search based *419 on a nonbinding judicial decision, that official is guessing at what the law might be, rather than relying on what a binding legal authority tells him it is.” LeFlore, 374 Ill.Dec. 983 , 996 N.E.2d at 692 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 30 The State also argues that law enforcement’s reliance upon State v. Cramer, 174 Ariz. 522, 525 , 851 P.2d 147, 150 (App. 1992) (holding that the use of an infrared heat measuring device does not constitute a search) and Knotts meets the Davis test. | 1 | 1 |
Reeves v. Marklegreen2 sentences2014Davis now argues the court erred in denying his motion because the record does not justify the verdict. ¶17 The trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial; the court has substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the verdict because it has seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, and “has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); see also Hutcherson v. City of Phx., 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). 2014Davis now argues the court erred in denying his motion because the record does not justify the verdict. ¶17 The trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial; the court has substantial latitude in deciding whether to upset the verdict because it has seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, and “has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163 , 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978); see also Hutcherson v. City of Phx., 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 12 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Matthew Martingreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2013) (“For the good faith exception to apply, officers performing a particular investigatory action ... must strictly comply with binding appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction in which they are acting.”); United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir.2013) (rejecting argument that police could rely on weight of authority around the country rather than on binding precedent in their jurisdiction); State v. Allen, 997 N.E.2d 621 , 626-27 (Ohio App.2013) (applying Davis test strictly and refusing to apply good-fai 2014See United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2013) (“For the good faith exception to apply, officers performing a particular investigatory action ... must strictly comply with binding appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction in which they are acting.”); United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir.2013) (rejecting argument that police could rely on weight of authority around the country rather than on binding precedent in their jurisdiction); State v. Allen, 997 N.E.2d 621 , 626-27 (Ohio App.2013) (applying Davis test strictly and refusing to apply good-fai | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cramergreen2 sentences2014“When a law enforcement official conducts a search based *419 on a nonbinding judicial decision, that official is guessing at what the law might be, rather than relying on what a binding legal authority tells him it is.” LeFlore, 374 Ill.Dec. 983 , 996 N.E.2d at 692 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 30 The State also argues that law enforcement’s reliance upon State v. Cramer, 174 Ariz. 522, 525 , 851 P.2d 147, 150 (App. 1992) (holding that the use of an infrared heat measuring device does not constitute a search) and Knotts meets the Davis test. 2014“When a law enforcement official conducts a search based *419 on a nonbinding judicial decision, that official is guessing at what the law might be, rather than relying on what a binding legal authority tells him it is.” LeFlore, 374 Ill.Dec. 983 , 996 N.E.2d at 692 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 30 The State also argues that law enforcement’s reliance upon State v. Cramer, 174 Ariz. 522, 525 , 851 P.2d 147, 150 (App. 1992) (holding that the use of an infrared heat measuring device does not constitute a search) and Knotts meets the Davis test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bartlettgreen2 sentences2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . 2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Herring v. United States
green
1 sentence2017As the Court in Davis observed, the reasons for and benefits of exclusion vary based on the culpability of law enforcement, and absent deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent violation of Fourth Amendment rights, grounds for exclusion are weak “when the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909); see also Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 35, 371 P.3d at 638 (applying Davis’s standard in finding good faith reliance on statutory and case authority). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2015He relies on Mitchell , a case in which this court declined to apply the Davis exception because the ease law was unsettled. 234 Ariz. 410, ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 . 2015He relies on Mitchell , a case in which this court declined to apply the Davis exception because the ease law was unsettled. 234 Ariz. 410, ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pineda-Moreno v. United States
green
2 sentences2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and 2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gagnon v. United States
green
2 sentences2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and 2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2014Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 , 451 P.2d 878 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Leon
green
2 sentences2014Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 , 451 P.2d 878 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. 2014Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 , 451 P.2d 878 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Pineda-Moreno
green
2 sentences2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and 2014We disagree that law enforcement’s conduct falls within the Davis rule. ¶28 To support its argument, the State relies upon United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA agents’ installation of GPS devices on defendant’s vehicle and use to monitor movements did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert, granted, judgment vacated,-U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1533 , 182 L.Ed.2d 151 (2012). 13 When applying the Davis good-faith exception, courts generally agree that the authority must be binding in the jurisdiction where the police conduct occurred, and | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Mills
green
2 sentences2010Although courts have commented that a defendant waives an argument by failing to object below, e.g., Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, ¶ 15 , 995 P.2d at 709 , such a failure technically does not "waive” a claim but rather limits the scope of appellate review. 2010Although courts have commented that a defendant waives an argument by failing to object below, e.g., Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, ¶ 15 , 995 P.2d at 709 , such a failure technically does not "waive” a claim but rather limits the scope of appellate review. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Lynch
red
2 sentences2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . 2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Dillon
green
2 sentences2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . 2004Bartlett, 171 Ariz. at 306-08 , 830 P.2d at 827-29 (court should consider circumstances of crime including any nonviolent nature as well as lack of any prior record); Dillon, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 720-22 ; Lynch, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d at 939-40 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Schroeder
green
2 sentences2003Although the scale is smaller in Davis’s case, the principle applies. ¶ 56 But the State asserts, and the court of appeals agreed, that State v. Schroeder, 167 Ariz. 47 , 804 P.2d 776 (App.1990), disposes of Davis’s claim. 2003Although the scale is smaller in Davis’s case, the principle applies. ¶ 56 But the State asserts, and the court of appeals agreed, that State v. Schroeder, 167 Ariz. 47 , 804 P.2d 776 (App.1990), disposes of Davis’s claim. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Davis v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan
green
2 sentences1989The Davis claim, like this, included allegations of misrepresentation. 887 F.2d at 695 . 1989The Davis claim, like this, included allegations of misrepresentation. 887 F.2d at 695 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.