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14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., Inc.green1 sentence2021According to the trial court, Ms. Davis could not have violated either cited provision, because they 56 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc.green1 sentence2021Code § 47-820 (a)” (emphasis added)); Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 A.2d at 212 (an appraiser for the District “did not fulfill his obligation under § 47-820(a) to consider income earning potential” (emphasis added)). 59 Mandsager v. Jaquith, 706 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C. 1995)). 29 the cost method,” that order would not have directed her to violate the law.60 Therefore, we affirm the denial of Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to amend. | 1 | 1 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2021Code § 47-820 (a)” (emphasis added)); Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 A.2d at 212 (an appraiser for the District “did not fulfill his obligation under § 47-820(a) to consider income earning potential” (emphasis added)). 59 Mandsager v. Jaquith, 706 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C. 1995)). 29 the cost method,” that order would not have directed her to violate the law.60 Therefore, we affirm the denial of Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to amend. | 1 | 1 |
Mandsager v. Jaquithgreen1 sentence2021Code § 47-820 (a)” (emphasis added)); Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 A.2d at 212 (an appraiser for the District “did not fulfill his obligation under § 47-820(a) to consider income earning potential” (emphasis added)). 59 Mandsager v. Jaquith, 706 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C. 1995)). 29 the cost method,” that order would not have directed her to violate the law.60 Therefore, we affirm the denial of Ms. Davis’s motion for leave to amend. | 1 | 1 |
Beard v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013A similar colloquy in Beard v. United States, 535 A.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C.1988), is instructive. 6 In Beard , there was a somewhat ambiguous exchange between defense counsel and the trial court in which we concluded that the “trial judge clearly did not grant defense counsel’s request for appellant’s presence, but instead pointed out the mitigating feature of the different arrangement which was to prevail.” Id. 2013A similar colloquy in Beard v. United States, 535 A.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C.1988), is instructive. 6 In Beard , there was a somewhat ambiguous exchange between defense counsel and the trial court in which we concluded that the “trial judge clearly did not grant defense counsel’s request for appellant’s presence, but instead pointed out the mitigating feature of the different arrangement which was to prevail.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Newby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003See Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. 1991); see also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (D.C.2002). 2003See Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. 1991); see also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (D.C.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Abdulshakur v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2003See Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. 1991); see also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (D.C.2002). 2003See Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. 1991); see also Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (D.C.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Goldston v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000In reviewing the denial of Davis’ motion to suppress evidence, “our role is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Parker, supra, 601 A.2d at 49 (quoting Goldston v. United States, 562 A.2d 96, 98 (D.C.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1994See Ray v. United States, 575 A.2d 1196, 1199 (D.C.1990) (every offense committed includes an attempt to commit that offense). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. First American Title Co.green2 sentences1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, 1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, | 1 | 1 |
Jamison v. S & H ASSOCIATESgreen2 sentences1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, 1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Rental Associates, Inc.green2 sentences1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, 1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, | 1 | 1 |
Battle v. Nashgreen2 sentences1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, 1991See Jamison v. S & H Associates, supra, 487 A.2d at 621 (generally approving the trial court’s hearing on the Davis factors, but reversing the judgment of possession because the court “never made any inquiry into the tenant’s allegation that the landlord had misrepresented” facts concerning waiver of the notice to quit); Taylor v. First American Title Co., supra, 477 A.2d at 230 ("If the defendant neither pays the undertaking nor obtains a stay, the trial court may, after holding a proper inquiry ... strike the defendant’s pleading and enter judgment for the plaintiff’); Battle v. Nash, supra, | 1 | 1 |
Arthur Bruce v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that “there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense . . . .” Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). 1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that “there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense . . . .” Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that "there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. . . ." Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). 1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that “there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense . . . .” Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Benjamin J. Thompsongreen2 sentences1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. 1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. | 1 | 1 |
Municipal Light Board of Reading, Massachusetts v. Federal Power Commissiongreen2 sentences1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. 1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. | 1 | 1 |
Malatesta v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. 1976See note 68, supra. Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 452 F.2d 1333 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 , 92 S.Ct. 1251 , 31 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Nonetheless, we must analyze appellant’s statement to his girlfriend under the Davis standard, since, if it was the required “clear assertion of the right to counsel,” id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2356 , the later waiver of his Miranda rights would not suffice under Edwards, 6 We hold that the statement was not the assertion of the right Davis requires. 1995Nonetheless, we must analyze appellant’s statement to his girlfriend under the Davis standard, since, if it was the required “clear assertion of the right to counsel,” id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2356 , the later waiver of his Miranda rights would not suffice under Edwards, 6 We hold that the statement was not the assertion of the right Davis requires. | 2 | 1995–2008 |
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2023In Jackson, this court recognized that (1) requiring an individual to be subject to GPS monitoring is a search under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 472 , and (2) such a search of an individual on probation may be upheld as constitutional under the special needs doctrine, which allows reasonable regulations to substitute for the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment where special needs exist, id. at 472-81 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Elizabeth B. Argent v. Samuel E. Argent
green
2 sentences2008In Argent v. Argent, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 46 , 396 F.2d 695 (1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, construing the then-current version of section 16-910, explained that “the District of Columbia courts are authorized to adjust and apportion property rights in [jointly held] property and, in fact, must do so in the same proceedings in which the divorce decree is entered.” 5 130 U.S.App. 2008In Argent v. Argent, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 46 , 396 F.2d 695 (1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, construing the then-current version of section 16-910, explained that “the District of Columbia courts are authorized to adjust and apportion property rights in [jointly held] property and, in fact, must do so in the same proceedings in which the divorce decree is entered.” 5 130 U.S.App. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
2 sentences2008In Davis , the Court explained that where there is ambiguity as to whether a suspect has invoked the right, the police have no duty to cease questioning because it would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly “irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321 ). 2008In Davis , the Court explained that where there is ambiguity as to whether a suspect has invoked the right, the police have no duty to cease questioning because it would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly “irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Parker v. United States
green
1 sentence2000In reviewing the denial of Davis’ motion to suppress evidence, “our role is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Parker, supra, 601 A.2d at 49 (quoting Goldston v. United States, 562 A.2d 96, 98 (D.C.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Jackson v. United States
green
2 sentences1991In Jackson, supra, 490 A.2d at 194 , while we did not address whether the trial judge had sought a commitment not to prosecute, it is clear that the trial judge had satisfied the Davis inquiry. 1991In Jackson, supra, 490 A.2d at 194 , while we did not address whether the trial judge had sought a commitment not to prosecute, it is clear that the trial judge had satisfied the Davis inquiry. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Blankenship v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
green
1 sentence1984Davis' brief relies on Blankenship v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F.Supp. 1016 (D.Or.1979), for the proposition that "the notice provision [of the PMPA] would have required notice to be given 90 days prior to December 31, 1982.” We do not read Blankenship to support Davis’ position. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Session v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Angarano v. United States
green
2 sentences1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that "there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. . . ." Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). 1978To conclude that there has been a constitutional deprivation of the right to counsel due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find that “there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense . . . .” Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40 , 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967); accord, Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 374 A.2d 885, 889 (1977); Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 , 298 n. 5 (1973). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.