Davis motion in Virginia

2022Canada contends that the 911 call in his case is analogous to the call in Wilder v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 579 (2010).

2022Canada contends that the 911 call in his case is analogous to the call in Wilder v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 579 (2010).

2012Id. at 601-02 , 659 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir.1980)). [3] We observed that these factors "are not exclusive and must be considered in the totality of the circumstances found in each case." Id. at 602 , 659 S.E.2d at 288 .

2012Id. at 601-02 , 659 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir.1980)). [3] We observed that these factors "are not exclusive and must be considered in the totality of the circumstances found in each case." Id. at 602 , 659 S.E.2d at 288 .

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2008These factors have been utilized in many jurisdictions, see Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 , 1367 (9th Cir.1990), Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy, Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 , 207 (3d Cir.1983), Elgin v. Alfa Corp., 598 So.2d 807 , 818-19 (Ala.1992), Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 680 A.2d 1243 , 1256 (1996), Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 90 P.3d 724 , 735-36 (Wyo.2004), and the trial court's factual findings here indicate that it considered the Davis factors in reaching its holding. 4 We agree that these factors are relevant in determining whether a limited partner can adequately and fairly represent the i

2003In Brown , we stated that “[t]he test to determine whether claims are part of a single cause of action is whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each claim.” 233 Va. at 216 , 355 S.E.2d at 567 .

2003In Brown , we stated that “[t]he test to determine whether claims are part of a single cause of action is whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each claim.” 233 Va. at 216 , 355 S.E.2d at 567 .

2002“Consent to search obtained as the result of an illegal detention is ‘not an independent source of the evidence, but rather [is] an exploitation of the unlawful [stop].’” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 204 , 487 S.E.2d at 264 (citing Ealy, 12 Va.App. at 757 , 407 S.E.2d at 689 ).

2002“Consent to search obtained as the result of an illegal detention is ‘not an independent source of the evidence, but rather [is] an exploitation of the unlawful [stop].’” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 204 , 487 S.E.2d at 264 (citing Ealy, 12 Va.App. at 757 , 407 S.E.2d at 689 ).

2002“Consent to search obtained as the result of an illegal detention is ‘not an independent source of the evidence, but rather [is] an exploitation of the unlawful [stop].’” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 204 , 487 S.E.2d at 264 (citing Ealy, 12 Va.App. at 757 , 407 S.E.2d at 689 ).

2002“Consent to search obtained as the result of an illegal detention is ‘not an independent source of the evidence, but rather [is] an exploitation of the unlawful [stop].’” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 204 , 487 S.E.2d at 264 (citing Ealy, 12 Va.App. at 757 , 407 S.E.2d at 689 ).

2001In undertaking an Edwards/Davis analysis, a trial court must apply an objective test to determine if an accused "'articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly'" for a "'reasonable police officer'" to "'understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.'" McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 602, 605 , 518 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1999) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 ). "[W]hether an accused - 11 - requested counsel is . . . a factual determination that will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 468 , 418 S.E.2d 7

2001In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), police officers were “converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions” when the officers “observed ...

2001In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), police officers were “converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions” when the officers “observed ...

1993The trial judge “assume[d] the General Assembly was aware of the process used tó convert the breath analysis to a blood alcohol concentration when they enacted the legislation permitting use of the breath test.” That statement evidences recognition that margin of error was an issue and “[ujnless rebutted .. ., [breathalyzer] test results are sufficient to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.” Davis, 8 Va. App. at 300 , 381 S.E.2d at 16 .

1993The trial judge “assume[d] the General Assembly was aware of the process used tó convert the breath analysis to a blood alcohol concentration when they enacted the legislation permitting use of the breath test.” That statement evidences recognition that margin of error was an issue and “[ujnless rebutted .. ., [breathalyzer] test results are sufficient to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.” Davis, 8 Va. App. at 300 , 381 S.E.2d at 16 .

1990Davis v. Davis, 8 Va.App. 12 , 377 S.E.2d 640 (1989). [3] While it is true that Donna's $9,000 spousal-support award was not entered until a day after Davis had divested himself of title to the property, the statute affords its remedy to "persons" as well as to "creditors" and applies not only to what they are entitled to but also to what they "may be entitled to".

1990Davis v. Davis, 8 Va.App. 12 , 377 S.E.2d 640 (1989). [3] While it is true that Donna's $9,000 spousal-support award was not entered until a day after Davis had divested himself of title to the property, the statute affords its remedy to "persons" as well as to "creditors" and applies not only to what they are entitled to but also to what they "may be entitled to".