Davis claim in Alabama

2024See State v. Collins, 937 So. 2d 86, 92-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that " 'Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights,' " and that " 'an officer faced with an ambiguous response to an initial advisement of Miranda rights, i.e., at the pre-waiver stage, is limited to posing questions designed to clarify the suspect's ambiguous response' " (citations omitted)), cited with approval in Yeiter v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0599, June 28, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 15 CR-2023-0820 Crim. App. 2024); Keaton v. State, 375 So. 3d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021); Belcher v. State, 341 So.

2024See State v. Collins, 937 So. 2d 86, 92-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that " 'Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights,' " and that " 'an officer faced with an ambiguous response to an initial advisement of Miranda rights, i.e., at the pre-waiver stage, is limited to posing questions designed to clarify the suspect's ambiguous response' " (citations omitted)), cited with approval in Yeiter v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0599, June 28, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 15 CR-2023-0820 Crim. App. 2024); Keaton v. State, 375 So. 3d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021); Belcher v. State, 341 So.

2024In addition, the Court in Berghuis considered the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the defendant had waived his right to remain silent, specifically holding that a waiver of Miranda rights "may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.' " 560 U.S. at 384 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added).

2024In addition, the Court in Berghuis considered the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the defendant had waived his right to remain silent, specifically holding that a waiver of Miranda rights "may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.' " 560 U.S. at 384 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added).

2015Police Reports as Hearsay Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle that- police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may be excluded as hearsay. 2 See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So.2d 304, 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (noting that “the reports of investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are deemed hearsay”); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105 , 266 So.2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that “the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay”); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 290 , 154 So.2d 297, 300 (196

2015Police Reports as Hearsay Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle that- police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may be excluded as hearsay. 2 See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So.2d 304, 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (noting that “the reports of investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are deemed hearsay”); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105 , 266 So.2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that “the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay”); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 290 , 154 So.2d 297, 300 (196

2015Police Reports as Hearsay Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle that- police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may be excluded as hearsay. 2 See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So.2d 304, 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (noting that “the reports of investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are deemed hearsay”); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105 , 266 So.2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that “the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay”); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 290 , 154 So.2d 297, 300 (196

2015Police Reports as Hearsay Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle that- police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may be excluded as hearsay. 2 See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So.2d 304, 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (noting that “the reports of investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are deemed hearsay”); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105 , 266 So.2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that “the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay”); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 290 , 154 So.2d 297, 300 (196

2015Police Reports as Hearsay Alabama courts have acknowledged the general principle that- police reports, whether of accidents or other events, may be excluded as hearsay. 2 See Gardner v. Williams, 390 So.2d 304, 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (noting that “the reports of investigating officers are not ordinarily admissible as they are deemed hearsay”); Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100, 105 , 266 So.2d 260, 264 (1972) (noting the apparent general rule that “the report of an investigating officer is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay”); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 290 , 154 So.2d 297, 300 (196

2014We should return to the faithful Gentry interpretation.” Ex parte Freeman, 776 So.2d 203, 205-06 (Ala.2000) (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2014We should return to the faithful Gentry interpretation.” Ex parte Freeman, 776 So.2d 203, 205-06 (Ala.2000) (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2014Under the doctrine of invited error, “the appellant cannot allege as error pi-oceedings in the trial court that were invited by [him] or that were a natural consequence of [his] own action.” Inmin v. State, 668 So.2d 152, 155 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), citing Bamberg v. State, 611 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).

2014In Dobyne v. State, 805 So.2d 733, 741 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: “““While the practice of adopting the state’s proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.’ ” ’ “805 So.2d at 741 (quoting other cases; emphasis added).” In Ingram, the circuit court’s order stated that “ ‘this Court presided over Ingram’s capital murder trial and personally observed the performance of both lawyers througho

2014VIL Finally, Davis argues that this Court should reverse the circuit court’s order because, he says, the circuit court adopted a proposed order that was submitted by the State that is “nearly identical to the State’s Answer and Motion to Dismiss .... ” (Davis’s brief, at 142.) Davis claims that the circuit court’s order “contains the ‘adversarial zeal’ of an advocate’s pleading” and was “ ‘not a product of [the circuit court’s] independent judgment.’” (Davis’s brief, at 142-44, quoting Ex parte Scott, [Ms. 1091275, March 18, 2011] — So.3d -, - (Ala.2011).) The Alabama Supreme Court addressed t

2014In Dobyne v. State, 805 So.2d 733, 741 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: “““While the practice of adopting the state’s proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.’ ” ’ “805 So.2d at 741 (quoting other cases; emphasis added).” In Ingram, the circuit court’s order stated that “ ‘this Court presided over Ingram’s capital murder trial and personally observed the performance of both lawyers througho

2014In Dobyne v. State, 805 So.2d 733, 741 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: “““While the practice of adopting the state’s proposed findings and conclusions is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.’ ” ’ “805 So.2d at 741 (quoting other cases; emphasis added).” In Ingram, the circuit court’s order stated that “ ‘this Court presided over Ingram’s capital murder trial and personally observed the performance of both lawyers througho

2014Davis contends that the fact that the trial court informed him that the State would “ ‘seek to prove’ the robbery-murder aggravating circumstance ... does not disprove [his] allegation that counsel misadvised him that the State would be unable to establish it.” (Davis’s brief; at 62-63.) Although we agree that the record does not necessarily refute Davis’s claim that counsel gave' him erroneous advice, we note that “where the judgment of the circuit court denying a petition for post-conviction relief is correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this Court, even if the circuit court stated

2014Davis contends that the fact that the trial court informed him that the State would “ ‘seek to prove’ the robbery-murder aggravating circumstance ... does not disprove [his] allegation that counsel misadvised him that the State would be unable to establish it.” (Davis’s brief; at 62-63.) Although we agree that the record does not necessarily refute Davis’s claim that counsel gave' him erroneous advice, we note that “where the judgment of the circuit court denying a petition for post-conviction relief is correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this Court, even if the circuit court stated

2014Under the doctrine of invited error, “the appellant cannot allege as error pi-oceedings in the trial court that were invited by [him] or that were a natural consequence of [his] own action.” Inmin v. State, 668 So.2d 152, 155 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), citing Bamberg v. State, 611 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).

2007To constitute substantial evidence, the evidence must be "of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); § 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975.

2007With respect to Davis's claim of fraud by forgery, the main opinion concludes that Davis "produced substantial evidence to support her claims of fraud by forgery and unjust enrichment" against the sons. 965 So.2d at 1093.

2007The main opinion notes: "Davis presented evidence indicating that Sterne Agee may have acted pursuant to an ineffective directive and that if Sterne Agee did act pursuant to an ineffective directive Daniel had a duty to answer Davis's inquiry and refused." 965 So.2d at 1092.

1997See Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co. , 680 So.2d 245 (Ala. 1996).

1997See Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680 So.2d 245 (Ala.1996).