Davis rule in Montana

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

1980State v. Brooks (1899), 23 Mont. 146 , 57 P. 1038 ; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358 , 59 P. 169 ; State v. Felker (1903), 27 Mont. 451 , 71 P. 668 .

2016State v. Kirn, 2012 MT 69, ¶ 8 , 364 *390 Mont. 356, 274 P.3d 746 . 3 DISCUSSION ¶7 Issue: Whether the District Court properly affirmed the Justice Court’s decision denying Davis’s motion to dismiss the criminal charge for insufficient evidence. ¶8 The State charged Davis with a violation of § 61-6-301(4), MCA, which makes it unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle “upon the ways of this state open to the public ... without a valid policy of liability insurance....” Davis argues that the Justice Court should have dismissed the charge because the State’s only evidence was her statement

2016State v. Kirn, 2012 MT 69, ¶ 8 , 364 *390 Mont. 356, 274 P.3d 746 . 3 DISCUSSION ¶7 Issue: Whether the District Court properly affirmed the Justice Court’s decision denying Davis’s motion to dismiss the criminal charge for insufficient evidence. ¶8 The State charged Davis with a violation of § 61-6-301(4), MCA, which makes it unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle “upon the ways of this state open to the public ... without a valid policy of liability insurance....” Davis argues that the Justice Court should have dismissed the charge because the State’s only evidence was her statement

2013Like the Supreme Court, we hold that “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.” Berghuis,_U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 .

2013Like the Supreme Court, we hold that “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.” Berghuis,_U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 .

2013State v. Jones, 2006 MT 209, ¶ 27 , 333 Mont. 294 , 142 P.3d 851 (emphasis added). ¶31 Finding no basis in Montana’s Constitution or our prior case law for an expanded right against self-incrimination, we now adopt Berghuis and its application of the Davis standard to a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent.

2013State v. Jones, 2006 MT 209, ¶ 27 , 333 Mont. 294 , 142 P.3d 851 (emphasis added). ¶31 Finding no basis in Montana’s Constitution or our prior case law for an expanded right against self-incrimination, we now adopt Berghuis and its application of the Davis standard to a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent.

2012The State argues that Davis’ assistance prior to the deal actually happening was sufficient for conviction under Montana law. ¶10 Issue: Did the District Court err when it denied Davis’ motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence ? ¶11 “ ‘The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” State v. Newman, 2005 MT 348, ¶ 19 , 330 Mont. 160 , 127 P.3d 374 (quoting In re *262 Winshi

2012The State argues that Davis’ assistance prior to the deal actually happening was sufficient for conviction under Montana law. ¶10 Issue: Did the District Court err when it denied Davis’ motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence ? ¶11 “ ‘The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” State v. Newman, 2005 MT 348, ¶ 19 , 330 Mont. 160 , 127 P.3d 374 (quoting In re *262 Winshi

2012The State argues that Davis’ assistance prior to the deal actually happening was sufficient for conviction under Montana law. ¶10 Issue: Did the District Court err when it denied Davis’ motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence ? ¶11 “ ‘The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” State v. Newman, 2005 MT 348, ¶ 19 , 330 Mont. 160 , 127 P.3d 374 (quoting In re *262 Winshi

2012The State argues that Davis’ assistance prior to the deal actually happening was sufficient for conviction under Montana law. ¶10 Issue: Did the District Court err when it denied Davis’ motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence ? ¶11 “ ‘The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” State v. Newman, 2005 MT 348, ¶ 19 , 330 Mont. 160 , 127 P.3d 374 (quoting In re *262 Winshi

2008DISCUSSION ¶11 Did the District Court correctly deny Davis’s motion to toll on equitable grounds the one-year time bar in § 46-21-102, MCA, so that Davis could file a petition for post-conviction relief? ¶12 The State argues that the District Court has no authority to toll the one-year time bar on post-conviction relief because the time bar is a “jurisdictional limit on litigation.” The State relies on State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55 , 304 Mont. 329 , 21 P.3d 610 , and Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293 , 323 Mont. 347 , 100 P.3d 154 , for the proposition that § 46-21-102, MCA, deprives district courts of

2008DISCUSSION ¶11 Did the District Court correctly deny Davis’s motion to toll on equitable grounds the one-year time bar in § 46-21-102, MCA, so that Davis could file a petition for post-conviction relief? ¶12 The State argues that the District Court has no authority to toll the one-year time bar on post-conviction relief because the time bar is a “jurisdictional limit on litigation.” The State relies on State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55 , 304 Mont. 329 , 21 P.3d 610 , and Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293 , 323 Mont. 347 , 100 P.3d 154 , for the proposition that § 46-21-102, MCA, deprives district courts of

2008DISCUSSION ¶11 Did the District Court correctly deny Davis’s motion to toll on equitable grounds the one-year time bar in § 46-21-102, MCA, so that Davis could file a petition for post-conviction relief? ¶12 The State argues that the District Court has no authority to toll the one-year time bar on post-conviction relief because the time bar is a “jurisdictional limit on litigation.” The State relies on State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55 , 304 Mont. 329 , 21 P.3d 610 , and Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293 , 323 Mont. 347 , 100 P.3d 154 , for the proposition that § 46-21-102, MCA, deprives district courts of

2008DISCUSSION ¶11 Did the District Court correctly deny Davis’s motion to toll on equitable grounds the one-year time bar in § 46-21-102, MCA, so that Davis could file a petition for post-conviction relief? ¶12 The State argues that the District Court has no authority to toll the one-year time bar on post-conviction relief because the time bar is a “jurisdictional limit on litigation.” The State relies on State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55 , 304 Mont. 329 , 21 P.3d 610 , and Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293 , 323 Mont. 347 , 100 P.3d 154 , for the proposition that § 46-21-102, MCA, deprives district courts of

1978In further expanding the application of the Davis rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation (9th Cir. 1969), 409 F.2d 1263 , stated: “* * * Davis distills the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer is under a duty to warn of dangers in ‘nondefective’ but potentially harmful products. * * * if the product is unreasonably dangerous and a warning should be given, but is not given, then the product is automatically ‘defective’ * * 409 F.2d 1271 .

1978In further expanding the application of the Davis rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation (9th Cir. 1969), 409 F.2d 1263 , stated: “* * * Davis distills the essence of the rule to be that the manufacturer is under a duty to warn of dangers in ‘nondefective’ but potentially harmful products. * * * if the product is unreasonably dangerous and a warning should be given, but is not given, then the product is automatically ‘defective’ * * 409 F.2d 1271 .