17 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2025See State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443 , 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989) (holding it is error for the trial judge to exclusively charge the Davis instruction on self-defense when the defendant requests additional charges and the evidence supports the request). 2025See State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443 , 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989) (holding it is error for the trial judge to exclusively charge the Davis instruction on self-defense when the defendant requests additional charges and the evidence supports the request). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cherrygreen2 sentences2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S 2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hepburngreen2 sentences2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S 2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burtongreen2 sentences2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S 2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Comed, Inc.green2 sentences2024See Davis, 619 F.2d at 594 (listing "the degree of support plaintiff was receiving from the shareholders he purported to represent" as Procedure 42 explain that the portion of the rule regarding derivative suits was deleted because it was redundant to Article 5.14 of the Business Corporation Act, which sets forth detailed procedures for derivative suits. a factor). 2024See Davis, 619 F.2d at 594 (listing "the degree of support plaintiff was receiving from the shareholders he purported to represent" as Procedure 42 explain that the portion of the rule regarding derivative suits was deleted because it was redundant to Article 5.14 of the Business Corporation Act, which sets forth detailed procedures for derivative suits. a factor). | 1 | 1 |
Hilton v. Flakeboard America Limitedgreen2 sentences2024See Hilton, 418 S.C. at 247 , 791 S.E.2d at 720 (finding it necessary to reach the underlying merits of the Appellate Panel's "admittedly interlocutory order" and concluding the nature of the error was such "that the order cannot stand"). 2024See Hilton, 418 S.C. at 247 , 791 S.E.2d at 720 (finding it necessary to reach the underlying merits of the Appellate Panel's "admittedly interlocutory order" and concluding the nature of the error was such "that the order cannot stand"). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Weeksgreen2 sentences2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse 2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou 2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. City of Columbiagreen2 sentences2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou 2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou | 1 | 1 |
Fassett v. Evansgreen2 sentences2023See Fassett v. Evans, 364 S.C. 42, 47 , 610 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[A]n [officer's] return of process creates the legal presumption of proper service that cannot be 'impeached by the mere denial of service by the defendant.'" (quoting Richardson Constr. 2023See Fassett v. Evans, 364 S.C. 42, 47 , 610 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[A]n [officer's] return of process creates the legal presumption of proper service that cannot be 'impeached by the mere denial of service by the defendant.'" (quoting Richardson Constr. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zeiglergreen2 sentences2023See State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 101 , 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 102 , 610 S.E.2d at 863 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); § 16-25-10(3) (providing a "household member" is "(a) a spouse; (b) a former spouse; (c) persons who have a child in common; or (d) a male 2023See State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 101 , 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 102 , 610 S.E.2d at 863 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); § 16-25-10(3) (providing a "household member" is "(a) a spouse; (b) a former spouse; (c) persons who have a child in common; or (d) a male | 1 | 1 |
Falk v. Sadlergreen2 sentences2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou 2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou | 1 | 1 |
Roberson v. Southern Finance of South Carolina, Inc.green2 sentences2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse 2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse | 1 | 1 |
Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse 2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse | 1 | 1 |
Wilder Corp. v. Wilkegreen2 sentences2023See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."). 2023See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."). | 1 | 1 |
Emery v. Smithgreen2 sentences2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou 2023We hold the master erred in granting Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on laches because the record, at this early stage, does not support the finding.1 See Falk v. Sadler, 341 S.C. 281, 286 , 533 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Any party may move for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP."); id. (stating that when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court must regard all properly pleaded factual allegations as admitted"); Pope v. Wilson, 427 S.C. 377, 384 , 831 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, the cou | 1 | 1 |
Mid-State Trust, II v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2023However, even if we considered the master's ruling as a grant of summary judgment, it would not affect our resolution of this appeal. ("Laches is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done." (quoting Mid-State Trust, II v. Wright, 323 S.C. 303, 307 , 474 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1996))); id. ("The party seeking to establish laches must show (1) delay, (2) unreasonable delay, and (3) prejudice."); id. at 216, 603 S.E.2d at 602 ("[T]he determination of whether laches has been established is 2023However, even if we considered the master's ruling as a grant of summary judgment, it would not affect our resolution of this appeal. ("Laches is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done." (quoting Mid-State Trust, II v. Wright, 323 S.C. 303, 307 , 474 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1996))); id. ("The party seeking to establish laches must show (1) delay, (2) unreasonable delay, and (3) prejudice."); id. at 216, 603 S.E.2d at 602 ("[T]he determination of whether laches has been established is | 1 | 1 |
State v. Alstongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. 2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 1 |
In re Coopergreen2 sentences2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. 2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Horry County Magistrate Hughesgreen1 sentence2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quattlebaumgreen2 sentences2022See Burgess, 408 S.C. 421, 442 , 759 S.E.2d 407, 418 (2014) ("As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." (quoting Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 450 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 )). 2022See Burgess, 408 S.C. 421, 442 , 759 S.E.2d 407, 418 (2014) ("As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." (quoting Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 450 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 )). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. 2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burgessgreen2 sentences2022See Burgess, 408 S.C. 421, 442 , 759 S.E.2d 407, 418 (2014) ("As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." (quoting Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 450 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 )). 2022See Burgess, 408 S.C. 421, 442 , 759 S.E.2d 407, 418 (2014) ("As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." (quoting Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. at 450 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 )). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443 , 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989) (holding it was error for the circuit court to charge the Davis instruction as an exclusive self-defense charge when the facts and circumstances necessitated the circuit court charge additional elements that were requested by the defendant); see also State v. Nichols, 325 S.C. 111, 116-17 , 481 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1997) (finding the evidence supported including additional instructions on (1) “the right to act on appearances,” (2) “relevance of prior difficulties,” and (3) “that a person does not have to wait before acting in self 2015See State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443 , 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989) (holding it was error for the circuit court to charge the Davis instruction as an exclusive self-defense charge when the facts and circumstances necessitated the circuit court charge additional elements that were requested by the defendant); see also State v. Nichols, 325 S.C. 111, 116-17 , 481 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1997) (finding the evidence supported including additional instructions on (1) “the right to act on appearances,” (2) “relevance of prior difficulties,” and (3) “that a person does not have to wait before acting in self | 1 | 1 |
| Bonaparte v. Floydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stone v. Roadway Expressgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Green
green
1 sentence2026See State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429 , 753 S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) ("If the state has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,' [the appellate court] must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury." (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004))); State v. Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265 , 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003) ("The appropriate 'vehicle for challenging the admissibility of evidence based on a search and seizure violation is a motion to suppress.'" (quoting S | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jennings v. KAY JENNINGS FAMILY LTD.
green
2 sentences2024The Virginia Supreme Court recognized in applying the Davis factors, a single shareholder derivative claim is possible when "the totality of the circumstances support[s] a finding that the plaintiff's personal interests do not preclude the shareholder from fairly and adequately representing the corporation." Id. 2024The Virginia Supreme Court recognized in applying the Davis factors, a single shareholder derivative claim is possible when "the totality of the circumstances support[s] a finding that the plaintiff's personal interests do not preclude the shareholder from fairly and adequately representing the corporation." Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Closing of the Probate Courts
green
1 sentence2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina
neutral
1 sentence2023See In re Est. of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 259 , 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); Delta Apparel, Inc. v. Farina, 406 S.C. 257, 265 , 750 S.E.2d 615 , 619 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." (quoting Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 365 S.C. 6, 9 , 615 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2005))); Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607 , 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("An abuse | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Tindall
green
1 sentence2022See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279 , 811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81 , 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| cluster 100 green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Davis v. United States green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wallace v. MILLIKEN & COMPANY green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Buckner v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Wallace v. Milliken & Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Sventko v. Kroger Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.