13 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ihnotgreen1 sentence2025We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied this claim. “[A] defendant’s right to testify in his or her own defense is protected by both the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution and Minnesota state law.” State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen1 sentence2025White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edgar Barraza-Maldonadogreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). 2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Erickson Meko Campbellgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). 2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sparksgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). 2024See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 883-87 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 867-69 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bristgreen2 sentences2016The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in State v. Brist that courts are required “to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court ‘testimonial’ statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly- rooted hearsay exception.” 812 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. 2012).4 Applying the Davis factors to this case, J.C.-L.’s statements to Detective Parranto in the ambulance were nontestimonial, and therefore admissible at trial. 2016The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in State v. Brist that courts are required “to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court ‘testimonial’ statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly- rooted hearsay exception.” 812 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. 2012).4 Applying the Davis factors to this case, J.C.-L.’s statements to Detective Parranto in the ambulance were nontestimonial, and therefore admissible at trial. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence2015See State v. Davis, 773 N.W.2d 66 , 68 n. 2 (Minn.2009) ("Because we do not decide this issue, Davis' motion to strike portions of the State’s appendix and the State’s motion to strike portions of Davis’ appendix are denied as moot.”). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Knafflagreen2 sentences2015Matakis argues, based on State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), that a convicted defendant has the right to at least one review by an appellate or postconviction court. 2015Matakis argues, based on State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), that a convicted defendant has the right to at least one review by an appellate or postconviction court. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Breauxgreen1 sentence2015See State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001). 10 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Swansongreen1 sentence2009See State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 658 (Minn.2006) (concluding that prosecutor’s impermissible questions and comments were harmless considering strength of state’s case and the “limited nature of the prosecutorial misconduct”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stonegreen1 sentence2009State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 1997). [5] The dissent argues that our decision in Stone requires the court to conclude that the State does not have the authority to prosecute Davis in state court for speeding because he is a member of the MCT and the alleged offense occurred within MCT territory. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jouppisgreen2 sentences2008State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 881 (Minn.1985); State v. Jouppis, 147 Minn. 87, 89 , 179 N.W. 678, 679 (1920) (“Whether a party shall be permitted to reopen his case * * * after he has rested, is generally within the discretion of the trial court * * In Jouppis, we held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant’s request to reopen the case because (1) the request was made right after the defense rested; (2) the evidence was material, not cumulative, and concerned a controlling issue; and (3) there was no improper purpose for failing to produce the evidence earlier. 147 Minn, 2008State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 881 (Minn.1985); State v. Jouppis, 147 Minn. 87, 89 , 179 N.W. 678, 679 (1920) (“Whether a party shall be permitted to reopen his case * * * after he has rested, is generally within the discretion of the trial court * * In Jouppis, we held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant’s request to reopen the case because (1) the request was made right after the defense rested; (2) the evidence was material, not cumulative, and concerned a controlling issue; and (3) there was no improper purpose for failing to produce the evidence earlier. 147 Minn, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Warsamegreen2 sentences2008See Warsame, 735 N.W.2d at 697 (remanding for further proceedings to properly apply Davis standard, with permission to further develop record as appropriate). [27] If the declarant is in police custody, for example, it is particularly likely that she is in no danger and that the police questioning is for the purpose of gathering evidence. 2008See Warsame, 735 N.W.2d at 697 (remanding for further proceedings to properly apply Davis standard, with permission to further develop record as appropriate). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2008State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 881 (Minn.1985); State v. Jouppis, 147 Minn. 87, 89 , 179 N.W. 678, 679 (1920) (“Whether a party shall be permitted to reopen his case * * * after he has rested, is generally within the discretion of the trial court * * In Jouppis, we held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant’s request to reopen the case because (1) the request was made right after the defense rested; (2) the evidence was material, not cumulative, and concerned a controlling issue; and (3) there was no improper purpose for failing to produce the evidence earlier. 147 Minn, 2008State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 831 (Minn.1985); State v. Jouppis, 147 Minn. 87, 89 , 179 N.W. 678, 679 (1920) ("Whether a party shall be permitted to reopen his case * * * after he has rested, is generally within the discretion of the trial court * * *."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cermakgreen2 sentences2008We stated in State v. Cermak that “generally evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the accused.” 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn.1985). 2008We stated in State v. Cermak that "generally evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the accused." 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Riley v. Stategreen1 sentence2016But see Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting testimony in affidavits as based on inadmissible hearsay). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Randy Leeroyal Swaney v. State of Minnesota
green
1 sentence2024Therefore, the failure to conduct the pretrial interview with D.T. cannot be attributed to trial counsel’s “inattention or neglect.” See id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Bonnie Ann Lindquist, Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
green
2 sentences2024In Lindquist, however, the supreme court adopted the Davis exception for situations in which “law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.” Id. at 876 . 2024In Lindquist, however, the supreme court adopted the Davis exception for situations in which “law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.” Id. at 876 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Strommen
green
1 sentence2016It is true that, “[a]s a rule, trial courts have a duty to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681 , 689 13 (Minn. 2002). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2015The Court mákes clear that the same rationale justifies its decision in Davis, explaining that “[ujnder our exclusionary-rule precedents, [the] acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim,” and that “in 27 years of practice under Leon’s good-faith exception, we have ‘never applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-29 . 2015The Court mákes clear that the same rationale justifies its decision in Davis, explaining that “[ujnder our exclusionary-rule precedents, [the] acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim,” and that “in 27 years of practice under Leon’s good-faith exception, we have ‘never applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-29 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. RMh
green
2 sentences2009The district court denied Davis’ motion, holding that under State v. R.M.H., 617 N.W.2d 55 (Minn.2000), the State has jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed on Indian reservations by nonmembers of the reservation. 2009The district court denied Davis' motion, holding that under State v. R.M.H., 617 N.W.2d 55 (Minn.2000), the State has jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed on Indian reservations by nonmembers of the reservation. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Duro v. Reina
red
2 sentences2009Davis’ claim is based on the fact that in R.M.H. we relied on Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 , 110 S.Ct. 2053 , 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). 2009Davis’ claim is based on the fact that in R.M.H. we relied on Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 , 110 S.Ct. 2053 , 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lothenbach
green
1 sentence2006Davis then entered a not-guilty plea, submitted the matter to the district court under State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn.1980), and was found guilty of controlled-substance crimes for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.