Davis claim in Indiana

2017Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149 , 154 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 1. 911 Call [7] Applying the Davis factors, we conclude that the operator’s questions objectively had the primary purpose of enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency.

2017Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149 , 154 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 1. 911 Call [7] Applying the Davis factors, we conclude that the operator’s questions objectively had the primary purpose of enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency.

2012Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court’s determinations as A determination of contributory negligence would have been an absolute bar to Davis’ claim. 14 See Johnson, 947 N.E.2d at 958 (noting Comparative Fault Act does not apply to claims under the Medical Malpractice Act). 15 While both Dr. Welch and Austin were included on the witness lists, again, Davis was not notified until approximately two weeks before trial that their testimony would go to the issue of contributory negligence. 19 to violations and sanctions should not be overturned.

2012See Johnson, 947 N.E.2d at 958 (noting Comparative Fault Act does not apply to claims under the Medical Malpractice Act). 15 .

2014Id. at 290.

2014Id. at 290 .

2026Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ind. 2006).

2024Consequently, the foreclosure decree in Cause 051 is void as to Bank because the trial court in Cause 051 never obtained personal jurisdiction over Bank. 4 Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bank and its subsequent denial of Davis’s motion to correct error. 5 See id. at 816 (holding judgment in foreclosure action was void as to Citimortgage because the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over it). 4 Bank also asserts in its brief that MERS was “the mortgagee” and “[a]s such, Indiana law required MERS to be named and served in the CSL forec

2020State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017).

2020See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that contentions in appellant’s brief be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) (requiring that argument include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review); Casady v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1181, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (failure to cite rules of evidence and case law waived claim of improperly admitted evidence), trans. denied (2011). [7] Waiver notwithstanding, Davis’s challenge to the denial of his motion

2019“When raised on collateral review, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal, (2) waiver of issues, and (3) failure to present issues well.” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ind. 2008). [43] Davis’ claim falls under the third category: an allegation of failure to present issues well.

2018See e.g., Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

2016Therefore, “just as ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are foreclosed in post- conviction proceedings if they are raised on direct appeal, such claims are foreclosed where, as here, the issue was raised in a motion to correct error but not raised on direct appeal.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. [11] Thus, in the present case, Davis’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was previously raised and adjudicated by the trial court.

2015“The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.” Holmes v. State, 728 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. 2000).

2014Co., L.P., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. 1995).

2014See Collier v. State, 846 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. 4 Concerning the fourth factor, Davis’ claim on appeal is that he did not know there would be a shooting until it happened. 1 Davis relies on Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1999), in which our Supreme Court reversed, finding insufficient evidence to prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another to commit murder.

2014“When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court.” Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and evidence considered by the trial court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

2014See Collier v. State, 846 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. 4 Concerning the fourth factor, Davis’ claim on appeal is that he did not know there would be a shooting until it happened. 1 Davis relies on Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1999), in which our Supreme Court reversed, finding insufficient evidence to prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another to commit murder.

2014“When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court.” Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and evidence considered by the trial court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

2013Smith v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

2012See Davis v. State, 418 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding ―that it was not reversible error for the court to accept Davis’s plea of guilty absent a written recommendation having been filed by the state‖ and that ―Davis has alleged no harm to himself as a result of the court not requiring the agreement to be reduced to writing‖).

2012See Jackson v. State, 806 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ind.2004) (holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct *475 erroneous sentence and noting that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is available only to correct sentencing errors clear from the face of the judgment); Bauer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (noting that the defendant’s claims required consideration of matters in the record outside the face of the judgment and accordingly they are not the types of claims that are properly presented in a motion to correct erroneous sentence), trans. deni

2012Cliver v. State, 666 N.E.2d 59, 64 (Ind. 1996) (citation omitted).

2012See Jackson v. State, 806 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ind.2004) (holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct *475 erroneous sentence and noting that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is available only to correct sentencing errors clear from the face of the judgment); Bauer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (noting that the defendant’s claims required consideration of matters in the record outside the face of the judgment and accordingly they are not the types of claims that are properly presented in a motion to correct erroneous sentence), trans. deni

2008“If the language of [an] instrument is unambiguous, the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of that instrument.” Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Price, 714 N.E.2d 712, 716 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

2006Davis v. Avco Fin'l Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 , 1068 (6th Cir.1984); see also, e.g., Riedel v. Acutote of Colo., 773 F.Supp. 1055, 1063 (S.D.Ohio 1991) (applying Davis factors).

2006Davis v. Aveo Fin'l Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 , 1068 (6th Cir.1984); see also, eg., Riedel v. Acutote of Colo., 773 F.Supp. 1055, 1063 (S.D.Ohio 1991) (applying Davis factors).

2004Pennycuff v. State, 745 N.E.2d 804, 811 (Ind.2001) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).