Davis motion in Arkansas

2025App. 504, at 4 , 471 S.W.3d 236, 239 . 10 Here, Davis’s motion failed to adequately specify any deficiencies in the State’s proof and is therefore inadequate to preserve for appellate review the specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence he now raises on appeal.

2024In re Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic–Resumption of Deadlines for Serv. of Process, 2021 Ark. 67 (per curiam).

2021Id. 3 Davis’s claim that the information contained defects that made it insufficient to charge him was summarily denied by the circuit court along with other claims because the court found that they were not proper grounds for relief under Rule 37.

2019Given the recent history of how inmate filings were handled by circuit clerks in this state, see, e.g. , Halfacre v. Kelley , 2016 Ark. 171 , in my view, it is incumbent on this court to treat such accusations with a little more circumspection.

2011The court stated that it did not hear Davis say that he wanted an attorney to be with him. |7The appellate courts have found that statements such as “You’ll furnish me a public defender,” Holsombach, 368 Ark. at 421 , 246 S.W.3d at 876 ; “Do I need to call an attorney,” Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 160 , 243 S.W.3d 866, 878 (2006); and “Do you think I need an attorney,” Higgins v. State, 317 Ark. 555, 560 , 879 S.W.2d 424, 427 (1994), were not unequivocal requests for counsel.

2011The court stated that it did not hear Davis say that he wanted an attorney to be with him. |7The appellate courts have found that statements such as “You’ll furnish me a public defender,” Holsombach, 368 Ark. at 421 , 246 S.W.3d at 876 ; “Do I need to call an attorney,” Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 160 , 243 S.W.3d 866, 878 (2006); and “Do you think I need an attorney,” Higgins v. State, 317 Ark. 555, 560 , 879 S.W.2d 424, 427 (1994), were not unequivocal requests for counsel.

2004We found this Davis violation was controlled by the guidance in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), which sets forth factors that are considered when determining whether the unconstitutionality of a statute will be applied retroactively.

2004We found this Davis violation was controlled by the guidance in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), which sets forth factors that are considered when determining whether the unconstitutionality of a statute will be applied retroactively.

2003App. 66 , 49 S.W.3d 122 , (2001), characterizes Chief Davis’s claim of exigent circumstances as “speculative, at best.” The historical facts of Starks and the present case are quite different.

2003App. 366 , 49 S.W.3d 122 , (2001), characterizes Chief Davis's claim of exigent circumstances as "speculative, at best." The historical facts of Starks and the present case are quite different.

2003Similarly, in Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406 , 4 S.W.3d 892 (2003), this court affirmed the denial of appellant Davis’s motion to suppress where the facts showed the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him.

1996A jury is not required to believe all or any part of a defendant’s or witness’s statement, Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385 , 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991), and is entided to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching its verdict.

1996A jury is not required to believe all or any part of a defendant’s or witness’s statement, Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385 , 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991), and is entided to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching its verdict.