Davis claim in Kansas

2021In Davis' direct appeal, this court noted: "Davis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravated battery conviction; however, we note that his arguments all concern his aggravated kidnapping conviction." Davis, 2011 WL 3795267, at *8 .

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020It reasoned that "'[t]he phrases "entering into" and "remaining within" refer to legally distinct factual situations'" because "entering into" refers to crossing the plane of a building's exterior wall, while "remaining within" refers to continued presence in a building after entry occurred. 303 Kan. at 789 . 10 In State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170 , 339 P.3d 795 (2014), the court addressed the fleeing and eluding statute, but its holding does not resolve Davis' claim.

2020It reasoned that "'[t]he phrases "entering into" and "remaining within" refer to legally distinct factual situations'" because "entering into" refers to crossing the plane of a building's exterior wall, while "remaining within" refers to continued presence in a building after entry occurred. 303 Kan. at 789 . 10 In State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170 , 339 P.3d 795 (2014), the court addressed the fleeing and eluding statute, but its holding does not resolve Davis' claim.

2020It reasoned that "'[t]he phrases "entering into" and "remaining within" refer to legally distinct factual situations'" because "entering into" refers to crossing the plane of a building's exterior wall, while "remaining within" refers to continued presence in a building after entry occurred. 303 Kan. at 789 . 10 In State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170 , 339 P.3d 795 (2014), the court addressed the fleeing and eluding statute, but its holding does not resolve Davis' claim.

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 65 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156 , 289 P.3d 85 (2012); State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 585 , 932 P.2d 981 (1997).

2020In its memorandum opinion, the district court addressed the merits of Davis' motion. "'[M]anifest injustice' [is] something obviously unfair or shocking to the conscience." State v. Barahona, 35 Kan.

2020App. 2d 605, 608-09 , 132 P.3d 959 , rev. denied 282 Kan. 791 (2006).

2007While Crawford addresses statements “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” (emphasis added) 541 U.S. at 51-52 , or for use “prosecutorially,” 541 U.S. at 51 , the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals includes statements that might be used in the investigation of the crime.

2007While Crawford addresses statements “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” (emphasis added) 541 U.S. at 51-52 , or for use “prosecutorially,” 541 U.S. at 51 , the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals includes statements that might be used in the investigation of the crime.

2007In particular, the Davis analysis is markedly different from die confrontation analysis in Bratt , on which the defendant relies in his brief, which employed the two-prong unavailability and reliability test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , regardless of the testimonial character of the statement in question.

2007In particular, the Davis analysis is markedly different from die confrontation analysis in Bratt , on which the defendant relies in his brief, which employed the two-prong unavailability and reliability test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , regardless of the testimonial character of the statement in question.

2001The Court of Appeals declined to review Davis’ claim of deprivation of due process because the record did not show that he was subjected to any discipline that represented a significant and atypical hardship not contemplated in the original sentence. 21 Kan.

1995This court in Morris adopted the Davis rule that when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement concerning the right to counsel, clarification is preferred but not required. 255 Kan. at 974-76 .

1995This court in Morris adopted the Davis rule that when a suspect makes an ambiguous statement concerning the right to counsel, clarification is preferred but not required. 255 Kan. at 974-76 .

1994The State cites State v. Goering, 225 Kan. 755 , 594 P.2d 194 (1979).

1994The State cites State v. Goering, 225 Kan. 755 , 594 P.2d 194 (1979).

1994Davis also points out that in State v. Thomas, 252 Kan. 564, 579 , 847 P.2d 1219 (1993), this court found threats the defendant had made against a witness to be relevant because “ ‘attempts by the accused to conceal or destroy evidence, or to fabricate or procure false evidence, are incriminating circumstances that may be presented to the jury.’ ” Davis reasons that threats made by Robert Thomas here were likewise relevant because the threats support Davis’ claim that Thomas threatened him and portray Thomas as the ringleader and therefore incriminate Thomas.

1994Davis also points out that in State v. Thomas, 252 Kan. 564, 579 , 847 P.2d 1219 (1993), this court found threats the defendant had made against a witness to be relevant because “ ‘attempts by the accused to conceal or destroy evidence, or to fabricate or procure false evidence, are incriminating circumstances that may be presented to the jury.’ ” Davis reasons that threats made by Robert Thomas here were likewise relevant because the threats support Davis’ claim that Thomas threatened him and portray Thomas as the ringleader and therefore incriminate Thomas.

1992Kirby discusses K.S.A. 22-2402 as a codification of the Terry “stop and frisk” standard. 12 Kan.