9 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2009Ed. 2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60 , P9, 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel)." 2008 ME 77 ,' 15. 2The State agrees that Agent Struck conducted a custodial interrogation of Defendant while Defendant was in Agent Struck's vehicle. 2009Ed. 2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60 , P9, 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel)." 2008 ME 77 ,' 15. 2The State agrees that Agent Struck conducted a custodial interrogation of Defendant while Defendant was in Agent Struck's vehicle. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Kinggreen2 sentences2026See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 849 n.9 (1998); see also United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Coke, No. 07 CR 971 RPP, 2011 WL 3738969 , at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2026See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998); see also United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Coke, No. 07 CR 971 RPP, 2011 WL 3738969, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Connorgreen2 sentences2026The 7 Court explained that “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id. at 395 . [¶12] Because the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects against unreasonable searches, Davis’s claims here are, under Graham, properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Because the search was reasonable under th 2026The 7 Court explained that “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id. at 395. [¶12] Because the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects against unreasonable searches, Davis’s claims here are, under Graham, properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Because the search was reasonable under the | 1 | 1 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2026See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 849 n.9 (1998); see also United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Coke, No. 07 CR 971 RPP, 2011 WL 3738969 , at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2026See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998); see also United States v. King, 222 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Coke, No. 07 CR 971 RPP, 2011 WL 3738969, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2011We have previously acknowledged that "an individual's common law duty will extend only so far in negligence actions related to winter weather, and we have on multiple occasions defined, limited, [or] restricted this duty.” Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶¶ 19, 30-32 , 930 A.2d 1016, 1021, 1024-25 ; cf. Budzko v. One City Ctr. 2011We have previously acknowledged that "an individual's common law duty will extend only so far in negligence actions related to winter weather, and we have on multiple occasions defined, limited, [or] restricted this duty.” Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶¶ 19, 30-32 , 930 A.2d 1016, 1021, 1024-25 ; cf. Budzko v. One City Ctr. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nielsengreen2 sentences2009Ed. 2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60 , P9, 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel)." 2008 ME 77 ,' 15. 2The State agrees that Agent Struck conducted a custodial interrogation of Defendant while Defendant was in Agent Struck's vehicle. 2009Ed. 2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60 , P9, 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel)." 2008 ME 77 ,' 15. 2The State agrees that Agent Struck conducted a custodial interrogation of Defendant while Defendant was in Agent Struck's vehicle. | 1 | 1 |
Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp.green1 sentence2006See id. | 1 | 1 |
Rippett v. Bemisgreen1 sentence1997Thus the trial court did not err by denying Davis’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 3 III. [¶ 5] To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for Davis on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Tyler “must establish a prima facie case for each element of that claim.” Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 85 (Me.1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kateryna A. Bagrii v. John P. Campbell
neutral
2 sentences2025Although a question has been raised as to whether the Davis standard is constitutionally required, see Bagrii v. Campbell, 2025 ME 38 , ¶ 60 n.17, 334 A.3d 733 (Douglas, J., dissenting), Davis controls and requires Welch to demonstrate standing by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Based on the court’s review of the pleadings and af idavits, [Welch] has not made prima facie showing of the entirety of subsection 3(C). [Welch] has not shown that the relationship that [Welch] posits by af idavit between [Welch] and the child was fostered or supported by another parent of the child (i.e. [Chavaree 2025Although a question has been raised as to whether the Davis standard is constitutionally required, see Bagrii v. Campbell, 2025 ME 38 , ¶ 60 n.17, 334 A.3d 733 (Douglas, J., dissenting), Davis controls and requires Welch to demonstrate standing by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Based on the court’s review of the pleadings and af idavits, [Welch] has not made prima facie showing of the entirety of subsection 3(C). [Welch] has not shown that the relationship that [Welch] posits by af idavit between [Welch] and the child was fostered or supported by another parent of the child (i.e. [Chavaree | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Nigro
green
2 sentences2018Rather than attempting to show the neighbor a photographic array at that point, the detective took a statement in which the witness indicated that he was one hundred percent certain that Davis was the man he saw through the truck windshield. [¶ 13] In ruling on Davis's motion in limine to bar the witness's out-of-court identification of Davis from being admitted at trial, the court applied to these factual findings the two-part test articulated in State v. Nigro , 2011 ME 81 , ¶¶ 21-23, 24 A.3d 1283 . 2018Rather than attempting to show the neighbor a photographic array at that point, the detective took a statement in which the witness indicated that he was one hundred percent certain that Davis was the man he saw through the truck windshield. [¶ 13] In ruling on Davis's motion in limine to bar the witness's out-of-court identification of Davis from being admitted at trial, the court applied to these factual findings the two-part test articulated in State v. Nigro , 2011 ME 81 , ¶¶ 21-23, 24 A.3d 1283 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12 , 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). 2015Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12 , 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Rickett
green
2 sentences2015Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12 , 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). 2015Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12 , 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2008If a defendant invokes his right to counsel at any time during an interview with police, “he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60, ¶ 9 , 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel). [¶ 16] In order to invoke one’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel, one must do so unambiguously. 2008If a defendant invokes his right to counsel at any time during an interview with police, “he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also State v. King, 1998 ME 60, ¶ 9 , 708 A.2d 1014, 1017 (providing that Maine courts apply the Davis rule in assessing invocations of the right to counsel). [¶ 16] In order to invoke one’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel, one must do so unambiguously. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.