Davis standard in Maryland

2018Id. at 238-39 , 647 A.2d 446 .

1999We held that Davis’s claim did not constitute a compensable occupational disease under § 9—502(d)(l)(i) because the alleged disease was not “ ‘due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist.’ ” Id. at 236, 647 A.2d at 451 (quoting § 9—502(d)(1)(i)).

2025The first part of the test is known as “the performance prong[,]” and the second prong is known as “the prejudice prong[.]” See Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356 , 168 A.3d 1, 9 (2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2025Id.

2025Id.

2021With respect to the plurality’s “accusatory” test, Justice Kagan observed that such a requirement “has no basis in our precedents,” id. at 135 , and quoted Davis’s standard: “We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose of establishing ‘past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’—in other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.” Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 ).

2021With respect to the plurality’s “accusatory” test, Justice Kagan observed that such a requirement “has no basis in our precedents,” id. at 135 , and quoted Davis’s standard: “We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose of establishing ‘past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’—in other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.” Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 ).

2021With respect to the plurality’s “accusatory” test, Justice Kagan observed that such a requirement “has no basis in our precedents,” id. at 135 , and quoted Davis’s standard: “We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose of establishing ‘past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’—in other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.” Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 ).

2020Davis, 447 Md. at 311 .

2015Id.

2015Id.

2012Id. at 533 , 14 A.3d at 719 .

2012Id. at 533 , 14 A.3d at 719 .

2012Davis filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Davis v. State, 421 Md. 557 , 28 A.3d 644 (2011), to consider the question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial court’s decision denying Mr. Davis’s motion to suppress derivative evidence seized by Montgomery County police after the police intercepted Mr. Davis’s phone call from his Virginia phone, placed while he was in Virginia, to a Virginia phone line when the call’s recipient was also in Virginia, in violation of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md.Code Ann.

2012Davis filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Davis v. State, 421 Md. 557 , 28 A.3d 644 (2011), to consider the question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision denying Mr. Davis's motion to suppress derivative evidence seized by Montgomery County police after the police intercepted Mr. Davis's phone call from his Virginia phone, placed while he was in Virginia, to a Virginia phone line when the call's recipient was also in Virginia, in violation of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. *1048 Code Ann.

2012Davis filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Davis v. State, 421 Md. 557 , 28 A.3d 644 (2011), to consider the question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial court’s decision denying Mr. Davis’s motion to suppress derivative evidence seized by Montgomery County police after the police intercepted Mr. Davis’s phone call from his Virginia phone, placed while he was in Virginia, to a Virginia phone line when the call’s recipient was also in Virginia, in violation of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md.Code Ann.

2012Davis filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Davis v. State, 421 Md. 557 , 28 A.3d 644 (2011), to consider the question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision denying Mr. Davis's motion to suppress derivative evidence seized by Montgomery County police after the police intercepted Mr. Davis's phone call from his Virginia phone, placed while he was in Virginia, to a Virginia phone line when the call's recipient was also in Virginia, in violation of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. *1048 Code Ann.

2011Later, in Braboy v. State, 130 Md.App. 220, 234-35 , 745 A.2d 471 (2000), where the issue was whether Braboy had invoked his right to counsel before executing a waiver of his Miranda rights, we applied the Davis standard and concluded that, because Braboy had not “unequivocally and ‘unambiguously’ ” requested counsel, he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel.

2011Later, in Braboy v. State, 130 Md.App. 220, 234-35 , 745 A.2d 471 (2000), where the issue was whether Braboy had invoked his right to counsel before executing a waiver of his Miranda rights, we applied the Davis standard and concluded that, because Braboy had not “unequivocally and ‘unambiguously’ ” requested counsel, he had not effectively invoked his right to counsel.

2011On appeal, after looking at how other jurisdictions had decided the issue of the applicability of the Davis post-waiver standard to a pre-waiver purported invocation of rights, 4 we concluded that the Davis standard, “requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel,” applied only in a “situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.” Id. at 429, 857 A.2d 557 .

2011On appeal, after looking at how other jurisdictions had decided the issue of the applicability of the Davis post-waiver standard to a pre-waiver purported invocation of rights, 4 we concluded that the Davis standard, “requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel,” applied only in a “situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.” Id. at 429, 857 A.2d 557 .

2011In State v. Lucas, supra, 407 Md. 307 , 965 A.2d 75 , the *666 Court considered statements made by a domestic violence victim when police officers encountered her at the entrance to her apartment.

2011In State v. Lucas, supra, 407 Md. 307 , 965 A.2d 75 , the *666 Court considered statements made by a domestic violence victim when police officers encountered her at the entrance to her apartment.

1999Davis v. DiPino, supra, 121 Md.App. at 79 , 708 A.2d at 382 .

1999Davis v. DiPino, supra, 121 Md.App. at 79 , 708 A.2d at 382 .

1999Id. at 670-671, 689 A.2d at 1242-43 .

1999Id. at 670-671, 689 A.2d at 1242-43 .

1994Davis, 280 Md. at 125 , 372 A.2d 231 .

1994Davis, 280 Md. at 125 , 372 A.2d 231 .

1994In Nutt , the articles seized from the defendant's apartment included: a bag containing fifteen tinfoil packets of codeine hydrochloride, a manila envelope containing heroin, ten glassine bags and five empty pink capsules of a type used to package and distribute cocaine or heroin, two burnt bottle top caps with residue, three hypodermic syringes and other devices used to inject heroin, 45 glassine bags containing heroin, seven tinfoil packets of cocaine. 16 Md.App. at 704, 299 A.2d 468 . 9 .

1993The actual Davis test is “to entitle one to such [punitive] damages there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful act.” Davis, 183 Md. at 133 , 36 A.2d at 701 .

1993The actual Davis test is “to entitle one to such [punitive] damages there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful act.” Davis, 183 Md. at 133 , 36 A.2d at 701 .

1993In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127 , 571 A.2d 1213 (1990), however, the Court of Appeals decided that limiting language in a notice of appeal should be deemed surplusage and ignored.

1993In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127 , 571 A.2d 1213 (1990), however, the Court of Appeals decided that limiting language in a notice of appeal should be deemed surplusage and ignored.

1992This Court further explained the Davis rule in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 , 372 A.2d 582 (1977): “The teaching of Davis v. Davis, supra, is plain.

1992This Court further explained the Davis rule in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 , 372 A.2d 582 (1977): “The teaching of Davis v. Davis, supra, is plain.

1992The notice that Vigneri received in the form of the Commission’s request for information as to any permanent disability he suffered was not more specific as to any statutory time limitation running on a possible permanent disability claim than was given to Vest in his “Award of Compensation” and “Statement of Compensation Paid.” At this juncture, we note Davis v. Silver Hill Concrete Co., 255 Md. 482 , 258 A.2d 591 (1969), in which the Court of Appeals determined that the statute’s then three year limitations period barred Davis’ claim for an additional award of permanent disability compensati

1992The notice that Vigneri received in the form of the Commission’s request for information as to any permanent disability he suffered was not more specific as to any statutory time limitation running on a possible permanent disability claim than was given to Vest in his “Award of Compensation” and “Statement of Compensation Paid.” At this juncture, we note Davis v. Silver Hill Concrete Co., 255 Md. 482 , 258 A.2d 591 (1969), in which the Court of Appeals determined that the statute’s then three year limitations period barred Davis’ claim for an additional award of permanent disability compensati

1990Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting in part from Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 , 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1283 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). 1 .

1990Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting in part from Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 , 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1283 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). 1 .

1990Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting in part from Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 , 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1283 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). 1 .

1990Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting in part from Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390 , 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1283 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). 1 .