presence hearing in Kansas

2007Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 107-08 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004); Supreme Court Rule 183(h) (2006 Kan.

2007Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 107-08 , 92 P.3d 574 (2004); Supreme Court Rule 183(h) (2006 Kan.

1970Thus, foundation proof testing the admissibility of a confession must be heard outside the presence and hearing of the jury, even though no request for such hearing is made, unless, of course, there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the accused —“an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (See, Fay v. Noia, supra, and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 82 L.

1970Thus, foundation proof testing the admissibility of a confession must be heard outside the presence and hearing of the jury, even though no request for such hearing is made, unless, of course, there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the accused —“an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (See, Fay v. Noia, supra, and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 82 L.

1971Thus, foundation proof testing the admissibility of a confession must be heard outside the presence and hearing of the jury, even though no request for such hearing is made, unless, of course, there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the accused — ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ (See, Fay v. Noia, supra, [ 372 U. S. 391 , 9 L.

1971Thus, foundation proof testing the admissibility of a confession must be heard outside the presence and hearing of the jury, even though no request for such hearing is made, unless, of course, there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the accused — ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ (See, Fay v. Noia, supra, [ 372 U. S. 391 , 9 L.

2026But Kubota contends that no additional warning is needed, pointing to Brand v. Mazda Motor Corp., where the court found that Mazda did not need to provide additional warnings about what could occur if the seatbelt was not fully secured. 978 F. Supp. at 1389 .

2020State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 712 , 207 P.3d 208 (2009).

2020State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 712 , 207 P.3d 208 (2009).

2017Khatib v. McDonald, 87 Ill.App.3d 1087 , 43 Ill.Dec. 266 , 410 N.E.2d 266 (1980) (improper to ask misleading or untrue question on cross-examination); see also, Izquierdo v. State, 724 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. App. 1998) (same). 72 "164.

2017Khatib v. McDonald, 87 Ill.App.3d 1087 , 43 Ill.Dec. 266 , 410 N.E.2d 266 (1980) (improper to ask misleading or untrue question on cross-examination); see also, Izquierdo v. State, 724 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. App. 1998) (same). 72 "164.

2009In analyzing the presence of these factors in this case, the State refers this court to State v. Hazley, 28 Kan.

2009App. 2d 664 , 19 P.3d 800 (2001), and State v. Bullocks, 2 Kan.

2009App. 2d 664 , 19 P.3d 800 (2001), and State v. Bullocks, 2 Kan.

2009In re Adoption of J.M.D., 41 Kan.

2009In order for silence to meet the statutory standard, the evidence must show: “(1) [T]he statement was extrajudicial, (2) it was incriminatory or accusative in import, (3) it was one to which an innocent person would in the situation and surrounding circumstances naturally respond, (4) it was uttered in the presence and hearing of the accused, (5) the accused was capable of understanding the incriminatory meaning of the statements, (6) the accused had sufficient knowledge of the facts embraced in the statement to reply thereto, and (7) the accused was at liberty to deny it or to reply thereto.”

2007Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 436-37 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005); Supreme Court Rule 183(h) (2006 Kan.

2007Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 436-37 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005); Supreme Court Rule 183(h) (2006 Kan.

2001Ritson, 210 Kan. at 763-64 .

1982Where the client chooses to make or receive communications from his attorney in the presence and hearing of third persons they cease to be confidential and are not entitled to the protection afforded by the privilege.” Fisher v. Mr. Harold's Hair Lab, Inc., 215 Kan. 515 , Syl. ¶1, 527 P.2d 1026 (1974).

1982Where the client chooses to make or receive communications from his attorney in the presence and hearing of third persons they cease to be confidential and are not entitled to the protection afforded by the privilege.” Fisher v. Mr. Harold's Hair Lab, Inc., 215 Kan. 515 , Syl. ¶1, 527 P.2d 1026 (1974).

1974In Hutton v. Hutton, 184 Kan. 560 , 337 P. 2d 635 , the following was quoted approvingly: “. . . [I]f the client chooses to make or receive his communication in the presence and hearing of third persons it ceases to be confidential and is not entitled to the protection afforded by the rule, and that the very nature of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it are inconsistent with the notion that the communication was ever intended to be confidential.’’ (p. 565.) In Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kan. 195 , 32 Pac. 892 , this court stated with respect to the attorney-client privilege: “Commun

1974In Hutton v. Hutton, 184 Kan. 560 , 337 P. 2d 635 , the following was quoted approvingly: “. . . [I]f the client chooses to make or receive his communication in the presence and hearing of third persons it ceases to be confidential and is not entitled to the protection afforded by the rule, and that the very nature of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it are inconsistent with the notion that the communication was ever intended to be confidential.’’ (p. 565.) In Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kan. 195 , 32 Pac. 892 , this court stated with respect to the attorney-client privilege: “Commun

1974In Hutton v. Hutton, 184 Kan. 560 , 337 P. 2d 635 , the following was quoted approvingly: “. . . [I]f the client chooses to make or receive his communication in the presence and hearing of third persons it ceases to be confidential and is not entitled to the protection afforded by the rule, and that the very nature of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it are inconsistent with the notion that the communication was ever intended to be confidential.’’ (p. 565.) In Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kan. 195 , 32 Pac. 892 , this court stated with respect to the attorney-client privilege: “Commun

1974In Hutton v. Hutton, 184 Kan. 560 , 337 P. 2d 635 , the following was quoted approvingly: “. . . [I]f the client chooses to make or receive his communication in the presence and hearing of third persons it ceases to be confidential and is not entitled to the protection afforded by the rule, and that the very nature of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it are inconsistent with the notion that the communication was ever intended to be confidential.’’ (p. 565.) In Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kan. 195 , 32 Pac. 892 , this court stated with respect to the attorney-client privilege: “Commun

1973In the more recent case of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 , 32 L.

1973In the more recent case of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 , 32 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967But this section shall not be construed to limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.” (Emphasis added.) Under the rationale of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 , 12 L. ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 1 A. L.

1967But this section shall not be construed to limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.” (Emphasis added.) Under the rationale of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 , 12 L. ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 1 A. L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1967(State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505 , 332 P. 2d 767 ; State v. Curtis, 93 Kan. 743 , 145 Pac. 858 ; State v. Hayes, 106 Kan. 253 , 187 Pac. 675 ; State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 417, 435 , 375 P. 2d 788 , cert. den. 373 U. S. 919 , 10 L.

1930This court had occasion to pass on a kindred question in State v. Hughes, 33 Kan. 23 , 5 Pac. 381 , where this court said: “In a criminal prosecution where the defendant lays the foundation for Impeaching one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution, and afterward introduces a witness for that purpose, and the prosecution afterward introduces •a witness to impeach the impeaching witness; and the court in the presence and hearing of the jury decides in effect that the impeaching witness of the defendant has sworn falsely, and that the impeaching witness for the prosecution, who was also t

1930Held, that the trial court committed material error in giving its opinion with regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony.” (Syl.) Another case is State v. Burwell, 52 Kan. 686 , 35 Pac. 780 .