168 California opinions name it 5 courts 1889–2026 32 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Moocgreen2 sentences2021Sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 codify Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1219 .) If a defendant seeking to discover an officer’s personnel records shows good 5 cause, then the trial court examines all relevant information from the custodian of records 2021Sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 codify Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1219 .) If a defendant seeking to discover an officer’s personnel records shows good cause, then the trial court examines all relevant information from the custodian of records “ ‘out of the prese | 4 | 11 |
Robert v. Stanford Universitygreen2 sentences2025(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 162 ; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error].) We conclude appellant cannot establish prejudice. 2024(Oak Valley Hospital Dist. v. State Dept. of Health Care Services, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 228 [undeveloped arguments are forfeited on appeal]; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error].) Even considering the merits, we find no prejudice. | 3 | 3 |
California Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantosgreen2 sentences2023The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 (Matosantos).) Where, as here, the statute contains no such clause, we consider whether the invalid provision is “ ‘grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.’ ” (Id. at p. 271.) As we explain below, we conclude the criteria for severability are satisfied. 2023The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 .) Where, as here, the statute contains no such clause, we consider whether the invalid provision is “ ‘grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.’ ” (Id. at p. 271.) We agree with the analysis conducted in In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 144 and similarly conclude the criteria for severability are satisfied. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Daggettgreen2 sentences2022(Fontana, at pp. 354, 362; § 782, subd. (a)(3).) “If the court finds the evidence relevant under section 780 and admissible under section 352, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and what questions are permitted.” (Fontana, at p. 354.) Recognizing the privacy concerns at stake, courts exercise their discretion under section 782 narrowly, taking great care to ensure the exception does not become a back door for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence. ( Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 362−363.) Thus, for example, section 782 permitted inquiry 2021(Fontana, at pp. 354, 362; § 782, subd. (a)(3).) “If the court finds the evidence relevant under section 780 and admissible under section 352, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and what questions are permitted.” (Fontana, at p. 354.) Recognizing the privacy concerns at stake, courts exercise their discretion under section 782 narrowly, taking great care to ensure the exception does not become a back door for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence. ( Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 362−363.) Thus, for example, section 782 permitted inquiry | 2 | 2 |
People v. Riozgreen2 sentences2022In any event, Sigala makes no argument that this omission affects our analysis. 12 hearing unless it first determines that the sworn offer of proof is sufficient.” (People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905, 916 (Rioz); accord Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514 .) If the offer is sufficient, then the court holds an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence where the defense may question the witness regarding the offer of proof. 2021In any event, Sigala makes no argument that this omission affects our analysis. 12 hearing unless it first determines that the sworn offer of proof is sufficient.” (People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905, 916 (Rioz); accord Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514 .) If the offer is sufficient, then the court holds an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence where the defense may question the witness regarding the offer of proof. | 2 | 2 |
The People v. Mestasgreen2 sentences2022In any event, Sigala makes no argument that this omission affects our analysis. 12 hearing unless it first determines that the sworn offer of proof is sufficient.” (People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905, 916 (Rioz); accord Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514 .) If the offer is sufficient, then the court holds an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence where the defense may question the witness regarding the offer of proof. 2022In any event, Sigala makes no argument that this omission affects our analysis. 12 hearing unless it first determines that the sworn offer of proof is sufficient.” (People v. Rioz (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 905, 916 (Rioz); accord Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514 .) If the offer is sufficient, then the court holds an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence where the defense may question the witness regarding the offer of proof. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences2021We have recognized that the presence of defense counsel or other third parties during a court- ordered psychological examination may invalidate its results (In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 411 ; Edwards v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 905, 911 ) and have concluded that the presence of counsel at such an examination is not constitutionally required (In re Spencer, at p. 412; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 698 (Ledesma)). 2011(Cf. People v. Ledesma, supra, at pp. 698-700 [limiting instruction need not be given when the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is not implicated].) Even were such a limiting instruction ordinarily required in that setting, however, it might have been inappropriate here. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Gilberggreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Banksgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hightowergreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Shamerygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. O'CONNORgreen | 2 | 2 |
| The People v. Baingreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. O'CONNORgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. O'Connorgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Kerrygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Nilesgreen | 2 | 2 |
Abbott Laboratories v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences2023(See also In re T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 916 [following “the D.L. court’s persuasive determination that the ‘good cause’ licensing requirement is severable”], petn. for review pending.) “Grammatical separability . . . depends on whether the invalid parts ‘can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording’ or coherence of what remains.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 271 .) In other words, “the valid and invalid parts of the statute can be separated by paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words.” (Abbott Laboratories v. Fr 2013“The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance.” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 267 P.3d 580 ]; see Abbott Laboratories v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1357 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ] (Abbott) [“A severability clause ‘ “ ‘normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment....’”’ ”]; Aguiar v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 313, 329 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ] [“ ‘a declaration of severability, although not conclusive, is persuasive evidence of the enacting body’s intent’ | 1 | 3 |
People v. Slocumgreen2 sentences2022Thus, it is within the [trial] court’s discretion whether or not to decide admissibility questions under Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b) 17. within the jury’s presence.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196 ; see People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 888 [same].) “ ‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, . . . unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 924 .) “[T]her 2020Code, § 402, subds. (a) & (b), italics added.) As in the present case, in “situations not involving confessions or admissions going directly to the crime charged, it is within the trial judge’s discretion as to whether [to] initially hear evidence outside the presence of the jury as to a preliminary fact that may bear upon the admissibility of proffered evidence.” (People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 888 .) The trial court thus may exercise its discretion concerning whether to hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury. | 1 | 3 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021Indeed, as defendant acknowledges, “this court is bound by the settled rule of Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .” We also decline defendant’s invitation to criticize Watson. 13 However, as the First Appellate District explained in People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984 , “nowhere does the opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 988.) Instead, “the presence of those factors was sufficient in that case to support a murder conviction.” (Ibid.) In Olivas, as here, th 2013The reason, however, is different from a required mental state such as intent or malice.‟ [Citation.]” ( Hillhouse at pp. 503-504 , italics added.)6 While Whisenhunt and Hillhouse bind us (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 ), because defendant argues that the jury was misled by the presence of the standard instruction on motive, we have addressed the issue as we have. 4. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Webergreen2 sentences1925(People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 338 [ 86 Pac. 671 ]; 8 Cal. Jur., sec. 196, and cases therein cited.) With so much in mind, but considering the further fact that much of the evidence to which objection was made was fully covered by other evidence which was unobjectionable, it cannot be said that any injury resulted to defendant by reason of any erroneous ruling of the court (assuming it to be such) to which attention is directed. 1925(People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 338 [ 86 Pac. 671 ]; 8 Cal. Jur., sec. 196, and cases therein cited.) With so much in mind, but considering the further fact that much of the evidence to which objection was made was fully covered by other evidence which was unobjectionable, it cannot be said that any injury resulted to defendant by reason of any erroneous ruling of the court (assuming it to be such) to which attention is directed. | 1 | 3 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2026If such a request is made, the court shall hold such a hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel.” 15 Evidence Code section 915, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part that “the court may require the person from whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person 28 261–263 [noting ex parte proceedings may be appropriate regarding trial strategy or the review of information under the rule of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 ].) Tapi 2015(Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 9 The record reflects that, while minor was in a special education program, his lack of academic success was “primarily” a result of his “lack of attendance and behavioral problems in the classroom,” rather than any overt mental issues. 8 bad faith of the prosecution”] [“Brady”]); see also People v. Uribe (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1475 [“A good faith | 1 | 2 |
People v. Munozgreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, given the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing and the limited scope of the evidence presented at this particular preliminary hearing, the first 4 Generally, “[o]pinions affirming convictions [of Watson murders] have relied on a number of factors present in Watson, including ‘ “(1) blood-alcohol level above the .08 legal percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” ’ ” (Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 152 .) But the presence or absence of one or more of these factors is 2020Rather, the opinion states that the presence of those factors was sufficient in that case.’” ( Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 682-683; accord, People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 152 .) In other words, a jury is entitled to consider all of the available facts in evaluating whether a defendant acted with implied malice in a particular case. | 1 | 2 |
San Ramon Valley Unified School District v. Wheatley-Jacobsen, Inc.green2 sentences2014Defendant meets this burden by “a showing of some prejudice or the presence of factors enumerated in the California Rules of Court which when viewed together militate in favor of dismissal, . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show excusable delay.” (San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist. v. Wheatley-Jacobsen, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1057 ; Lopez v. State of California (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1295 ; Putnam v. Clague (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 542, 547 .) The plaintiff’s burden to justify delay requires a specific showing of particular facts and events constituting an excuse. 1996(Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 332 .) “Moreover, courts hold that prejudice inheres in cases like this one, where long delay inevitably results in dimmed memories and lost witnesses.” (Freedman v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 696, 712 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 8 ].) Earlier appellate court cases placed the burden on the moving party to establish that there was “some prejudice or the presence of factors enumerated in the California Rules of Court which when viewed together militate in favor of dismissal, . . .” (San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist. v. Wheatley-Jacobsen, Inc | 1 | 2 |
People v. Marven C.green2 sentences2001(See In re Marven C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 354 .) The trial court instructed the jury to consider "such things as flight after the crime, giving conflicting statements to investigating officers, and closeness to the age of 14." These considerations were entirely proper. { In re Gregory S., supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 212 , 149 Cal.Rptr. 216 ; In re Cindy E., supra, 83 Cal. App.3d at p. 399 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 812 .) Indeed, defendant did not request further amplification or explanation of these instructions. 2001(See In re Marven C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 354 .) The trial court instructed the jury to consider "such things as flight after the crime, giving conflicting statements to investigating officers, and closeness to the age of 14." These considerations were entirely proper. { In re Gregory S., supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 212 , 149 Cal.Rptr. 216 ; In re Cindy E., supra, 83 Cal. App.3d at p. 399 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 812 .) Indeed, defendant did not request further amplification or explanation of these instructions. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Arvisogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Pouchan v. Godeaugreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Reynaldo R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Steven Bassett v. Abm Parking Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. J.K.green | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Olivas
green
2 sentences2024Rather, the opinion states that the presence of those factors was sufficient in that case to support a murder conviction.” (People v. Olivas, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 988 .) Following Watson, appellate courts “have relied upon some or all of the following factors in upholding drunk-driving-murder convictions: (1) a blood-alcohol level above 10. the .08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” (People v. Talamantes (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 968, 973 .) Other relevant evidence may include 2021Indeed, as defendant acknowledges, “this court is bound by the settled rule of Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .” We also decline defendant’s invitation to criticize Watson. 13 However, as the First Appellate District explained in People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984 , “nowhere does the opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 988.) Instead, “the presence of those factors was sufficient in that case to support a murder conviction.” (Ibid.) In Olivas, as here, th | 4 | 2018–2024 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2003With regard to interrogations of minors without the presence of defense counsel, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers a privilege against self-incrimination, that is, no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In order to safeguard this right, and to counteract the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 444 , established the now familiar rights that (1) before questioning begins, subjects must be warned that they have the right to r 1990(See, e.g., People v. Carswell, supra, 51 Cal.2d 602, 608 .) Section 1538.5 provides in pertinent part: “(a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of the following grounds: Evidence Code section 402: “(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this article. “(b) The court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury; but in a c | 3 | 1983–2003 |
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
green
2 sentences2025(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 162 ; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error].) We conclude appellant cannot establish prejudice. 2024(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 162 ; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each brief must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”], (a)(1)(C) [each brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”].)3 She does not explain, even without a record, what occur | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Wolfe
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, given the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing and the limited scope of the evidence presented at this particular preliminary hearing, the first 4 Generally, “[o]pinions affirming convictions [of Watson murders] have relied on a number of factors present in Watson, including ‘ “(1) blood-alcohol level above the .08 legal percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” ’ ” (Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 152 .) But the presence or absence of one or more of these factors is 2020Rather, the opinion states that the presence of those factors was sufficient in that case.’” ( Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 682-683; accord, People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 152 .) In other words, a jury is entitled to consider all of the available facts in evaluating whether a defendant acted with implied malice in a particular case. | 2 | 2020–2023 |
People v. Fontana
green
2 sentences2022(Fontana, at pp. 354, 362; § 782, subd. (a)(3).) “If the court finds the evidence relevant under section 780 and admissible under section 352, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and what questions are permitted.” (Fontana, at p. 354.) Recognizing the privacy concerns at stake, courts exercise their discretion under section 782 narrowly, taking great care to ensure the exception does not become a back door for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence. ( Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 362−363.) Thus, for example, section 782 permitted inquiry 2021(Fontana, at pp. 354, 362; § 782, subd. (a)(3).) “If the court finds the evidence relevant under section 780 and admissible under section 352, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and what questions are permitted.” (Fontana, at p. 354.) Recognizing the privacy concerns at stake, courts exercise their discretion under section 782 narrowly, taking great care to ensure the exception does not become a back door for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence. ( Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 362−363.) Thus, for example, section 782 permitted inquiry | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2022Thus, it is within the [trial] court’s discretion whether or not to decide admissibility questions under Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b) 17. within the jury’s presence.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196 ; see People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 888 [same].) “ ‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, . . . unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 924 .) “[T]her 2013(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196 .) “On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit or not admit evidence, whether made in limine or 2 Section 402 provides in relevant part: “(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this article. [¶] (b) The court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury; but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the defendant out | 2 | 2013–2022 |
Pitchess v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences2021Sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 codify Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1219 .) If a defendant seeking to discover an officer’s personnel records shows good cause, then the trial court examines all relevant information from the custodian of records “ ‘out of the prese 2021Sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 codify Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1219 .) If a defendant seeking to discover an officer’s personnel records shows good cause, then the trial court examines all relevant information from the custodian of records “ ‘out of the prese | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2021Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b).) “The trial court may not disclose complaints more than five years old, the ‘conclusions of any officer’ who investigates a citizen complaint of police misconduct, or facts ‘so remote as to make [their] disclosure of little or no practical benefit.’ (§ 1045, subd. (b); [Citation].)” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 .) “A trial court’s decision on the discoverability of material in police personnel files is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220 .) As requested, we have r 2021Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b).) “A trial court’s decision on the discoverability of material in police personnel files is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220 .) As requested, we have reviewed the sealed transcript of the in camera proceeding in which the trial court questioned the custodian of records under oath regarding the detective’s personnel records. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2020Code, § 402, subd. (c).) “On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit or not admit evidence, whether made in limine or following a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” (Williams, at p. 197.) For a defendant to be subject to an enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), where the crime involves a criminal street gang, “ ‘the prosecution must prove that the crime for which the defendant was convicted had been “committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific 2014(People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040 , 1050-1051 6 Evidence Code section 402 provides: “(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this article. [¶] (b) The court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury; but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury if any party so requests. [¶] (c) A ruling on the ad | 2 | 2014–2020 |
People v. Fryhaat
green
2 sentences2019We found that although "section 1473.7 does not require a superior court to secure a defendant's presence at the hearing, [ ] if a defendant's presence is waived or good cause exists to excuse a defendant's presence, such as when a defendant is confined in federal immigration custody, then counsel must be appointed." ( Id. at p. 983-984, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 .) We hereby adopt the analysis and holding in Fryhaat , supra , 35 Cal.App.5th 969 , 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 . "[T]he People's argument ignores the Legislative Counsel's Digest summarizing the final version of Assembly Bill No. 2867 (2017-2018 R 2019We found that although "section 1473.7 does not require a superior court to secure a defendant's presence at the hearing, [ ] if a defendant's presence is waived or good cause exists to excuse a defendant's presence, such as when a defendant is confined in federal immigration custody, then counsel must be appointed." ( Id. at p. 983-984, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 .) We hereby adopt the analysis and holding in Fryhaat , supra , 35 Cal.App.5th 969 , 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 . "[T]he People's argument ignores the Legislative Counsel's Digest summarizing the final version of Assembly Bill No. 2867 (2017-2018 R | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Therefore, Davidson's cross-complaint fails to allege "the presence of factors that might warrant application of the continuing violation doctrine." ( Aryeh , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 , 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) In sum, the trial court did not err. *561 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 2018Therefore, Davidson's cross-complaint fails to allege "the presence of factors that might warrant application of the continuing violation doctrine." ( Aryeh , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 , 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) In sum, the trial court did not err. *561 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Vickers
green
2 sentences2016Vickers held that counsel is required at "formal proceedings for the revocation of probation." ( Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-462.) "The initial [probable cause] hearing need not be formal . . . ." (Id., at p. 456.) In his opening brief, appellant refers to "the informal probable cause procedure conducted by Officer Meza." Such an informal hearing is not the equivalent of a "formal proceeding for the revocation of probation" that, pursuant to Vickers, requires the presence or waiver of counsel. 2016Vickers held that counsel is required at "formal proceedings for the revocation of probation." ( Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-462.) "The initial [probable cause] hearing need not be formal . . . ." (Id., at p. 456.) In his opening brief, appellant refers to "the informal probable cause procedure conducted by Officer Meza." Such an informal hearing is not the equivalent of a "formal proceeding for the revocation of probation" that, pursuant to Vickers, requires the presence or waiver of counsel. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Sacramento Bail Bonds
green
2 sentences2014Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1378 , 1380–1381 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 210 ] [also holding the defendant was “lawfully required” by rules of court to appear at the pretrial conference and bail was properly forfeited when he failed to appear].) Sacramento Bail distinguished Classified on the ground no rule of court or comparable statute was in play—in Classified, “no rule of law required the defendant’s presence at the hearing at which he was absent.” (Sacramento Bail, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) Moreover, in distinguishing Classified, the Sacramento Bail court agreed with Classified’s view that sec 1990The Third District distinguished Classified, first, on the grounds that in Classified “no rule of law required the defendant’s presence at the hearing at which he was absent—a hearing on a motion pursuant to section 995 .... [¶] In the instant case, a rule of court [rule 227.6] required defendant’s presence at the trial status conference.” 2 (Id. at p. 121.) Second, Classified was distinguished on the grounds that in Classified, “the defendant in fact had no notice of the hearing from which he was absent.” (Sacramento Bail Bonds, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 .) The Sacramento court stated: | 2 | 1990–2014 |
People v. Hobbs
green
2 sentences2014All or part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to protect the identity of an informant who has provided probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. ( Hobbs, supra, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 .) In such cases, where the defendant moves to traverse or quash the warrant, the trial court is required to conduct an in camera hearing. 2014All or part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to protect the identity of an informant who has provided probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. ( Hobbs, supra, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 .) In such cases, where the defendant moves to traverse or quash the warrant, the trial court is required to conduct an in camera hearing. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Idell v. Goodman
green
2 sentences1998“We do not believe that the presence of factors implicitly rejected in Coleman allows us to reach an opposite result. [Citation.]” (Idell v. Goodman, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 276 .) We therefore reject Robert’s claim that the application for a writ of sale gives rise to a claim for malicious prosecution. *64 B. 1998Both proceedings are adversarial and require the parties to incur additional costs, but neither is an independent proceeding. *89 "We do not believe that the presence of factors implicitly rejected in Coleman allows us to reach an opposite result. [Citation.]" ( Idell v. Goodman, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 276 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 605 .) We therefore reject Robert's claim that the application for a writ of sale gives rise to a claim for malicious prosecution. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Phillips green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Jones v. Strom Construction Co. green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Gary Commander and Tom Waters v. Basf Wyandotte Corporation, Basf Corporation, Third Party v. S & S Sprinkler Company, Inc., Third Party green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Perkins v. Rubicon, Inc. green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Teshara green | 2 | 1913–1919 |
| People v. Olivencia green | 2 | 1909–1911 |
| People v. Jurado green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Mays green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Prince green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Cromer green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. McCarnes green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Murray green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Talamantes green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Johnigan green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| California v. Trombetta green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Clifton green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Melhado green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Ruiz green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Gurule green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Waidla green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.