20 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
James Richard Ellis v. State of Oklahoma and Warden Ray H. Pagegreen2 sentences2022We emphasized, "[a]ll that the Constitution requires at such a conference is the presence of defense counsel." Id. (citing Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1970)) (emphasis added). 2022In this case, defense counsel was present "at such a conference" "concerning dismissal of a juror." See id. ¶38 Prior to the discussion on the juror's dismissal, the judge was notified that a juror was feeling ill and laying down in the jury room, had Juror 2 moved to her chambers where there was "a quiet place for her to rest," proceeded to check on Juror 2 in her chambers——meanwhile "conferr[ing]" with counsel who "agreed to wait"——and asked a question on behalf of defense counsel regarding the nature of the illness. | 2 | 2 |
CONTEMPT IN STATE v. Dewerthgreen2 sentences1995Court, 154 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 452 N.W.2d 355 (1990) (citing Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d at 552 -53 & n.4, 407 N.W.2d 862 ), we held that the actual presence requirement is satisfied when the contumacious act occurs during formal court proceedings. 1995Court, 154 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 452 N.W.2d 355 (1990) (citing Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d at 552 -53 & n.4, 407 N.W.2d 862 ), we held that the actual presence requirement is satisfied when the contumacious act occurs during formal court proceedings. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Arvizugreen1 sentence2015See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002). ¶37 It follows that the legality of the extension of the traffic stop in this case turns on the presence of factors which, in the aggregate, amount to reasonable suspicion that Hogan committed a crime the investigation of which would be furthered by the defendant's performance of field sobriety tests. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Postgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶ 10 , 301 Wis. 2d 1 , 733 N.W.2d 634 . ¶ 38. 2015See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶ 10 , 301 Wis. 2d 1 , 733 N.W.2d 634 . ¶ 38. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Barry H. Parentgreen1 sentence2006ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 15-5.2(a) (3d ed.1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/jurytrial_toc.html (last visited June 22, 2006). [44] United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. David J.K.green2 sentences1998We believe that the correct view of the law, as stated in both State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 88 , 519 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1994), and State v. David J.K, 190 Wis. 2d 726, 736 , 528 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1994), is that a violation of the defendant's right to be present "does not automatically entitle [the defendant] to a new trial; such error may be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In McMahon , the court communicated with the jury on five occasions without the defendant's presence or a waiver. 1998We believe that the correct view of the law, as stated in both State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 88 , 519 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1994), and State v. David J.K, 190 Wis. 2d 726, 736 , 528 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1994), is that a violation of the defendant's right to be present "does not automatically entitle [the defendant] to a new trial; such error may be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In McMahon , the court communicated with the jury on five occasions without the defendant's presence or a waiver. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McMahongreen2 sentences1998We believe that the correct view of the law, as stated in both State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 88 , 519 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1994), and State v. David J.K, 190 Wis. 2d 726, 736 , 528 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1994), is that a violation of the defendant's right to be present "does not automatically entitle [the defendant] to a new trial; such error may be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In McMahon , the court communicated with the jury on five occasions without the defendant's presence or a waiver. 1998We believe that the correct view of the law, as stated in both State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 88 , 519 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1994), and State v. David J.K, 190 Wis. 2d 726, 736 , 528 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1994), is that a violation of the defendant's right to be present "does not automatically entitle [the defendant] to a new trial; such error may be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In McMahon , the court communicated with the jury on five occasions without the defendant's presence or a waiver. | 1 | 1 |
Leach v. Stategreen2 sentences1980The presence of these factors in a reinterrogation situation indicates that the potentially coercive effect of the renewed attempt to question a suspect may be held to be so low as to justify a finding that a statement elicited through questioning after the suspect has invoked his privilege is not "the product of compulsion," the primary concern of Miranda . *295 In Leach v. State, supra , we declined the defendant's invitation to limit Mosley to those situations in which a suspect invokes only the right to remain silent and instead indicated that the factors emphasized in Mosley , while not c 1980In Leach v. State, supra, we declined the defendant’s invitation to limit Mosley to those situations in which a suspect invokes only the right to remain silent and instead indicated that the factors emphasized in Mosley , while not controlling, could be considered in determining whether continued interrogation was a violation of the suspect’s right to counsel. 83 Wis.2d at 210-11, 214 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ashgreen2 sentences1978However, Cox, supra, was decided prior to Ash, supra. The United States Supreme Court in Ash, supra, at 302, fn. 2, in holding that there is no right to the presence of defense counsel at a photographic identification, considered the videotape in Cox to be a photographic identification. 2 United States v. Wade, supra; Gilbert v. California, supra, sometimes referred to by this court as a Goodchild-type hearing. 1978However, Cox, supra, was decided prior to Ash, supra. The United States Supreme Court in Ash, supra, at 302, fn. 2, in holding that there is no right to the presence of defense counsel at a photographic identification, considered the videotape in Cox to be a photographic identification. 2 United States v. Wade, supra; Gilbert v. California, supra, sometimes referred to by this court as a Goodchild-type hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sabin
green
2 sentences2002Sabin, 79 Wis. 2d at 306 . 2002Sabin, 79 Wis. 2d at 306 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State ex rel. Fowlie v. Painter
green
2 sentences1983This court explained the rule on adoptive admissions in Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 178 , 51 N.W. 652 (1892) : “The rule is fairly to be deduced from the authorities cited to the point by the respective counsel that inculpa-tory statements, made in the presence and hearing of one accused of crime, which he, having opportunity to do so, does not deny, and the truth or falsity of which is within his personal knowledge, are admissions of the accused by acquiescence, and as such admissible in evidence. . . .” 6 Second, the adoptive admission in this case contains sufficient indicia of reliabil 1983This court explained the rule on adoptive admissions in Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 178 , 51 N.W. 652 (1892): "The rule is fairly to be deduced from the authorities cited to the point by the respective counsel that inculpatory statements, made in the presence and hearing of one accused of crime, which he, having opportunity to do so, does not deny, and the truth or falsity of which is within his personal knowledge, are admissions of the accused by acquiescence, and as such admissible in evidence. . . ." [6] Second, the adoptive admission in this case contains sufficient indicia of reliabil | 2 | 1923–1983 |
Richards v. State
green
2 sentences1983This court explained the rule on adoptive admissions in Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 178 , 51 N.W. 652 (1892) : “The rule is fairly to be deduced from the authorities cited to the point by the respective counsel that inculpa-tory statements, made in the presence and hearing of one accused of crime, which he, having opportunity to do so, does not deny, and the truth or falsity of which is within his personal knowledge, are admissions of the accused by acquiescence, and as such admissible in evidence. . . .” 6 Second, the adoptive admission in this case contains sufficient indicia of reliabil 1983This court explained the rule on adoptive admissions in Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 178 , 51 N.W. 652 (1892): "The rule is fairly to be deduced from the authorities cited to the point by the respective counsel that inculpatory statements, made in the presence and hearing of one accused of crime, which he, having opportunity to do so, does not deny, and the truth or falsity of which is within his personal knowledge, are admissions of the accused by acquiescence, and as such admissible in evidence. . . ." [6] Second, the adoptive admission in this case contains sufficient indicia of reliabil | 2 | 1923–1983 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2024Also like the circuit court, we ultimately conclude that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Johnson had operated his vehicle while intoxicated, such that Wojcik could permissibly extend the traffic stop by removing Johnson from his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. ¶20 We consider several factors in reaching this conclusion.3 First, we note that when Wojcik made contact with Johnson, he observed that Johnson’s 3 Johnson argues that in our reasonable suspicion analysis, we may not consider the initial complaint about his driving because it was an ano 2024Also like the circuit court, we ultimately conclude that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Johnson had operated his vehicle while intoxicated, such that Wojcik could permissibly extend the traffic stop by removing Johnson from his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. ¶20 We consider several factors in reaching this conclusion.3 First, we note that when Wojcik made contact with Johnson, he observed that Johnson’s 3 Johnson argues that in our reasonable suspicion analysis, we may not consider the initial complaint about his driving because it was an ano | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Anthony Provenzano, Stephen Andretta, and Thomas Andretta
green
1 sentence2022We emphasized, "[a]ll that the Constitution requires at such a conference is the presence of defense counsel." Id. (citing Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1970)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Patrick I. Hogan
green
2 sentences2021Analysis ¶18 From the legal principles summarized above, “[i]t follows that the legality of the extension of the traffic stop in this case turns on the presence of factors which, in the aggregate, amount to reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] committed a crime the investigation of which would be furthered by the defendant’s performance of field sobriety tests.” State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶37 , 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 . 2021Analysis ¶18 From the legal principles summarized above, “[i]t follows that the legality of the extension of the traffic stop in this case turns on the presence of factors which, in the aggregate, amount to reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] committed a crime the investigation of which would be furthered by the defendant’s performance of field sobriety tests.” State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶37 , 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Amjad T. Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC
green
2 sentences2018Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC , 2013 WI 62 , ¶ 30, 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . 2018Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC , 2013 WI 62 , ¶ 30, 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2006The United States Supreme Court has observed: "[W]hen a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic." [47] Generally the denial of counsel is deemed a "structural error" and the harmless error analysis does not apply. [48] ¶ 75 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 , 101 S.Ct. 665 , 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), that a violation of the right to counsel at certain critical stages of th 2006The United States Supreme Court has observed: "[W]hen a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic." [47] Generally the denial of counsel is deemed a "structural error" and the harmless error analysis does not apply. [48] ¶ 75 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 , 101 S.Ct. 665 , 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), that a violation of the right to counsel at certain critical stages of th | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gower v. Circuit Court for Marinette County
green
2 sentences1995Court, 154 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 452 N.W.2d 355 (1990) (citing Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d at 552 -53 & n.4, 407 N.W.2d 862 ), we held that the actual presence requirement is satisfied when the contumacious act occurs during formal court proceedings. 1995Court, 154 Wis. 2d 1, 12 , 452 N.W.2d 355 (1990) (citing Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d at 552 -53 & n.4, 407 N.W.2d 862 ), we held that the actual presence requirement is satisfied when the contumacious act occurs during formal court proceedings. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Chestnut
green
1 sentence1994The trial court will always have to determine, as in Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d at 347 , the extent of testimony not heard. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gilbert v. California
green
1 sentence1978However, Cox, supra, was decided prior to Ash, supra. The United States Supreme Court in Ash, supra, at 302, fn. 2, in holding that there is no right to the presence of defense counsel at a photographic identification, considered the videotape in Cox to be a photographic identification. 2 United States v. Wade, supra; Gilbert v. California, supra, sometimes referred to by this court as a Goodchild-type hearing. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence1978However, Cox, supra, was decided prior to Ash, supra. The United States Supreme Court in Ash, supra, at 302, fn. 2, in holding that there is no right to the presence of defense counsel at a photographic identification, considered the videotape in Cox to be a photographic identification. 2 United States v. Wade, supra; Gilbert v. California, supra, sometimes referred to by this court as a Goodchild-type hearing. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence1978State v. Brown, 60 Wis.2d 665, 673 , 185 N.W.2d 323 (1971); State ex rel. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Abraham v. State
green
2 sentences1977Abraham v. State, 47 Wis.2d 44, 53 , 176 N.W.2d 349 (1970). 1977Abraham v. State, 47 Wis.2d 44, 53 , 176 N.W.2d 349 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Will of Schacht
neutral
2 sentences1937Will of Schacht, 175 Wis. 54, 56 , 182 N. W. 981 . 1937Will of Schacht, 175 Wis. 54, 56 , 182 N. W. 981 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.