presence hearing in Washington

2019State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2019RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2019State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2019RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

1972State v. Redwine, 23 Wn.2d 467 , 161 P.2d 205 (1945), allows evidence of a defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation made prior to his arrest to be presented: [W]hen a statement is made in the presence and hearing of an accused that is accusatory or incriminating in character, and such statement is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement and fact of his failure to deny, contradict, or object are admissible on a criminal trial as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth. [Citations omitted.] See also State v. Lounsbery, 74 Wn.2d 659 , 445 P.2d 1017 (1968).

1972State v. Redwine, 23 Wn.2d 467 , 161 P.2d 205 (1945), allows evidence of a defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation made prior to his arrest to be presented: [W]hen a statement is made in the presence and hearing of an accused that is accusatory or incriminating in character, and such statement is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement and fact of his failure to deny, contradict, or object are admissible on a criminal trial as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth. [Citations omitted.] See also State v. Lounsbery, 74 Wn.2d 659 , 445 P.2d 1017 (1968).

2013The legislature has already shown its willingness to adapt the presence requirement to meet modern circumstances by adding exceptions to the presence requirement to "address social problems either not recognized or not present during common law ... ." Walker, 157 Wn.2d at 316-17 .

2013The legislature has already shown its willingness to adapt the presence requirement to meet modern circumstances by adding exceptions to the presence requirement to “address social problems either not recognized or not present during common law . . . .” Walker, 157 Wn.2d at 316-17 .

1976In State v. hounsbery, 74 Wn.2d 659, 662 , 445 P.2d 1017 (1968), the court said: When a statement is made in the presence and hearing of one who is later charged with a crime, the statement being accusatory or incriminating in character, and the statement is not denied by him, both the statement and the reactions thereto are admissible at the trial as evidence of the defendant’s acquiescence in the truth of the statements. [Citing cases.] Accord, State v. Fullen, 7 Wn.

1976In State v. hounsbery, 74 Wn.2d 659, 662 , 445 P.2d 1017 (1968), the court said: When a statement is made in the presence and hearing of one who is later charged with a crime, the statement being accusatory or incriminating in character, and the statement is not denied by him, both the statement and the reactions thereto are admissible at the trial as evidence of the defendant’s acquiescence in the truth of the statements. [Citing cases.] Accord, State v. Fullen, 7 Wn.

2018State v. Redwine, 23 Wn.2d 467, 470 , 161 P.2d 205 (1945), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 24 Wn.2d 909, 917 , 167 P.2d 986 (1946)).

2018State v. Redwine, 23 Wn.2d 467, 470 , 161 P.2d 205 (1945), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 24 Wn.2d 909, 917 , 167 P.2d 986 (1946)).

2013"When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the 5 85788-1 legislative intent without considering outside sources." State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

2013“When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the legislative intent without considering outside sources.” State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

2013For example, after we found in State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120 , 713 P.2d 71 (1986), that an officer could not validly arrest an intoxicated minor for possessing or consuming alcohol when the misdemeanor conduct did not occur in the officer’s presence, the legislature responded by amending RCW 10.31.100(1) to explicitly include the minor in possession statute.

2013For example, after we found in State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120 , 713 P.2d 71 (1986), that an officer could not validly arrest an intoxicated minor for possessing or consuming alcohol when the misdemeanor conduct did not occur in the officer’s presence, the legislature responded by amending RCW 10.31.100(1) to explicitly include the minor in possession statute.

2013"When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the 5 85788-1 legislative intent without considering outside sources." State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

2013“When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the legislative intent without considering outside sources.” State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

2013App. 32 , 882 P.2d 799 (1994), although the Court of Appeals ultimately found that a violation of the presence requirement under state law could not support the appellants' federal civil claims, it also noted that the fellow officer rule would apply to misdemeanor arrests. !d. at 39.

2013App. 32, 39 , 882 P.2d 799 (1994), although the Court of Appeals ultimately found that a violation of the presence requirement under state law could not support the appellants’ federal civil claims, it also noted that the fellow officer rule would apply to misdemeanor arrests.

2013App. 818, 821 , 677 P.2d 781 (1984) (finding that the officer at first lacked a well- founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining the defendant, but "he did have the limited right and duty to approach and inquire about what appeared to be suspicious circumstances"). 14 85788-1 Moreover, to the extent that a strict interpretation of the presence requirement hinders modern law enforcement practices, it is important to note that Officer McLaughlin only established probable cause to believe Ortega committed a misdemeanor.

2013App. 818, 821 , 677 P.2d 781 (1984) (finding that the officer at first lacked a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining the defendant but that “he did have the limited right and duty to approach and inquire about what appeared to be suspicious circumstances”). ¶26 Moreover, to the extent that a strict interpretation of the presence requirement hinders modern law enforcement practices, it is important to note that Officer McLaughlin established only probable cause to believe Ortega committed a misdemeanor.

2010State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 509 , 664 P.2d 466 (1983); State v. Russell, 25 Wash.App. 933, 948 , 611 P.2d 1320 (1980). ¶ 24 Mr. Koss has not, however, supplied an adequate record to permit further review of his claim that he was denied his right to be present.

2010State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 509 , 664 P.2d 466 (1983); State v. Russell, 25 Wash.App. 933, 948 , 611 P.2d 1320 (1980). ¶ 24 Mr. Koss has not, however, supplied an adequate record to permit further review of his claim that he was denied his right to be present.

2010State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 509 , 664 P.2d 466 (1983); State v. Russell, 25 Wash.App. 933, 948 , 611 P.2d 1320 (1980). ¶ 24 Mr. Koss has not, however, supplied an adequate record to permit further review of his claim that he was denied his right to be present.

2010State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 509 , 664 P.2d 466 (1983); State v. Russell, 25 Wash.App. 933, 948 , 611 P.2d 1320 (1980). ¶ 24 Mr. Koss has not, however, supplied an adequate record to permit further review of his claim that he was denied his right to be present.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2007State v. Barnhart, 73 Wash.2d 936 , 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (interspousal communication); Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wash.2d 303, 312 , 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (attorney-client communication); Redding v. Virginia Mason Medical Ctr., 75 Wash.App. 424, 428 , 878 P.2d 483 (1994). [15] Glass honked his horn, opened the passenger window, and was talking with another person about purchasing cocaine when C.R.G. walked up, entered the car alone and said "What's up?" C.R.G.

2006As the majority noted, we said in Cubias that "`in both Blakely and Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court was directing its attention to the sentence on a single count of a multiple-count charge.'" Majority at 578 (quoting Cubias, 155 Wash.2d at 553 , 120 P.3d 929 ). ¶ 30 I fail to understand how the presence of a presumption for concurrent sentences somehow reverses the analysis we used in Cubias.

2006As the majority noted, we said in Cubias that “ ‘in both Blakely and Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court was directing its attention to the sentence on a single count of a multiple-count charge.’ ” Majority at 741 (quoting Cubias, 155 Wn.2d at 553 ). ¶30 I fail to understand how the presence of a presumption for concurrent sentences somehow reverses the analysis we used in Cubias.

1999Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when defense counsel was not notified in advance about the nature of a psychiatric examination).

1999Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when defense counsel was not notified in advance about the nature of a psychiatric examination).

1998The County relies on our previous decisions in Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wn.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) and Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739 , 675 P.2d 226 (1984), where we affirmed the presence requirement.

1998The County relies on our previous decisions in Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wn.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) and Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739 , 675 P.2d 226 (1984), where we affirmed the presence requirement.

1998The County relies on our previous decisions in Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wn.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) and Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739 , 675 P.2d 226 (1984), where we affirmed the presence requirement.

1998The County relies on our previous decisions in Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wn.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) and Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739 , 675 P.2d 226 (1984), where we affirmed the presence requirement.

1966In State v. Bauers, 25 Wn.2d 825, 842 , 172 P.2d 279 (1946), we said: [W]hen a statement is made in the presence and hearing of one who is later charged with the crime, the statement being accusatory or incriminating in character, and the statement is not denied by him, both the statement and the reactions thereto, if any, are admissible at the trial as evidence of the defendant’s acquiescence in the truth of the statement.

1966In State v. Bauers, 25 Wn.2d 825, 842 , 172 P.2d 279 (1946), we said: [W]hen a statement is made in the presence and hearing of one who is later charged with the crime, the statement being accusatory or incriminating in character, and the statement is not denied by him, both the statement and the reactions thereto, if any, are admissible at the trial as evidence of the defendant’s acquiescence in the truth of the statement.

1922The authorities sustaining this rule are counted by the score and it is hardly necessary to cite more than the opinion of this court in State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283 , 91 Pac. 977 , where it is said: “Counsel for the state contend broadly that any statement or declaration of the person injured made to a third person, in the presence or hearing of the accused, either charging him directly with the crime or pertaining to matters otherwise relevant to the issue, if not denied by the accused, may be given in evidence against him as an admission on his part.

1922The authorities sustaining this rule are counted by the score and it is hardly necessary to cite more than the opinion of this court in State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283 , 91 Pac. 977 , where it is said: “Counsel for the state contend broadly that any statement or declaration of the person injured made to a third person, in the presence or hearing of the accused, either charging him directly with the crime or pertaining to matters otherwise relevant to the issue, if not denied by the accused, may be given in evidence against him as an admission on his part.

2023Like Mr. Gilliver, the informant in Z.U.E., was “a named, but otherwise unknown, 911 caller[ ].” Id. at 622 .

2023However, even with the presence of these factors, the Z.U.E. court still concluded that the informant’s tip did not “create a sustainable basis for a Terry stop.” Id. at 623 .

2021This decision is inconsistent with the majority’s reasoning: adopting Grimsby as a guide suggests that we should also adopt a presence requirement. 3 In any event, the Grimsby court rejected the potentially unlimited liability argument based on the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which we have not yet adopted for interference with bodily remains. 85 Wn.2d at 59-60 ; Adams, 164 Wn.2d at 656 ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM.

2021This decision is inconsistent with the majority’s reasoning: adopting Grimsby as a guide suggests that we should also adopt a presence requirement. 3 In any event, the Grimsby court rejected the potentially unlimited liability argument based on the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which we have not yet adopted for interference with bodily remains. 85 Wn.2d at 59-60 ; Adams, 164 Wn.2d at 656 ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM.