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21 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ronald Gene Sears, United States of America v. Chandra Werner, United States of America v. Hubert Strozykgreen2 sentences1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . 1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c | 3 | 3 |
Comford v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019To constitute an adoptive admission, “the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, . . . the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and the statement must “contain[] assertions of fact which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny,” Comford, 947 A.2d at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009Thus, “[w]hen a statement is made in the presence of a party containing assertions of fact which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny, failure to speak has traditionally been received as an admission,” Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1185 (D.C.2008) (quoting 2 MoCormick on Evidenoe § 262 (6th ed. 2006)), so long as “the statement [was] made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant ... actually understood] what was said and [had] an opportunity to deny it.” Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C.2002). | 2 | 2 |
Littlejohn v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. 13 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek “a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witnesses] Fifth Amendment claim”); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury’s presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quotin 2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. [13] See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek "a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witness'[s] Fifth Amendment claim"); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury's presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quo | 2 | 2 |
Harrison v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c 1983“Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule ‘if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.’ ” Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.App.1971) (quoting Naples v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 126 , 344 F.2d 508, 511 (1964)); accord United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982) (“[t]o constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be | 2 | 2 |
In re Gainesgreen2 sentences1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . 1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c | 1 | 3 |
Werner v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . 1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c | 1 | 3 |
Stoute v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . 1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c | 1 | 3 |
Foreman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019To constitute an adoptive admission, “the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, . . . the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and the statement must “contain[] assertions of fact which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny,” Comford, 947 A.2d at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009Thus, “[w]hen a statement is made in the presence of a party containing assertions of fact which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny, failure to speak has traditionally been received as an admission,” Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1185 (D.C.2008) (quoting 2 MoCormick on Evidenoe § 262 (6th ed. 2006)), so long as “the statement [was] made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant ... actually understood] what was said and [had] an opportunity to deny it.” Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C.2002). | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . 1992“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 , 102 S.Ct. 1731 , 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982), quoted in Brown, supra, 464 A.2d at 123 . | 1 | 2 |
John A. Naples v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c 1990As this court stated in Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C.1971) (quoting Naples, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 , 344 F.2d at 511 ), Testimony that an accused adopted statements of another person as his own admissions may be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule “if it clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements.” In Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123 (D.C.1983), this court repeated the quoted language from Naples and Harrison , and added (quoting United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), c | 1 | 2 |
Moctar v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017See Jones v. United States, 127 A.3d 1173, 1189 (D.C. 2015); Moctar v. United States, 718 A.2d 1063, 1065 (D.C. 1998) (“As we have repeatedly held, the grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, to whom we accord wide latitude.”). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas R. Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017See Jones v. United States, 127 A.3d 1173, 1189 (D.C. 2015); Moctar v. United States, 718 A.2d 1063, 1065 (D.C. 1998) (“As we have repeatedly held, the grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, to whom we accord wide latitude.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James McCoygreen2 sentences2013While the jurors’ supplemental testimony is far from conclusive, we are presented with an adequate record on which we hold that because a clerk received and responded to the note without alerting Mr. Euceda or his counsel, Mr. Euceda was deprived of his constitutional right to “the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” United States v. (James) McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 742 (D.C.Cir.1970); see also Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 528 (D.C.1981) (“[A] defendant and his counsel have a right to be informed of all communications from the jury a 2013Analysis Mr. Euceda raises the following claims, among others, on appeal: (1) the supplemented record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review, requiring per se reversal, United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C.Cir.1970); and (2) even if the record is adequate, the trial court’s handling of the jury note was improper and deprived appellant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to “the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” (James) McCoy, 429 F.2d at 742 . | 1 | 1 |
Winestock v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013While the jurors’ supplemental testimony is far from conclusive, we are presented with an adequate record on which we hold that because a clerk received and responded to the note without alerting Mr. Euceda or his counsel, Mr. Euceda was deprived of his constitutional right to “the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” United States v. (James) McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 742 (D.C.Cir.1970); see also Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 528 (D.C.1981) (“[A] defendant and his counsel have a right to be informed of all communications from the jury a | 1 | 1 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences1991The Court emphasized that an uncorroborated anonymous tip, "standing alone, would not warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate." 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 1991The Court emphasized that an uncorroborated anonymous tip, “standing alone, would not warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate.” 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Leroy Walker v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1973Although the trial court should have refrained from communicating with the jury outside the presence of defense counsel, see Super.Ct.Cr.R. 43, “[sluch an error does not require reversal . . . when the record shows with reasonable certainty that it did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights.” Walker v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 222 , 322 F.2d 434, 435 (1963). 1973Although the trial court should have refrained from communicating with the jury outside the presence of defense counsel, see Super.Ct.Cr.R. 43, “[sluch an error does not require reversal . . . when the record shows with reasonable certainty that it did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights.” Walker v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 222 , 322 F.2d 434, 435 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Lawrence M. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. 13 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek “a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witnesses] Fifth Amendment claim”); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury’s presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quotin 2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. [13] See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek "a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witness'[s] Fifth Amendment claim"); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury's presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quo | 2 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Mandujano
green
2 sentences2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. 13 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek “a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witnesses] Fifth Amendment claim”); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury’s presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quotin 2003Because no questions were asked, it is impossible to determine on appeal if the threat of incrimination was real. 13 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (stating that where a person is compelled to testify, the interrogator must honor the privilege or seek “a judicial determination as to the bona fides of the witnesses] Fifth Amendment claim”); Littlejohn, 705 A.2d at 1083 (stating that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court should permit examination of the witness outside the jury’s presence and rule on the claim of privilege one question at a time) (quotin | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Middleton v. United States
green
2 sentences1990The controlling decision here is Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109 (D.C.1979), in which we held that reverse Jencks discovery could not be conducted in circumstances analogous to appellant’s. 1990The controlling decision here is Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1979), in which we held that reverse Jencks discovery could not be conducted in circumstances analogous to appellant's. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
James Owens v. Republic of Sudan
green
1 sentence2018Circuit reviewed our case law and was "genuinely uncertain" whether this jurisdiction "would apply the presence requirement in the Second Restatement of Torts to preclude recovery for IIED by family members absent from the scene of a terrorist bombing." 864 F.3d at 812 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Blackson v. United States
green
1 sentence2018WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadbourne Rev. 1970) ); cf. Blackson v. United States , 979 A.2d 1 , 7 (D.C. 2009) (explaining that an individual's failure to speak has traditionally been received as an admission so long as a third party makes a statement in the individual's presence and hearing; the individual actually understood what was said; the individual had an opportunity to deny it; and the statement contains assertions which, if untrue, the party would be expected to deny under the circumstances). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bollenbach v. United States
green
2 sentences2013This error is obvious, undisputed, and implicates important rights at the crucial moment of a trial when a confused jury seeks further instruction from the trial judge, whose “influence ... on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 , 66 S.Ct. 402 , 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). 2013This error is obvious, undisputed, and implicates important rights at the crucial moment of a trial when a confused jury seeks further instruction from the trial judge, whose “influence ... on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 , 66 S.Ct. 402 , 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Michael E. Workcuff
green
2 sentences2013Analysis Mr. Euceda raises the following claims, among others, on appeal: (1) the supplemented record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review, requiring per se reversal, United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C.Cir.1970); and (2) even if the record is adequate, the trial court’s handling of the jury note was improper and deprived appellant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to “the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” (James) McCoy, 429 F.2d at 742 . 2013Circuit’s statement in Workcuff that jury instruction is a “crucial stage” of the trial. 422 F.2d at 702 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Holmes v. United States
green
2 sentences2002“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” Holmes, supra, 580 A.2d at 1262 . 2002“To constitute an admission by silence, the statement must be made in the defendant’s presence and hearing, and the defendant must actually understand what was said and have an opportunity to deny it.” Holmes, supra, 580 A.2d at 1262 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
District of Columbia v. Walker
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 47-48 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Suitland Parkway Overlook Tenants Ass'n v. Cooper
green
2 sentences1995Camalier misreads Suitland Parkway, supra, as indicating that the presence of such a clause in that ease was pivotal to enforcement of the judgment as written. 1995Camalier misreads Suitland Parkway, supra, as indicating that the presence of such a clause in that case was pivotal to enforcement of the judgment as written. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences1979Courtroom identifications thereafter, even if unaided by official pre-trial identifications, are open to attack on their worth but not on their admissibility. [ 327 A.2d at 541 ; citation omitted.] In addition to the absence of any improper pretrial activity by the prosecutor, the instant case is further distinguished by the fact that, while Greene, York, and Mason involved an absence of counsel (in York the point was uncertain, see id., 138 U.S.App.D.C., at 198 n. 7, 426 F.2d at 1192 n. 7), here the challenged confrontation occurred in the presence of defense counsel. 1979Courtroom identifications thereafter, even if unaided by official pre-trial identifications, are open to attack on their worth but not on their admissibility. [ 327 A.2d at 541 ; citation omitted.] In addition to the absence of any improper pretrial activity by the prosecutor, the instant case is further distinguished by the fact that, while Greene, York, and Mason involved an absence of counsel (in York the point was uncertain, see id., 138 U.S.App.D.C., at 198 n. 7, 426 F.2d at 1192 n. 7), here the challenged confrontation occurred in the presence of defense counsel. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. James E. York
green
1 sentence1979Courtroom identifications thereafter, even if unaided by official pre-trial identifications, are open to attack on their worth but not on their admissibility. [ 327 A.2d at 541 ; citation omitted.] In addition to the absence of any improper pretrial activity by the prosecutor, the instant case is further distinguished by the fact that, while Greene, York, and Mason involved an absence of counsel (in York the point was uncertain, see id., 138 U.S.App.D.C., at 198 n. 7, 426 F.2d at 1192 n. 7), here the challenged confrontation occurred in the presence of defense counsel. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
2 sentences1978Since a waiver of counsel cannot be presumed from an official court docket which is silent on that question, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), perforce such a waiver may not be presumed where total knowledge of the conviction is derived from a less formal source. 1978Since a waiver of counsel cannot be presumed from an official court docket which is silent on that question, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), perforce such a waiver may not be presumed where total knowledge of the conviction is derived from a less formal source. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Wade
green
2 sentences1977Further, the post-lineup identification was so unreliable that it “created a substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification,” 2 and hence any testimony at trial concerning that identification violated appellant’s due process right. *1140 Appellant relies on United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) and its progeny to support his claim that he was denied his right to counsel. 1977Further, the post-lineup identification was so unreliable that it “created a substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification,” 2 and hence any testimony at trial concerning that identification violated appellant’s due process right. *1140 Appellant relies on United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) and its progeny to support his claim that he was denied his right to counsel. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.