6 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Alessandrello, Gaetano, in No. 79-2654. Appeal of Lacognata, Salvatore, in No. 79-2699green2 sentences2023United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it ‘embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence’). 1998United States v. AUssandrel-lo, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it “embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence”). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Estate of Stantongreen1 sentence2019This Court has stated, “Recitals in an attestation clause of a will are presumed to be true and can be used to establish due execution unless the presumption of truth is overcome by clear and convincing evidence.” Estate of Wagner, 551 N.W.2d 292, 295 (N.D. 1996) (quoting Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 744 (N.D. 1991)). [¶11] The Jensens’ argument on the validity of Blikre’s will is based on Jean Nordahl’s November 2018 deposition testimony about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Estate of Wagnergreen1 sentence2019This Court has stated, “Recitals in an attestation clause of a will are presumed to be true and can be used to establish due execution unless the presumption of truth is overcome by clear and convincing evidence.” Estate of Wagner, 551 N.W.2d 292, 295 (N.D. 1996) (quoting Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 744 (N.D. 1991)). [¶11] The Jensens’ argument on the validity of Blikre’s will is based on Jean Nordahl’s November 2018 deposition testimony about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. German Severinogreen1 sentence2001United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2nd Cir.1986); see also United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2nd Cir.1972) (the trial judge had discretion to require counsel to exercise challenges in the presence and hearing of veniremen rather than at side bar); United States v. Rowe, 435 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir.1970) (the court’s ruling on peremptory challenge of a juror in front of the jury offended no statute or rule of procedure-for exercising peremptory challenges). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Washabaugh, Jr., William David Wentroblegreen1 sentence2001United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2nd Cir.1986); see also United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2nd Cir.1972) (the trial judge had discretion to require counsel to exercise challenges in the presence and hearing of veniremen rather than at side bar); United States v. Rowe, 435 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir.1970) (the court’s ruling on peremptory challenge of a juror in front of the jury offended no statute or rule of procedure-for exercising peremptory challenges). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roger R. Ploof and George J. Godingreen1 sentence2001United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2nd Cir.1986); see also United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2nd Cir.1972) (the trial judge had discretion to require counsel to exercise challenges in the presence and hearing of veniremen rather than at side bar); United States v. Rowe, 435 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir.1970) (the court’s ruling on peremptory challenge of a juror in front of the jury offended no statute or rule of procedure-for exercising peremptory challenges). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Woodgreen1 sentence1998In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1119 , 114 S.Ct. 2125 , 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994), the Ninth Circuit outlined the change: "In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250, 254 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court distinguished between capital and noncapital cases and between custodial and noncustodial defendants, stating that the courts have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control, and the other b | 1 | 1 |
Donald David Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998Jones v. United States, 299 F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir.1962). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James McCoygreen2 sentences1971The U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia subsequently held that “the Sixth Amendment requires the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” United States v. McCoy, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 60 , 429 F.2d 739, 742 (1970). 1971The U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia subsequently held that “the Sixth Amendment requires the presence of defense counsel and the accused at all critical stages of the prosecution.” United States v. McCoy, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 60 , 429 F.2d 739, 742 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Allen
green
2 sentences2023Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 1 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). 2023Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 1 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). | 2 | 1998–2023 |
Byrne v. P. B. I. C., Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 1 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). 1998Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057,1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). | 2 | 1998–2023 |
Coleman v. Balkcom, Warden
green
2 sentences2023United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it ‘embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence’). 1998United States v. AUssandrel-lo, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it “embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence”). | 2 | 1998–2023 |
Gray v. Van Ooteghem
green
2 sentences2023United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it ‘embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence’). 1998United States v. AUssandrel-lo, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it “embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence”). | 2 | 1998–2023 |
Ohio Department of Highway Safety v. United States
green
2 sentences2023United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it ‘embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence’). 1998United States v. AUssandrel-lo, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 949 , 101 S.Ct. 2031 , 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43 is broader than the constitutional right because it “embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege of presence”). | 2 | 1998–2023 |
State v. Hatch
green
2 sentences2009This Court explained: “To dismiss a violation of the presence requirement as harmless, it must be ‘determined beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] substantial rights of the defendant are not affected.... ’ • Hatch, 346 N.W.2d at 278 . 1998To dismiss a violation of the presence' requirement as harmless, it must be “determined beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] substantial rights of the defendant are not affected.... ” Hatch, 346 N.W.2d at 278 . | 2 | 1998–2009 |
Nash v. United States
green
1 sentence2023Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 1 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Diaz v. United States
green
2 sentences1998In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1119 , 114 S.Ct. 2125 , 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994), the Ninth Circuit outlined the change: "In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250, 254 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court distinguished between capital and noncapital cases and between custodial and noncustodial defendants, stating that the courts have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control, and the other b 1998In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1119 , 114 S.Ct. 2125 , 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994), the Ninth Circuit outlined the change: "In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250, 254 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court distinguished between capital and noncapital cases and between custodial and noncustodial defendants, stating that the courts have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control, and the other b | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Illinois v. Allen
green
1 sentence1998Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057,1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 , reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 915 , 90 S.Ct. 1684 , 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Campbell v. Wood
green
1 sentence1998In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1119 , 114 S.Ct. 2125 , 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994), the Ninth Circuit outlined the change: "In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250, 254 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court distinguished between capital and noncapital cases and between custodial and noncustodial defendants, stating that the courts have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control, and the other b | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Campbell v. Wood
green
1 sentence1998In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1119 , 114 S.Ct. 2125 , 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994), the Ninth Circuit outlined the change: "In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250, 254 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court distinguished between capital and noncapital cases and between custodial and noncustodial defendants, stating that the courts have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control, and the other b | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.