38 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1872–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences2015Id. at 922-923 . [40] With respect to Kochersperger’s argument that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post- testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of defense counsel, this court observed that the Sixth Amendment “provides that an accused has a right to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 2015Id. at 922-923 . [40] With respect to Kochersperger’s argument that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post- testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of defense counsel, this court observed that the Sixth Amendment “provides that an accused has a right to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, | 1 | 1 |
Greenlee v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“Such a stage is considered a ‘critical stage,’ that is, any stage in a criminal proceeding where incrimination may occur or where the opportunity for effective defense must be seized or be foregone.” Id. (quoting Greenlee v. State, 477 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Id. at 922-923 . [40] With respect to Kochersperger’s argument that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post- testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of defense counsel, this court observed that the Sixth Amendment “provides that an accused has a right to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2006See Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692 . [7] As the majority notes, Morrissey holds that probationers or parolees facing revocation have a due process right "to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). . . ." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . 2006See Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692. 7 As the majority notes, Morrissey holds that probationers or parolees facing revocation have a due process right “to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).... ” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lamond D. Kelleygreen1 sentence2006See Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692 . [7] As the majority notes, Morrissey holds that probationers or parolees facing revocation have a due process right "to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). . . ." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2005Importantly, the difficulties asso-clated with learning the reason for the length of a continuance is the very reason for the IAD's "in the defendant's presence requirement." State v. Miller, 299 N.J.Super. 387, 398 , 691 A.2d 377 (1997) ("The purpose of the IAD's requirement that continuances be set in the defendant's presence is to ensure there is a record for appellate review") (emphasis added). 2005Importantly, the difficulties asso-clated with learning the reason for the length of a continuance is the very reason for the IAD's "in the defendant's presence requirement." State v. Miller, 299 N.J.Super. 387, 398 , 691 A.2d 377 (1997) ("The purpose of the IAD's requirement that continuances be set in the defendant's presence is to ensure there is a record for appellate review") (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David Earl Crozier (99-6561) Charles W. Burton (99-6567), United States of America v. Charles W. Burtongreen2 sentences2005Our holding is that (1) the defendant's presence during the setting of a continuance is an independent IAD requirement, United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 514 (6th Cir.2001) (the defendant's presence is a requirement of the IAD), and (2) Conn's inability to learn of the trial court's reason for the length of his continuance at the time of its issuance precludes an honest review of whether there was good cause to extend Conn's trial 102 days beyond his IAD deadline. 2005Our holding is that (1) the defendant's presence during the setting of a continuance is an independent IAD requirement, United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 514 (6th Cir.2001) (the defendant's presence is a requirement of the IAD), and (2) Conn's inability to learn of the trial court's reason for the length of his continuance at the time of its issuance precludes an honest review of whether there was good cause to extend Conn's trial 102 days beyond his IAD deadline. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See id. (holding that although an accused has a right to advice and assistance of counsel, he also has right to forego such representation); see also Owens, 176 Ind.App. at 3 , 373 N.E.2d at 915 n. 2 (noting that “defendant’s counsel would be required to sign the stipulation only when a defendant’s right to counsel has already attached and where the defendant has not waived such right to counsel”). 8 Kochersperger further contends that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post-testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See id. (holding that although an accused has a right to advice and assistance of counsel, he also has right to forego such representation); see also Owens, 176 Ind.App. at 3 , 373 N.E.2d at 915 n. 2 (noting that “defendant’s counsel would be required to sign the stipulation only when a defendant’s right to counsel has already attached and where the defendant has not waived such right to counsel”). 8 Kochersperger further contends that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post-testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of 2000See id. (holding that although an accused has a right to advice and assistance of counsel, he also has right to forego such representation); see also Owens, 176 Ind.App. at 3 , 373 N.E.2d at 915 n. 2 (noting that “defendant’s counsel would be required to sign the stipulation only when a defendant’s right to counsel has already attached and where the defendant has not waived such right to counsel”). 8 Kochersperger further contends that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post-testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Lewis v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 50, 55 . | 1 | 1 |
| Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pierce v. Goldsberry
green
2 sentences1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . 1957Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Pruett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State ex rel., 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 .” Springer, by Next Friend v. Byram (1894), 137 Ind. 15, 25 , 36 N. E. 361 , 23 L. | 4 | 1894–1991 |
Broyles v. State ex rel. DeLong
green
2 sentences1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . 1957Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Pruett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State ex rel., 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 .” Springer, by Next Friend v. Byram (1894), 137 Ind. 15, 25 , 36 N. E. 361 , 23 L. | 4 | 1894–1991 |
Puett v. Beard
green
2 sentences1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . 1957Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Pruett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State ex rel., 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 .” Springer, by Next Friend v. Byram (1894), 137 Ind. 15, 25 , 36 N. E. 361 , 23 L. | 4 | 1894–1991 |
Surber v. State
green
2 sentences1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . 1957Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Pruett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State ex rel., 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 .” Springer, by Next Friend v. Byram (1894), 137 Ind. 15, 25 , 36 N. E. 361 , 23 L. | 4 | 1894–1991 |
Conway v. State
green
2 sentences1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . 1991Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317 ; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104 ; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 ; Broyles v. State, ex rel. [De Long], 47 Ind. 251 ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 [ 21 N.E. 285 ], In 1 Rice on Evidence, p. 424, the author says: “The act or declaration of another person, and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto, is relevant, if, under all the circumstances of the case, he would have been likely to have been affected by the act or the declaration.” 137 Ind. at 25 , 36 N.E. 361 . | 4 | 1894–1991 |
Springer v. Byram
green
2 sentences1991In Springer v. Byram (1893) 137 Ind. 15 , 36 N.E. 361 , the concept was applied in a civil setting as follows: If statements are made in the presence and hearing of a person, affecting his rights, and under such circumstances as call for a reply, what he said, or if he failed to say anything, may be proven as in the nature of an admission. 1991In Springer v. Byram (1893) 137 Ind. 15 , 36 N.E. 361 , the concept was applied in a civil setting as follows: If statements are made in the presence and hearing of a person, affecting his rights, and under such circumstances as call for a reply, what he said, or if he failed to say anything, may be proven as in the nature of an admission. | 3 | 1901–1991 |
In Re Adoption of M.L. J.H. v. J.L. and C.L.
green
2 sentences2018M.L., 973 N.E.2d at 1223 . 2018M.L. , 973 N.E.2d at 1223 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Kochersperger v. State
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 922-923 . [40] With respect to Kochersperger’s argument that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post- testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of defense counsel, this court observed that the Sixth Amendment “provides that an accused has a right to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 2015Id. at 922-923 . [40] With respect to Kochersperger’s argument that his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated when the polygraph examination and post- testing interrogation were conducted without the presence of defense counsel, this court observed that the Sixth Amendment “provides that an accused has a right to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, | 2 | 2008–2015 |
Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436 , 319 N.E.2d 843 ; Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, Inc. (1973), 156 Ind.App. 497 , 297 N.E.2d 831 . 1981Faught v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 436 , 319 N.E.2d 843 ; Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, Inc. (1973), 156 Ind.App. 497 , 297 N.E.2d 831 . | 2 | 1974–1981 |
Diamond v. State
green
2 sentences1974In Diamond the rule is stated thus: "Where a charge is made in the presence and hearing of a person accusing him of a crime, his silence, or failure to contradict or explain the statement, may be shown, as being in the nature of an admission of the truth of such statements, providing the circumstances are such as to afford him an opportunity to speak and such as would naturally call for some action or reply from persons similarly situated." (Id., 195 Ind. at 291 , 144 N.E. at 468 .) The "charge" quite clearly is hearsay. 1973The rule is stated in Diamond v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 285, 291 , 144 N.E. 466 : “Where a charge is made in the presence and hearing of a person accusing him of a crime his silence, or failure to contradict or explain the statement, may be shown, as being in the nature of an admission of the truth of such statements, providing the circumstances are such as to afford him an opportunity to speak and such as would naturally call for some action or reply from persons similarly situated.” We are not concerned with whether the hearsay to which Officer Cambridge may have testified to was admissible. | 2 | 1973–1974 |
Commonwealth v. Wise
neutral
2 sentences1901Supp. 578 ; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray 519 ; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 ; Wharton Crim. 1894Cotton v. State, supra; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun, 7; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray, 519 ; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 (142); Wharton Crim. | 2 | 1894–1901 |
In re McCarthy's Will
neutral
2 sentences1901In an able opinion by Dailey, J., after reviewing the authorities, it was said: “It is settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily present as officers or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited from testifying to what they heard.” Citing Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75 , 6 South. 396 ; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 , 27 N. W. 858 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun 7 , 8 N. Y. 1901In an able opinion by Dailey, J., after reviewing the authorities, it was said: “It is settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily present as officers or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited from testifying to what they heard.” Citing Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75 , 6 South. 396 ; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 , 27 N. W. 858 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun 7 , 8 N. Y. | 2 | 1894–1901 |
Cotton v. State
green
2 sentences1901In an able opinion by Dailey, J., after reviewing the authorities, it was said: “It is settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily present as officers or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited from testifying to what they heard.” Citing Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75 , 6 South. 396 ; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 , 27 N. W. 858 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun 7 , 8 N. Y. 1894Cotton v. State, supra; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun, 7; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray, 519 ; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 (142); Wharton Crim. | 2 | 1894–1901 |
House v. House
neutral
2 sentences1901In an able opinion by Dailey, J., after reviewing the authorities, it was said: “It is settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily present as officers or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited from testifying to what they heard.” Citing Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75 , 6 South. 396 ; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 , 27 N. W. 858 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun 7 , 8 N. Y. 1901In an able opinion by Dailey, J., after reviewing the authorities, it was said: “It is settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily present as officers or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited from testifying to what they heard.” Citing Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75 , 6 South. 396 ; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 , 27 N. W. 858 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun 7 , 8 N. Y. | 2 | 1894–1901 |
Oliver v. Pate
green
2 sentences1901Supp. 578 ; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray 519 ; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 ; Wharton Crim. 1894Cotton v. State, supra; House v. House, 61 Mich. 69 ; In re McCarthy, 55 Hun, 7; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 ; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray, 519 ; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 (142); Wharton Crim. | 2 | 1894–1901 |
Guard v. Risk
green
2 sentences1876Shinloub v. Ammerman, 7 Ind. 347 ; Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156 . 'We do not,think the words actionable per se, throughout the country generally. 1875This point is against the appellant. 2 G. & H. 110, sec. 86; and see Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156 . | 2 | 1875–1876 |
In re Adoption of D.M. Michael Mendez v. Brent L. Weaver
green
1 sentence2018D.M., 82 N.E.3d at 359 . [16] In M.L., where the father challenged the trial court's conclusion that he was an unfit parent, we noted the presence of these factors. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Coolman v. State
green
2 sentences2013After the jury had retired to deliberate on their verdict, in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, and out of the presence and hearing of the judge of the court, the foreman of the jury said to the bailiff, who had been called to the door of the room in which the jury were kept, “We can’t agree upon a verdict, and have agreed to disagree.” 163 Ind. at 509-510 , 72 N.E. at 570 . 2013After the jury had retired to deliberate on their verdict, in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, and out of the presence and hearing of the judge of the court, the foreman of the jury said to the bailiff, who had been called to the door of the room in which the jury were kept, “We can’t agree upon a verdict, and have agreed to disagree.” 163 Ind. at 509-510 , 72 N.E. at 570 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Department of Public Welfare, State v. Couch
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 168-169 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Indiana Forge & MacHine Co. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
green
1 sentence1993Indiana Forge & Machine Co., Inc. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1979), Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 910, 912 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Jarrell v. Monsanto Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| FMC Corp. v. Brown green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Dedrick v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hollonquest v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Faught v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| General Cigar Co. Ex Rel. Home Insurance Co. v. Lancaster Leaf Tobacco Co. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Burton neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Burrus v. Silhavy green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Key v. State green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Fluty v. State green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Kintner v. State ex rel. Ripperdan neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Kramer v. Northwestern Elevator Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| People v. Lurie green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| People v. Lindley neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Brunker v. Cummins neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Madden v. State green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Harris v. State green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Foudray v. Foudray green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.