29 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thacker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024“The test for harmless error is whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error.” Exantus v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 871 , 890 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006)). 2021We test for harmless error by inquiring as to “any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error.” Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983)). | 6 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. McIntoshgreen2 sentences2024Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 43 (Ky. 1983)). 2021We test for harmless error by inquiring as to “any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error.” Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Ky. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983)). | 3 | 3 |
Lett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007NOTES [1] See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). [2] RCr 9.24. [3] See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky.2001) (holding that it was reversible error for a jury to be permitted to play tapes of evidence in the jury room during deliberations); Lett v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267 , 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940) (holding that it was reversible error, even absent an explicit showing of prejudice, for a stenographer to read portions of the evidence to a jury without the presence of defense counsel). [4] Lett, 144 S.W.2d at 509 ("It has been recognized since time immemorial, under the common law, the federa 2007NOTES [1] See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). [2] RCr 9.24. [3] See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky.2001) (holding that it was reversible error for a jury to be permitted to play tapes of evidence in the jury room during deliberations); Lett v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267 , 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940) (holding that it was reversible error, even absent an explicit showing of prejudice, for a stenographer to read portions of the evidence to a jury without the presence of defense counsel). [4] Lett, 144 S.W.2d at 509 ("It has been recognized since time immemorial, under the common law, the federa | 2 | 3 |
Mills v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007NOTES [1] See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). [2] RCr 9.24. [3] See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky.2001) (holding that it was reversible error for a jury to be permitted to play tapes of evidence in the jury room during deliberations); Lett v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267 , 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940) (holding that it was reversible error, even absent an explicit showing of prejudice, for a stenographer to read portions of the evidence to a jury without the presence of defense counsel). [4] Lett, 144 S.W.2d at 509 ("It has been recognized since time immemorial, under the common law, the federa 2007See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky.2001) (holding that it was reversible error for a jury to be permitted to play tapes of evidence in the jury room during deliberations); Lett v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267 , 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940) (holding that it was reversible error, even absent an explicit showing of prejudice, for a stenographer to read portions of the evidence to a jury without the presence of defense counsel). .Lett, 144 S.W.2d at 509 ("It has been recognized since time immemorial, under the common law, the federal and our Constitution, that when one is charged with a fel | 2 | 3 |
Griffith v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2017Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506 , 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933). 4 Like many common law rules of evidence that have been included in modern codes of evidence, KRE 801A(b)(2) derives its wisdom from an elementary rule of human nature that was long ago woven into the fabric of the common law. 2017Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506 , 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933). 4 Like many common law rules of evidence that have been included in modern codes of evidence, KRE 801A(b)(2) derives its wisdom from an elementary rule of human nature that was long ago woven into the fabric of the common law. | 2 | 2 |
Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkinsgreen1 sentence2022While Bannister reads this section as allowing for a 5% impairment rating for tinnitus only in the presence of hearing loss, “the proper interpretation of the Guides and the proper assessment of an impairment rating are medical questions.” Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkins, 107 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Ky. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Craiggreen1 sentence2021Gibson alleges that he was harmed by the video conferenced hearing because “he was not personally present to observe demeanor, confront witnesses face-to-face, lodge immediate observations and objections in a confidential manner with counsel, or have the court ascertain his own actions and demeanor.” However, as Maryland v. Craig makes clear, the Confrontation Clause does not provide “an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting[.]” 497 U.S. 836, 836-37 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Jason Dickerson v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen2 sentences2017Our standard for finding that a constitutional error -- was harmless "is whether we are convinced· 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Ky. 2016) (quoting .Chapman v. California, 386'U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 6 Put another way, we consider. the itnproper evidence in the context of the entire trial and ask, "whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have been different without the presence of that error." Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287, 291 ( 2017"With this standard in mind, examining the nature of the constitutionally offensive evidence in the context of the entire trial, and in light of the overwhelming ·evidence of [his] guilt," pickerson, 485 S.W.3d at 327 , we conclude that the improperly-introduced evidence was harmless beyond a r~asonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2016Instead, the act of drawing a reasonable inference “is a process of reasoning by which a proposition is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts already proven.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 253 (Ky. 1999).- Indeed, inferring something not already proved based on proven facts necessarily contemplates reaching a conclusion derived from circumstantial evidence, such ■as the presence of the bar of soap in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Humphrey v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2012While we have stated it is the “better practice to ... conduct! ] • • • • competency hearing in chambers, outside the presence and hearing of the jury,” Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Ky.1998), we have never required it. | 1 | 1 |
Stepp v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2007Stepp v. Commonwealth, 608 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Ky.1980) ("It is the whole circumstances which surround the incident that must be considered by the trial judge in deciding whether an instruction on self-defense is proper or whether an instruction on self-defense with limitations is proper. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graves v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2025Moreover, even “the prosecutor at trial plainly indicated in the presence of defense counsel [that] the proposed instruction was defective.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Warner v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1965Appellant’s first contention, that the judgment should be vacated because the court asked him in the presence of the jury whether he objected to a separation of the jury, was answered in Warner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 62 , adversely. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Hughes v. General Electric Light & Power Co.
neutral
2 sentences1953While the jury are thus absent no person, other than the person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.” Of this section, in Meier v. Weikel, 59 S.W. 496 , 497, 22 Ky.Law Rep. 953, this observation was made: “It will be observed that this section only authorizes the jury ‘to have a view of real property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred.’ It is the place, and the place only, that the court is authorized to send the jury to see.” In a number of cases, Hughes v. General Electric Light & Power Co., 107 Ky. 48 1953While the jury are thus absent no person, other than the person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.” Of this section, in Meier v. Weikel, 59 S.W. 496 , 497, 22 Ky.Law Rep. 953, this observation was made: “It will be observed that this section only authorizes the jury ‘to have a view of real property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred.’ It is the place, and the place only, that the court is authorized to send the jury to see.” In a number of cases, Hughes v. General Electric Light & Power Co., 107 Ky. 48 | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Mountain Water Co. v. Davis
neutral
2 sentences1953While the jury are thus absent no person, other than the person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.” Of this section, in Meier v. Weikel, 59 S.W. 496 , 497, 22 Ky.Law Rep. 953, this observation was made: “It will be observed that this section only authorizes the jury ‘to have a view of real property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred.’ It is the place, and the place only, that the court is authorized to send the jury to see.” In a number of cases, Hughes v. General Electric Light & Power Co., 107 Ky. 48 1953While the jury are thus absent no person, other than the person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.” Of this section, in Meier v. Weikel, 59 S.W. 496 , 497, 22 Ky.Law Rep. 953, this observation was made: “It will be observed that this section only authorizes the jury ‘to have a view of real property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred.’ It is the place, and the place only, that the court is authorized to send the jury to see.” In a number of cases, Hughes v. General Electric Light & Power Co., 107 Ky. 48 | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Lawson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1950But it has never been held to be reversible error to allow someone to speak to a juror on a subject foreign to the trial in the presence and hearing of the officer or officers in charge of the jury.” See also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 1 , 127 S. W. 2d 876 . 1950But it has never been held to be reversible error to allow someone to speak to a juror on a subject foreign to the trial in the presence and hearing of the officer or officers in charge of the jury.” See also Lawson v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 1 , 127 S. W. 2d 876 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Glenday v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . 1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Shorter v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . 1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Canter v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . 1941Canter v. Com., 176 Ky. 360 , 195 S. W. 825 ; Glenday v. Com., 255 Ky. 313 , 74 S. W. (2d) 332 ; Shorter v. Com., 248 Ky. 37 , 58 S. W. (2d) 224 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Justice v. Wellman
neutral
2 sentences1936Justice v. Wellman, 260 Ky. 479 , 86 S. W. (2d) 132 . 1936Justice v. Wellman, 260 Ky. 479 , 86 S. W. (2d) 132 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Blair v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1933Respecting the evidence as to the bloodhound following the trail from the scene of the murder to the accused’s home, it is stated in our former opinion, “Upon another trial, evidence may be introduced to prove more satisfactorily that the dog did possess the qualifications demanded by the rules of admissibility, as- definitely laid down in Blair v. Com., 181 Ky. 218 , 204 S. W. 67 .” As regards- the evidence showing the statements of the deceased at the home of Mrs. Barnes which were admitted oil the first trial, it was our conclusion, and so stated in our opinion, that it'was not shown they w 1933Respecting the evidence as to the bloodhound following the trail from the scene of the murder to the accused’s home, it is stated in our former opinion, “Upon another trial, evidence may be introduced to prove more satisfactorily that the dog did possess the qualifications demanded by the rules of admissibility, as- definitely laid down in Blair v. Com., 181 Ky. 218 , 204 S. W. 67 .” As regards- the evidence showing the statements of the deceased at the home of Mrs. Barnes which were admitted oil the first trial, it was our conclusion, and so stated in our opinion, that it'was not shown they w | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Shields v. Patterson
neutral
1 sentence1932In Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560 , 186 S. W. 142 , in relation to the statements admitted under somewhat similar conditions, it was written that the most that could be said was that the accused might or could have heard the statements had he been listening, and that if any presumption is to be indulged from the facts related it would reasonably be that, if he had heard the statement or accusation, some response or comment would have been induced. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Pace v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1932In Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560 , 186 S. W. 142 , in relation to the statements admitted under somewhat similar conditions, it was written that the most that could be said was that the accused might or could have heard the statements had he been listening, and that if any presumption is to be indulged from the facts related it would reasonably be that, if he had heard the statement or accusation, some response or comment would have been induced. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Merriweather v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1931Merriweather v. Com., 118 Ky. 870 , 82 S. W. 592 , 26 Ky. Law Rep. 793 , 4 Ann. 1931Merriweather v. Com., 118 Ky. 870 , 82 S. W. 592 , 26 Ky. Law Rep. 793 , 4 Ann. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Conclin v. Grand Central Savings & Building Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1931Conclin v. Grand Central Savings & Building Association, 144 Ky. 237 , 138 S. W. 312 ; Smith v. Holowell, 201 Ky. 271 , 256 S. W. 408 . 1931Conclin v. Grand Central Savings & Building Association, 144 Ky. 237 , 138 S. W. 312 ; Smith v. Holowell, 201 Ky. 271 , 256 S. W. 408 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Smith v. Holowell
green
2 sentences1931Conclin v. Grand Central Savings & Building Association, 144 Ky. 237 , 138 S. W. 312 ; Smith v. Holowell, 201 Ky. 271 , 256 S. W. 408 . 1931Conclin v. Grand Central Savings & Building Association, 144 Ky. 237 , 138 S. W. 312 ; Smith v. Holowell, 201 Ky. 271 , 256 S. W. 408 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Spears v. McCoy
neutral
2 sentences1929Spears v. McCoy, 155 Ky. 1 , 159 S. W. 610 , 49 L. 1929Spears v. McCoy, 155 Ky. 1 , 159 S. W. 610 , 49 L. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Utterback v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1926In the ease of Utterback v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 723 , we held that the reading of the indictment to the jury by the Commonwealth’s attorney in the presence and hearing of the defendant is a substantial compliance with section 154 of the Criminal Code. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Bolling v. Bolling's Admr.
neutral
1 sentence1923In the case of Bolling v. Bolling’s Admr., 146 Ky. 313 , we held that where the decedent upon whom the daughter-in-law waited in his sickness had said to her or in her presence “He (the decedent) had plenty and they would be well paid for it. ’ ’ And again, ‘ ‘ Carrie, didn’t I promise to give you $500.00 a year to stay here and wait on me ? ” To which she answered. ‘‘ Yes, sir. ” We held that such statements did not amount to proof, in a case like this, sufficient to establish an express contract to pay for the services. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Bowlin v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1922The rule contended for and sought to-be applied here is rested upon the theory that if a damaging statement is made in the presence of a litigant and he heard it, or the circumstances were such that he must necessarily have heard it, and he neither said nor did anything in refutation of it, his silence, under the circumstances, may he treated as an admission of the truth of the statement, and it is universally regarded as competent, under such circumscribing circumstances, to prove such statements, and which 'rule of' practice this court has -heretofore recognized and applied. 16 Cyc. 956-960; | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Watson v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Benge's Administrator v. Fouts green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.