presence hearing in Connecticut

2012Although evidence of silence in the face of an accusation may be admissible under the ancient maxim that silence gives consent the inference of assent may be made only when no other explanation is consistent with silence.” 6 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522-23 , 504 A.2d 480 (1986).

2012Although evidence of silence in the face of an accusation may be admissible under the ancient maxim that silence gives consent the inference of assent may be made only when no other explanation is consistent with silence.” 6 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522-23 , 504 A.2d 480 (1986).

2001As we said in Leecan , ”[w]hen a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 522 .

1989State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1986“When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his part.” State v. Cook, supra, 76 ; State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 152 , 139 A. 632 (1927).

1986“When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his part.” State v. Cook, supra, 76 ; State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 152 , 139 A. 632 (1927).

1996Although it is true, as the ATR noted, that the contract required all modifications to be in writing, that does not end the inquiry, for "despite the presence of such a clause in a contract, a modification by subsequent parol agreement will be given effect." McKenna v. Woods, 21 Conn. App. 528 , 533 , 574 A.2d 836 (1990).

1996Although it is true, as the ATR noted, that the contract required all modifications to be in writing, that does not end the inquiry, for "despite the presence of such a clause in a contract, a modification by subsequent parol agreement will be given effect." McKenna v. Woods, 21 Conn. App. 528 , 533 , 574 A.2d 836 (1990).

1989State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

1989State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L.

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn. App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn.App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn. App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn.App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn. App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2008In re Jonathan M., 46 Conn. App. 545, 551-52 , 700 A.2d 1370 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 930 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997).

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2006At that time, the defendant asked with a smirk on his face, “Who got shot?” Roncinske also testified that after the defendant stated that “they were going to f_him up,” Roncinske replied that “they meant they were going to do something serious to him, not just a quick beating or anything like that.” When asked how the defendant responded, Roncinske testified that “he never disagreed with me.” “[I]n Connecticut . . . when a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his p

2006At that time, the defendant asked with a smirk on his face, “Who got shot?” Roncinske also testified that after the defendant stated that “they were going to f_him up,” Roncinske replied that “they meant they were going to do something serious to him, not just a quick beating or anything like that.” When asked how the defendant responded, Roncinske testified that “he never disagreed with me.” “[I]n Connecticut . . . when a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his p

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2006Moreover, “[wjhile a defendant may invoke his *379 right to remain silent at any time, even after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, it does not necessarily follow that he may remain ‘selectively’ silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); State v. Torres, 85 Conn. App. 303, 315-16 , 858 A.2d 776 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 947 , 861 A.2d 1179 (2004).

2003“To determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the petitioner of the right claimed to be waived.” McClain v. Manson, 183 Conn. 418, 430 , 439 A.2d 430 (1981).

2003“To determine the presence of waiver, there must be evidence of intelligent and intentional action by the petitioner of the right claimed to be waived.” McClain v. Manson, 183 Conn. 418, 430 , 439 A.2d 430 (1981).

2001At a September 21, 1998 pretrial hearing, the defendant argued that Connecticut law allows a private citizen to make a citizen’s arrest of a felon though the private person was not present when the felony was committed. 13 Citing Wrexford v. Smith, 2 Root (Conn.) 171 (1795), and State v. Ghiloni, 35 Conn. Sup. 570 , 398 A.2d 1204 (1978), 14 the state argued that “there is an in presence requirement both at common law and under the statute.” The court agreed with the state and ruled that “the concept of citizen’s arrest is [inapplicable] to [the] stipulated facts in this case.

2001At a September 21, 1998 pretrial hearing, the defendant argued that Connecticut law allows a private citizen to make a citizen’s arrest of a felon though the private person was not present when the felony was committed. 13 Citing Wrexford v. Smith, 2 Root (Conn.) 171 (1795), and State v. Ghiloni, 35 Conn. Sup. 570 , 398 A.2d 1204 (1978), 14 the state argued that “there is an in presence requirement both at common law and under the statute.” The court agreed with the state and ruled that “the concept of citizen’s arrest is [inapplicable] to [the] stipulated facts in this case.

2001In Altholtz v. Dental Commission , 4 Conn. App. 307 , 309 (1985), one element of the ruling allowing the hearsay testimony was that "[a]t no point did the plaintiff . . . request a recess or continuance in order to secure CT Page 16410 the presence at the hearing of . . . [the experts] who had prepared the reports. . . ." The Supreme Court case of Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 398 (1971) was the precedent that led to the rule on hearsay as set forth in Carlson v. Kozlowski , supra Richardson upheld under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and due process the admission of expert report

1995Hartford contends that the presence of these factors distinguishes its case from our decisions in CBIA I, supra, 214 Conn. 726 , and Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 218 Conn. 335 , 589 A.2d 356 (1991) (CBIA II), in which we determined that the plaintiffs had not been aggrieved by the decision of the commission on hospitals and health care (CHHC) that had permitted increased hospital revenue because the plaintiffs had failed “to demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of the decisions [of the agency] that can be distinguished from

1995Hartford contends that the presence of these factors distinguishes its case from our decisions in CBIA I, supra, 214 Conn. 726 , and Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 218 Conn. 335 , 589 A.2d 356 (1991) (CBIA II), in which we determined that the plaintiffs had not been aggrieved by the decision of the commission on hospitals and health care (CHHC) that had permitted increased hospital revenue because the plaintiffs had failed “to demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of the decisions [of the agency] that can be distinguished from

1995Hartford contends that the presence of these factors distinguishes its case from our decisions in CBIA I, supra, 214 Conn. 726 , and Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 218 Conn. 335 , 589 A.2d 356 (1991) (CBIA II), in which we determined that the plaintiffs had not been aggrieved by the decision of the commission on hospitals and health care (CHHC) that had permitted increased hospital revenue because the plaintiffs had failed “to demonstrate a legal interest in the subject matter of the decisions [of the agency] that can be distinguished from

1994“We make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole”; Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149 , 440 A.2d 885 (1981); with a goal of “reconciling its separate parts in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation.” Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 305 , 562 A.2d 7 (1989).

1994“We make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole”; Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149 , 440 A.2d 885 (1981); with a goal of “reconciling its separate parts in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation.” Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 305 , 562 A.2d 7 (1989).

1994“We make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole”; Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149 , 440 A.2d 885 (1981); with a goal of “reconciling its separate parts in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation.” Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 305 , 562 A.2d 7 (1989).

1994“We make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole”; Powers v. Ulichny, 185 Conn. 145, 149 , 440 A.2d 885 (1981); with a goal of “reconciling its separate parts in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation.” Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 305 , 562 A.2d 7 (1989).

1993State v. Leecan, [supra]; State v. Cook, 174 Conn. 73, 76 , 381 A.2d 563 (1977); State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 152 , 139 A. 632 (1927).

1993State v. Leecan, [supra]; State v. Cook, 174 Conn. 73, 76 , 381 A.2d 563 (1977); State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 152 , 139 A. 632 (1927).