56 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perdue v. Stategreen2 sentences1957In Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277, 281 ( 69 S. E. 184 ), it was stated: “If counsel was of the opinion that the remarks [of the court] . . . which it is insisted were prejudicial to the cause of his client were of such a character as to influence the minds of the jury prejudicially to the cause of the defendant, he should have moved for a postponement of the *486 case until other jurors could be empaneled to try the same, or, if the jury which actually tried the case had been empaneled and sworn in this particular case, a motion should have been made for a mistrial, and the judge’s refusal to de 1957In Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277, 281 ( 69 S. E. 184 ), it was stated: “If counsel was of the opinion that the remarks [of the court] . . . which it is insisted were prejudicial to the cause of his client were of such a character as to influence the minds of the jury prejudicially to the cause of the defendant, he should have moved for a postponement of the *486 case until other jurors could be empaneled to try the same, or, if the jury which actually tried the case had been empaneled and sworn in this particular case, a motion should have been made for a mistrial, and the judge’s refusal to de | 2 | 4 |
Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-1, LLCgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 922 (B). 2014Id. at 922 (B). | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Dennogreen2 sentences1990“Prior to Miranda the admissibility of an accused’s in-custody statements was judged solely by whether they were ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. [Cits.] If a suspect’s statements had been obtained by ‘techniques and methods offensive to due process’ [cits.], or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise ‘a free and unconstrained will’ [cits.], the statements would not be admitted.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304 (105 SC 1285, 84 LE2d 222) (1985); see Jackson v. Denno, supra. “Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendmen 1990"Prior to Miranda the admissibility of an accused's in-custody statements was judged solely by whether they were `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. [Cits.] If a suspect's statements had been obtained by `techniques and methods offensive to due process' [cits.], or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise `a free and unconstrained will' [cits.], the statements would not be admitted." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 304 (105 SC 1285, 84 LE2d 222) (1985); see Jackson v. Denno, supra. "Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendmen | 2 | 2 |
Price v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences1989Since a waiver depends upon the presence of a claim in the action for which liability insurance protection has been provided, if no employee is made a party defendant there will be no waiver as to DOT." Id. at 537-538 . 1989Since a waiver depends upon the presence of a claim in the action for which liability insurance protection has been provided, if no employee is made a party defendant there will be no waiver as to DOT.” Id. at 537-538 . | 1 | 2 |
Stapleton v. Stategreen2 sentences1923Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Rogers v. State, 18 Ga. App. 332 ( 89 S. E. 460 ); Stapleton v. State, 19 Ga. App. 36 (13) ( 90 S. E. 1029 ); Harrison v. State, 20 Ga. App. 157 (6) ( 92 S. E. 970 ); Grigg v. State, 22 Ga. App. 637 (2) ( 96 S. E. 1049 ); Gilbert v. State, 27 Ga. App. 604 (4). ( 109 S. E. 697 ). 1923Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Rogers v. State, 18 Ga. App. 332 ( 89 S. E. 460 ); Stapleton v. State, 19 Ga. App. 36 (13) ( 90 S. E. 1029 ); Harrison v. State, 20 Ga. App. 157 (6) ( 92 S. E. 970 ); Grigg v. State, 22 Ga. App. 637 (2) ( 96 S. E. 1049 ); Gilbert v. State, 27 Ga. App. 604 (4). ( 109 S. E. 697 ). | 1 | 2 |
Craig v. Holseygreen1 sentence2021Given the presence of these factors and the evidence summarized above, Fassnacht’s behavior clearly “exhibited a high degree of reprehensibility.” Craig, 264 Ga. App. at 348-349 (5) (a) (defendant’s conduct, which resulted in physical harm and exhibited a reckless disregard for the safety of others, was highly reprehensible). | 1 | 1 |
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Goregreen1 sentence2021See 28 BMW of North America, 517 U.S. at 575 (III) (indicating, as part of analysis of reprehensibility, that “crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence” are more serious and blameworthy than nonviolent crimes or negligence) (citation and punctuation omitted). (ii) Ratio. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Notwithstanding the vague and indefinite nature of Prescott’s enumerations, see Martin, 223 Ga. at 653 (7); Pinson, 266 Ga. App. at 259 (3) (b), none are supported by citations of authority or to the record. | 1 | 1 |
Pinson v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Notwithstanding the vague and indefinite nature of Prescott’s enumerations, see Martin, 223 Ga. at 653 (7); Pinson, 266 Ga. App. at 259 (3) (b), none are supported by citations of authority or to the record. | 1 | 1 |
NORWICH Et Al. v. THE SHRIMP FACTORY, INC.green2 sentences2019See 332 Ga. App. at 162 , 770 S.E.2d 357 . 2019See 332 Ga. App. at 162 , 770 S.E.2d 357 . | 1 | 1 |
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences2016While we may be able to conceive of a statement that constitutes an “upbraid, insult, or abuse” that could be classified as “fighting words” and thus not subject to First Amendment protections, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 62 SCt 766 , 86 LE 1031) (1942) (words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”), “we can just as easily formulate statements punishable by the statute which would not be likely to cause an average addressee to fight.” Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549 (III) ( 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 475 ) ( 2016While we may be able to conceive of a statement that constitutes an “upbraid, insult, or abuse” that could be classified as “fighting words” and thus not subject to First Amendment protections, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 62 SCt 766 , 86 LE 1031) (1942) (words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”), “we can just as easily formulate statements punishable by the statute which would not be likely to cause an average addressee to fight.” Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549 (III) ( 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 475 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
O'KELLEY v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Over a decade later, in O’Kelley v. State, 278 Ga. 564, 567 (2) ( 604 SE2d 509 ) (2004), this Court overruled prior case law indicating that a first appearance hearing was not a critical stage of proceedings, stating: [W]e overrule [prior case law] and hold that an initial appearance hearing, although often not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding in its own right requiring the actual presence of a defense attorney, is a formal legal proceeding wherein the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 2012Over a decade later, in O’Kelley v. State, 278 Ga. 564, 567 (2) ( 604 SE2d 509 ) (2004), this Court overruled prior case law indicating that a first appearance hearing was not a critical stage of proceedings, stating: [W]e overrule [prior case law] and hold that an initial appearance hearing, although often not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding in its own right requiring the actual presence of a defense attorney, is a formal legal proceeding wherein the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. | 1 | 1 |
Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Associates, Architects & Planners, Inc.green2 sentences1998Compare Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., 254 Ga. 734, 736 (2) ( 334 SE2d 308 ) (damages as well as injunctive relief available to protect registered trade name). 1998Compare Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., 254 Ga. 734, 736 (2) ( 334 SE2d 308 ) (damages as well as injunctive relief available to protect registered trade name). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The inference of a weapon’s presence was not error. 1 Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) (a) ( 392 SE2d 280 ) (1990). 2. 1997The inference of a weapon’s presence was not error. 1 Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) (a) ( 392 SE2d 280 ) (1990). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Baranco, Inc. v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences1996See Baranco, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 217 Ga. App. 169, 171 (1) ( 456 SE2d 592 ) (1995). 1996See Baranco, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 217 Ga. App. 169, 171 (1) ( 456 SE2d 592 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Little v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Elstadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pierce v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Fentongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Valdosta, Moultrie & Western Railroadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Askew v. Spencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chance v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manget v. Cunninghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barnett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corbin v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mims v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heard v. Heardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hanson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hannah v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brady v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farrar v. Brackettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenberg v. Weinsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harrison v. State
green
2 sentences1928“Prejudicial remarks of the court in the presence and hearing of the jury are not ground for a new trial, unless a -motion to declare a mistrial on that ground has been made and refused.” Harrison v. State, 20 Ga. App. 157 (6) ( 92 S. E. 970 ). 1928“Prejudicial remarks of the court in the presence and hearing of the jury are not ground for a new trial, unless a -motion to declare a mistrial on that ground has been made and refused.” Harrison v. State, 20 Ga. App. 157 (6) ( 92 S. E. 970 ). | 5 | 1920–1928 |
Davis v. State
neutral
2 sentences1977"Prejudicial remarks of the judge in the presence and hearing of the jury on the trial of a criminal case are not cause for a new trial when there was no motion for a mistrial on account of them.” Davis v. State, 40 Ga. App. 123 (4) ( 149 SE 51 ) (1929). 1977"Prejudicial remarks of the judge in the presence and hearing of the jury on the trial of a criminal case are not cause for a new trial when there was no motion for a mistrial on account of them.” Davis v. State, 40 Ga. App. 123 (4) ( 149 SE 51 ) (1929). | 3 | 1930–1977 |
Godwin v. State
green
2 sentences1933In Goodwin v. State, 123 Ga. 569 ( 51 S. E. 598 ), the direct point came up as to whether the court could compel counsel to read the law to the court in the presence and hearing of the jury, rather than to read it directly to the jury, and the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had this power. 1933In Goodwin v. State, 123 Ga. 569 ( 51 S. E. 598 ), the direct point came up as to whether the court could compel counsel to read the law to the court in the presence and hearing of the jury, rather than to read it directly to the jury, and the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had this power. | 3 | 1911–1968 |
Dent v. State
green
2 sentences1968Godwin v. State, 123 Ga. 569 ( 51 SE 598 ); Clark v. State, 8 Ga. App. 757 (2), 760 ( 70 SE 90 ); Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 776, 777 ( 169 SE 321 ). 1933This precedent, which has never been overruled or criticised, would compel us, if there were no other reason, to hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to require counsel to read the law to the court, rather than to the jury, provided that the jury were allowed to hear the law as read.” Clark v. State, 8 Ga. App. 757 (2), 760 ( 70 S. E. 90 ). | 2 | 1933–1968 |
Clark v. State
neutral
2 sentences1968Godwin v. State, 123 Ga. 569 ( 51 SE 598 ); Clark v. State, 8 Ga. App. 757 (2), 760 ( 70 SE 90 ); Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 776, 777 ( 169 SE 321 ). 1933This precedent, which has never been overruled or criticised, would compel us, if there were no other reason, to hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to require counsel to read the law to the court, rather than to the jury, provided that the jury were allowed to hear the law as read.” Clark v. State, 8 Ga. App. 757 (2), 760 ( 70 S. E. 90 ). | 2 | 1933–1968 |
Barnett v. Strain
green
2 sentences1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). 1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). | 2 | 1923–1926 |
Kay v. Benson
green
2 sentences1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). 1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). | 2 | 1923–1926 |
Moore v. McAfee
green
2 sentences1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). 1926Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ); Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 (11) ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 (5) ( 107 S. E. 530 ); Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 ( 108 S. E. 779 ); Waddell v. State, 29 Ga. App. 33 (5) ( 113 S. E. 94 ). | 2 | 1923–1926 |
Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford
green
1 sentence2017Even with the presence of a clause providing for a governing state law, this Court held that the agreement at issue "without question invokes *107 both the substantive law and procedure of the FAA." Id . at 437 (1) (a), 538 S.E.2d 73 ; see also Primerica Fin. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Wise
green
2 sentences2017Serv., Inc. v. Wise , 217 Ga. App. 36 , 36-37 (1), 456 S.E.2d 631 (1995) ( "[N]otwithstanding a choice of laws provision stating Georgia law shall govern the agreement, the arbitration clause in this case makes two express references to the FAA ... 2017Serv., Inc. v. Wise , 217 Ga. App. 36 , 36-37 (1), 456 S.E.2d 631 (1995) ( "[N]otwithstanding a choice of laws provision stating Georgia law shall govern the agreement, the arbitration clause in this case makes two express references to the FAA ... | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ketchens v. Reiner
green
2 sentences2016While we may be able to conceive of a statement that constitutes an “upbraid, insult, or abuse” that could be classified as “fighting words” and thus not subject to First Amendment protections, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 62 SCt 766 , 86 LE 1031) (1942) (words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”), “we can just as easily formulate statements punishable by the statute which would not be likely to cause an average addressee to fight.” Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549 (III) ( 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 475 ) ( 2016While we may be able to conceive of a statement that constitutes an “upbraid, insult, or abuse” that could be classified as “fighting words” and thus not subject to First Amendment protections, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 62 SCt 766 , 86 LE 1031) (1942) (words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”), “we can just as easily formulate statements punishable by the statute which would not be likely to cause an average addressee to fight.” Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549 (III) ( 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 475 ) ( | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Garcia v. Charles Evans BMW, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997“In the absence of any evidence that [plaintiffs were] prevented from reading the contract, the presence of this clause defeats [plaintiffs’] claim of justifiable reliance on any representations by [defendants]. [Cit.]” Garcia v. Charles Evans BMW, 222 Ga. App. at 122 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1995Factors to be considered are: the presence of the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), the voluntariness of the incriminating statement, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statement, the presence of intervening circumstances between the arrest and the statement, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 1995Factors to be considered are: the presence of the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), the voluntariness of the incriminating statement, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statement, the presence of intervening circumstances between the arrest and the statement, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Deaton v. Department of Corrections
neutral
2 sentences1995We have previously noted that a waiver of immunity “depends upon the presence of a claim in the action for which liability insurance protection has been provided and that if no employee is made a party defendant there will be no waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deaton v. Dept. *14 of Corrections, 212 Ga. App. 612 ( 443 SE2d 8 ) (1994). 1995We have previously noted that a waiver of immunity “depends upon the presence of a claim in the action for which liability insurance protection has been provided and that if no employee is made a party defendant there will be no waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deaton v. Dept. *14 of Corrections, 212 Ga. App. 612 ( 443 SE2d 8 ) (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1995Brown v. Illinois, supra at 603-604 . 1995Brown v. Illinois, supra at 603-604 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Condios, Inc. v. Driver green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Freeman v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Cottingham v. Weeks neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Farrar v. Farrar green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Eberhart v. State green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Georgia Power Co. v. Puckett green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Bell v. Summerlin green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Cochran v. State green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Mathis v. State green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Pavlovski v. Thornton neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Blackston v. State neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Cassels v. Usry, Sturgis & Co. neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Parks v. State green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Hardin v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Roberts v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Smith v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Strickland v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Futch v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Young green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Darden v. State green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| West v. Rosenberg green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Painter v. Painter green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Young v. State green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.