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13 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. John H. Bartlettgreen2 sentences2017See Sawyer, 2014 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 95 A.3d 608 (noting, in a decision where we affirmed a dismissal with preju dice, that the .court had “placed the parties on notice that dismissal with prejudice was a very real possibility”); cf. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 14 , 87 A.3d 741 (stating that “[pjarties are not entitled to a warning that the trial court may dismiss a case based on noncompliance with pretrial procedures,” but that we will consider “the presence of a warning as a factor supporting dismissal with prejudice”). 2017See Sawyer, 2014 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 95 A.3d 608 (noting, in a decision where we affirmed a dismissal with preju dice, that the .court had “placed the parties on notice that dismissal with prejudice was a very real possibility”); cf. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 14 , 87 A.3d 741 (stating that “[pjarties are not entitled to a warning that the trial court may dismiss a case based on noncompliance with pretrial procedures,” but that we will consider “the presence of a warning as a factor supporting dismissal with prejudice”). | 2 | 3 |
Daniel J. GATELY, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Et Al., Defendants, Appellantsgreen1 sentence2019See Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 411 A.2d at 79 (stating that "[a]ny inconvenience, expense or reputational injury [which] results from holding a statutorily authorized administrative hearing does not constitute irreparable harm"); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1232 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that "irreparable harm is subject to a sliding scale analysis, such that the showing of irreparable harm required of a plaintiff increases in the presence of factors, including the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which cut against a court's traditional authority to issue equitable rel | 1 | 1 |
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexandergreen1 sentence2019See Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 411 A.2d at 79 (stating that "[a]ny inconvenience, expense or reputational injury [which] results from holding a statutorily authorized administrative hearing does not constitute irreparable harm"); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1232 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that "irreparable harm is subject to a sliding scale analysis, such that the showing of irreparable harm required of a plaintiff increases in the presence of factors, including the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which cut against a court's traditional authority to issue equitable rel | 1 | 1 |
Liteky v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). 2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Gannett Co., Inc. v. State Tax Assessorgreen2 sentences2017See Gannett Co., 2008 ME 171 , ! 14, 959 A.2d 741 . 2017See Gannett Co., 2008 ME 171 , ! 14, 959 A.2d 741 . | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sawyergreen2 sentences2017See Sawyer, 2014 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 95 A.3d 608 (noting, in a decision where we affirmed a dismissal with preju dice, that the .court had “placed the parties on notice that dismissal with prejudice was a very real possibility”); cf. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 14 , 87 A.3d 741 (stating that “[pjarties are not entitled to a warning that the trial court may dismiss a case based on noncompliance with pretrial procedures,” but that we will consider “the presence of a warning as a factor supporting dismissal with prejudice”). 2017See Sawyer, 2014 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 95 A.3d 608 (noting, in a decision where we affirmed a dismissal with preju dice, that the .court had “placed the parties on notice that dismissal with prejudice was a very real possibility”); cf. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 14 , 87 A.3d 741 (stating that “[pjarties are not entitled to a warning that the trial court may dismiss a case based on noncompliance with pretrial procedures,” but that we will consider “the presence of a warning as a factor supporting dismissal with prejudice”). | 1 | 1 |
Douglas v. Martelgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Douglas, 2003 ME 132, ¶ 10 , 835 A.2d 1099 (noting, in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice as a discovery sanction, that the plaintiff had been “given two specific warnings that failure to comply would result in dismissal with prejudice”); Hatch v. Me. 2014See, e.g., Douglas, 2003 ME 132, ¶ 10 , 835 A.2d 1099 (noting, in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice as a discovery sanction, that the plaintiff had been “given two specific warnings that failure to comply would result in dismissal with prejudice”); Hatch v. Me. | 1 | 1 |
Pelletier v. Pelletiergreen1 sentence2014See Pelletier v. Pelletier, 597 A.2d 60, 61 (Me.1991) (stating that lack of preparedness is not an excuse when adequate notice is given); see also Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 14 , 87 A.3d 741 (“We have ... considered the presence of a warning as a factor supporting dismissal with prejudice.”). [¶ 13] The Bank concedes, as it did in the Superior Court, that it failed to participate constructively in the mediation process and that it was not prepared to present evidence at the hearing, but argues (A) that the sanction of dismissal with prejudice is excessive under the circumstances and creates a win | 1 | 1 |
Latremore v. Latremoregreen1 sentence2011The Law Court has held that section 46(2) of the Restatement "is designed to apply in a situation where the intent to cause harm is directed toward a third party and the plaintiff is injured indirectly by watching the [third] party suffer." Latremore v. Latremore, 584 A.2d 626, 631 (Me. 1990).4 The actual presence requirement for bystander liability is further clarified in the comment to section 46(2) of the Restatement: Conduct directed at a third person. | 1 | 1 |
Avery v. Whatleygreen1 sentence2004See Avery v. Whately, 670 A.2d 922, 924-25 (Me. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frechettegreen1 sentence1996We reiterate that “consecutive sentencing, when considered in light of the maximum periods of incarceration imposed, may result in sentences being excessive.” State v. Cloutier, 646 A.2d 358 , 362 n. 8 (Me.1994) (citing State v. Frechette, 645 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Me.1994)) (forty-year sentence on arson count consecutive to concurrent sentences of forty years excessive). | 1 | 1 |
Thayer v. Ushergreen2 sentences1967Thayer v. Usher, 98 Me. 468, 471 , 57 A. 839, 840 (1904); Dennis v. Waterford Packing Company, 113 Me. 159, 162 , 93 A. 58, 60 (1915); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 633; 31A C.J.S. 1967Thayer v. Usher, 98 Me. 468, 471 , 57 A. 839, 840 (1904); Dennis v. Waterford Packing Company, 113 Me. 159, 162 , 93 A. 58, 60 (1915); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 633; 31A C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Sterns v. Hudsongreen1 sentence1967Thayer v. Usher, 98 Me. 468, 471 , 57 A. 839, 840 (1904); Dennis v. Waterford Packing Company, 113 Me. 159, 162 , 93 A. 58, 60 (1915); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 633; 31A C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). 2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Diane L. Charette v. Dale N. Charette
green
2 sentences2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). 2018See Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 ; Charette , 2013 ME 4 , ¶ 21, 60 A.3d 1264 . "[I]t is fundamental that the court should resolve disputed issues of fact only after hearing all of the evidence with an open mind." People v. Johnson , 4 Ill.App.3d 539 , 281 N.E.2d 451 , 453 (1972). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
John Swenson Granite, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor
green
1 sentence2017However, the Court concludes that Kraft has met the lesser standard of substantial authority adopted by the Law Court in John Swenson Granite, Inc., 685 A.2d at 429 n.3, given the fact"intensive, almost ad hoc determination of whether a corporation is engaged in a unitary business and the presence of the factors listed above. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1996In imposing consecutive sentences, however, "the discretion can be exercised only if one of the factors listed in section 1256(2) is present.” Id. “ ‘The court’s determination as to the presence of those factors is reviewed for clear error.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). 7 . 1996In imposing consecutive sentences, however, "the discretion can be exercised only if one of the factors listed in section 1256(2) is present.” Id. “ ‘The court’s determination as to the presence of those factors is reviewed for clear error.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). 7 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Cloutier
green
1 sentence1996We reiterate that “consecutive sentencing, when considered in light of the maximum periods of incarceration imposed, may result in sentences being excessive.” State v. Cloutier, 646 A.2d 358 , 362 n. 8 (Me.1994) (citing State v. Frechette, 645 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Me.1994)) (forty-year sentence on arson count consecutive to concurrent sentences of forty years excessive). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Michaud
green
1 sentence1992“The court’s determination as to the presence of those factors is reviewed for clear error.” Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Dennis v. Waterford Packing Co.
green
1 sentence1967Thayer v. Usher, 98 Me. 468, 471 , 57 A. 839, 840 (1904); Dennis v. Waterford Packing Company, 113 Me. 159, 162 , 93 A. 58, 60 (1915); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 633; 31A C.J.S. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Sibly v. Hood
neutral
1 sentence1925He maintains that the declaration is fatally defective because the colloquium and the words alleged to be actionable as set out are inconsistent; more specifically stated, that the allegation that the words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff in the presence and hearing of third persons, “and in conversation with them,” is equivalent to a charge that the words were spoken in the third person, and is inconsistent with the alleged defamatory words as set out in the second person: “You are no better than he is.” “You are keeping a house of ill fame.” He relies upon the principle applicabl | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Wolf v. Rodifer
neutral
1 sentence1925He maintains that the declaration is fatally defective because the colloquium and the words alleged to be actionable as set out are inconsistent; more specifically stated, that the allegation that the words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff in the presence and hearing of third persons, “and in conversation with them,” is equivalent to a charge that the words were spoken in the third person, and is inconsistent with the alleged defamatory words as set out in the second person: “You are no better than he is.” “You are keeping a house of ill fame.” He relies upon the principle applicabl | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Miller v. Miller
neutral
1 sentence1925He maintains that the declaration is fatally defective because the colloquium and the words alleged to be actionable as set out are inconsistent; more specifically stated, that the allegation that the words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff in the presence and hearing of third persons, “and in conversation with them,” is equivalent to a charge that the words were spoken in the third person, and is inconsistent with the alleged defamatory words as set out in the second person: “You are no better than he is.” “You are keeping a house of ill fame.” He relies upon the principle applicabl | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.