presence hearing in Vermont

2026Dudley’s defamation claim fails because he does not sufficiently plead either falsity or lack of privilege. “[W]here the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint show the presence of a privilege,” a defamation plaintiff must “include in [his] pleadings allegations that would overcome the presence of a privilege.” Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agric., 2014 VT 133, ¶ 12 , 198 Vt. 187 (citations omitted).

2026Dudley’s defamation claim fails because he does not sufficiently plead either falsity or lack of privilege. “[W]here the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint show the presence of a privilege,” a defamation plaintiff must “include in [his] pleadings allegations that would overcome the presence of a privilege.” Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agric., 2014 VT 133, ¶ 12 , 198 Vt. 187 (citations omitted).

2014As noted earlier, the Parks PCR exception to actual prejudice turned on the trial court’s “wholesale failure” to follow any of the Rule 11 constitutional protocol—again, not the situation presented here. 2008 VT 65, ¶ 10 . [5] That such a direct inquiry, in any event, is no talisman against coercion is illustrated by In re Fuller , 135 Vt. 575, 577 , 381 A.2d 1056, 1058 (1977), where a guilty plea was stricken as coerced in an appeal from PCR denial, despite the petitioner’s earlier response to the trial court’s specific inquiry that he was acting “freely, voluntarily and without coercion.” [6

1990Vaillancourt, 139 Vt. at 143 , 425 A.2d at 95 .

1990Vaillancourt, 139 Vt. at 143 , 425 A.2d at 95 .

1989Second, the veracity of the information must be demonstrated in either of two ways: by proof of the inherent credibility of the source of the hearsay, or “by the presence of factors reasonably demonstrating the ‘reliability’ of the information fur *319 nished by the informer.” Id. at 374 , 320 A.2d at 625 ; see V.R.Cr.P. 41(c).

1989Second, the veracity of the information must be demonstrated in either of two ways: by proof of the inherent credibility of the source of the hearsay, or “by the presence of factors reasonably demonstrating the ‘reliability’ of the information fur *319 nished by the informer.” Id. at 374 , 320 A.2d at 625 ; see V.R.Cr.P. 41(c).

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1976Such cases include Childs Construction Co. v. Hart, 181 Vt. *580 241, 308 A.2d 139 (1973), involving service on a Netherlands resident by publication in a Vermont newspaper; Estey v. Neveille, 119 Vt. 438 , 128 A.2d 319 (1957), notice of trial which never reached counsel; Joyce v. Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 121 Vt. 69 , 147 A.2d 683 (1959), relating to premature entry of default judgment; and Wellington v. Wellington, 124 Vt. 401 , 205 A.2d 568 (1964), where a party’s presence at the hearing was prevented by the other party’s fraud.

1973It is a general principle that the constructive possession of land is in the holder of the record title until there is an actual disseisin and expulsion, or actual hostile possession of another under a claim of title. 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 18. *279 This Court in Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365 , 216 A.2d 41 (1965), said: “The presence of a claim of title in the land records meant that actual and exclusive occupation of any part of the deeded premises carried with it constructive possession of the whole absent any competing actual occupation. [Citation omitted.] The occupancy

1973It is a general principle that the constructive possession of land is in the holder of the record title until there is an actual disseisin and expulsion, or actual hostile possession of another under a claim of title. 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 18. *279 This Court in Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365 , 216 A.2d 41 (1965), said: “The presence of a claim of title in the land records meant that actual and exclusive occupation of any part of the deeded premises carried with it constructive possession of the whole absent any competing actual occupation. [Citation omitted.] The occupancy

1965Hassam v. Safford Lumber Co., 82 Vt. 444, 449-50 , 74 Atl. 197 .

1965Hassam v. Safford Lumber Co., 82 Vt. 444, 449-50 , 74 Atl. 197 .

1964West River Power Co. v. Bussino, 111 Vt. 137, 139 , 11 A.2d 263 ; Weinberg *205 v. Norton, 107 Vt. 279, 292 , 178 Atl. 913 ; see also, 6 Thompson, Real Property, §3037 (1962 Replacement); 4 Tiffany, Real Property, §1235 (3rd Ed.).

1964West River Power Co. v. Bussino, 111 Vt. 137, 139 , 11 A.2d 263 ; Weinberg *205 v. Norton, 107 Vt. 279, 292 , 178 Atl. 913 ; see also, 6 Thompson, Real Property, §3037 (1962 Replacement); 4 Tiffany, Real Property, §1235 (3rd Ed.).

1964West River Power Co. v. Bussino, 111 Vt. 137, 139 , 11 A.2d 263 ; Weinberg *205 v. Norton, 107 Vt. 279, 292 , 178 Atl. 913 ; see also, 6 Thompson, Real Property, §3037 (1962 Replacement); 4 Tiffany, Real Property, §1235 (3rd Ed.).

1964West River Power Co. v. Bussino, 111 Vt. 137, 139 , 11 A.2d 263 ; Weinberg *205 v. Norton, 107 Vt. 279, 292 , 178 Atl. 913 ; see also, 6 Thompson, Real Property, §3037 (1962 Replacement); 4 Tiffany, Real Property, §1235 (3rd Ed.).

1930It was said by Judge Peck in State v. Gilbert, 36 Vt. 145 , that “what is stated in the presence and hearing of a party under circumstances calling for a reply, is sometimes admissible against the party if not contradicted by him.

1904McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 Vt. 363 .