discussed standard in Michigan

2025The Court, looking to criminal law principles, held: Accordingly, where a respondent-parent appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a child-neglect case where adjudication was done by jury trial, we apply the following standard of review as modified from [People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239 ; 917 NW2d 559 (2018)]: In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain a jury’s verdict finding jurisdiction in a child-neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, and considers whether there was sufficient evidence to justi

2025The Court, looking to criminal law principles, held: Accordingly, where a respondent-parent appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a child-neglect case where adjudication was done by jury trial, we apply the following standard of review as modified from [People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239 ; 917 NW2d 559 (2018)]: In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain a jury’s verdict finding jurisdiction in a child-neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, and considers whether there was sufficient evidence to justi

2022In Venable v Gen Motors Corp, 253 Mich App 473 , 476- 477; 656 NW2d 188 (2002) (citations omitted), this Court discussed the framework used to evaluate employment discrimination claims.

2022The trial court discussed factors mentioned in Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 46 , such as the seriousness of the offense, as well as factors not accounted for in the guidelines, relating in part to defendant’s low potential for rehabilitation, as well as defendant’s repeated violations of the trial court’s orders.

2022Referencing McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802 ; 93 S Ct 1817 ; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973) as authority, this Court stated: [O]ur Supreme Court adapted the McDonnell Douglas framework to the Michigan Civil Rights Act.

2022Referencing McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802 ; 93 S Ct 1817 ; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973) as authority, this Court stated: [O]ur Supreme Court adapted the McDonnell Douglas framework to the Michigan Civil Rights Act.

2022In Venable v Gen Motors Corp, 253 Mich App 473 , 476- 477; 656 NW2d 188 (2002) (citations omitted), this Court discussed the framework used to evaluate employment discrimination claims.

2020In Zitka, 325 Mich App at 44 , this Court discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel as follows: -9- The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent proceeding when that issue has previously been the subject of a final judgment in an earlier proceeding.

2020Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 485 ; 542 NW2d 905 (1995).

2020Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 485 ; 542 NW2d 905 (1995).

2019In Woodington, 288 Mich App at 356 , this Court discussed the factors associated with determining spousal support, stating: 6 Berlin had previously purchased the Lots from a third party in 2011. 7 Alternatively, defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion to modify, amend, or set aside the JOSM was untimely under MCR 2.612(C).

2019In Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 276-277 , this Court discussed the framework: Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis, when a plaintiff asserting a claim for retaliatory discharge under MCL 418.301(13) circumstantially establishes a rebuttable prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its adverse employment action.

2019This argument was not raised in the trial court, and arguments raised for the first time on appeal are unpreserved and “are not ordinarily subject to review.” Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234 ; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).

2019This argument was not raised in the trial court, and arguments raised for the first time on appeal are unpreserved and “are not ordinarily subject to review.” Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234 ; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).

2015In Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006), this Court discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating: Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.

2015In Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006), this Court discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating: Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.

2014In People v Siler, 171 Mich App 246, 251 ; 429 NW2d 865 (1988), superseded in part on other grounds as stated in People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587 ; 739 NW2d 385 (2007), this Court discussed the requirement that the declarant be aware of his or her impending death in order for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

2014In People v Siler, 171 Mich App 246, 251 ; 429 NW2d 865 (1988), superseded in part on other grounds as stated in People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587 ; 739 NW2d 385 (2007), this Court discussed the requirement that the declarant be aware of his or her impending death in order for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

2014In People v Siler, 171 Mich App 246, 251 ; 429 NW2d 865 (1988), superseded in part on other grounds as stated in People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587 ; 739 NW2d 385 (2007), this Court discussed the requirement that the declarant be aware of his or her impending death in order for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

2014In People v Siler, 171 Mich App 246, 251 ; 429 NW2d 865 (1988), superseded in part on other grounds as stated in People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587 ; 739 NW2d 385 (2007), this Court discussed the requirement that the declarant be aware of his or her impending death in order for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

2008In Northwestern, supra at 487-490 , this Court discussed the standard of review circuit courts must apply to decisions of the insurance commissioner: The Michigan Constitution provides that “[a]ll final decisions ... of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or hy law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law.

2008In Northwestern, supra at 487-490 , 586 N.W.2d 563 , this Court discussed the standard of review circuit courts must apply to decisions of the insurance commissioner: The Michigan Constitution provides that "[a]ll final decisions ... of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law.

2004This Court discussed this principle in In re Fraser Estate, 288 Mich. 392, 394 , 285 N.W. 1 (1939): Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding.

2004This Court discussed this principle in In re Fraser Estate, 288 Mich. 392, 394 , 285 N.W. 1 (1939): Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding.

1998Id. at 140 .

1996In People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 271-272, 278 ; 475 NW2d 16 (1991), the Court discussed this exception to the warrant requirement and outlined that an inventory search of a person in detention is constitutional if the underlying arrest was valid and the search was conducted by the police in accordance with standardized department procedures.

1996In People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 271-272, 278 ; 475 NW2d 16 (1991), the Court discussed this exception to the warrant requirement and outlined that an inventory search of a person in detention is constitutional if the underlying arrest was valid and the search was conducted by the police in accordance with standardized department procedures.

1994In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that a comatose young woman had a privacy right grounded in the federal constitution to be free from bodily invasion by further treatment (a respirator), that the right was not diminished by her mental incompetency, and that her father could refuse such treatment on her behalf. [29] In tracing the history of cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment, the Court discussed the doctrine of informed consent that embraces the common-law notion of "bodily integrity," i.e., "the right of every individual to the possession and control of his

1994In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that a comatose young woman had a privacy right grounded in the federal constitution to be free from bodily invasion by further treatment (a respirator), that the right was not diminished by her mental incompetency, and that her father could refuse such treatment on her behalf. [29] In tracing the history of cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment, the Court discussed the doctrine of informed consent that embraces the common-law notion of "bodily integrity," i.e., "the right of every individual to the possession and control of his

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994This is determined by comparing post-injury with pre-injury ability to compete with the able-bodied for jobs within the type of work in which the injury occurred. [Emphasis added, see also Dressler v Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp, 402 Mich 243, 251 ; 262 NW2d 629 (1978); Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128 ; 116 NW2d 225 (1962); Adair v Metropolitan Bldg Co, 38 Mich App 393, 403 ; 196 NW2d 335 (1972).] The Legislature codified this judicial definition of disability when it amended the wdca, 1981 PA 200 , in § 301(4), and defined "disability” as "a limitation of an employee’s wage earni

1994In Kidd v General Motors Corp, 414 Mich 578, 591-592 ; 327 NW2d 265 (1982), the Court discussed the standard to be used in determining disability: It is well-established that the standard to be used in general disability cases is whether there is an impairment in wage-earning capacity.

1994In Kidd v General Motors Corp, 414 Mich 578, 591-592 ; 327 NW2d 265 (1982), the Court discussed the standard to be used in determining disability: It is well-established that the standard to be used in general disability cases is whether there is an impairment in wage-earning capacity.

1991This Court discussed the rule in Smalley v Mitchell, 110 Mich 650, 652 ; 68 NW 978 (1896): The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute.

1991This Court discussed the rule in Smalley v Mitchell, 110 Mich 650, 652 ; 68 NW 978 (1896): The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute.

1991This Court discussed the rule in Smalley v Mitchell, 110 Mich 650, 652 ; 68 NW 978 (1896): The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute.

1991This Court discussed the rule in Smalley v Mitchell, 110 Mich 650, 652 ; 68 NW 978 (1896): The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute.

1991The rule is that if, by any possibility, it is capable of being completed within a year, it is not within the statute .... [See also Fothergill v McKay Press, 361 Mich 666 ; 106 NW2d 215 (1960).] In Drummey v Henry, 115 Mich App 107 ; 320 NW2d 309 (1982), the plaintiff sued the defendant for sales commissions allegedly owed under an oral employment contract.

1991The rule is that if, by any possibility, it is capable of being completed within a year, it is not within the statute .... [See also Fothergill v McKay Press, 361 Mich 666 ; 106 NW2d 215 (1960).] In Drummey v Henry, 115 Mich App 107 ; 320 NW2d 309 (1982), the plaintiff sued the defendant for sales commissions allegedly owed under an oral employment contract.