discussed standard in Kansas

2021App. 2d 247 , 261 P.3d 943 (2011), a panel of this court discussed the rule of law established in Stanfield and reiterated in Rhoten: "[T]he Kansas Supreme Court redefined res judicata in a unique and narrow way.

2017The court discussed the doctrine but found it inapplicable to the circumstances before it. 227 Kan. at 907 .

2008In State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, 29 , 128 P.3d 382 (2006), this court discussed its standard for reviewing claims of cumulative error: "Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may be so great as to require reversal of the defendant's conviction.

2008In State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, 29 , 128 P.3d 382 (2006), this court discussed its standard for reviewing claims of cumulative error: "Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may be so great as to require reversal of the defendant's conviction.

2008In the recent case of State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 894 , 126 P.3d 1110 (2006), this court discussed the standard of review applicable when an indigent defendant requests the appointment of different trial counsel: "A trial court's refusal to appoint new trial counsel is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.

2008In the recent case of State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 894 , 126 P.3d 1110 (2006), this court discussed the standard of review applicable when an indigent defendant requests the appointment of different trial counsel: "A trial court's refusal to appoint new trial counsel is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.

2007The court discussed the standard set forth in Terry, 392 U.S. 1 , that an officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity in order to justify a stop.

2005In Holmes, this court discussed an exception to this general rule in State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838 , 896 P.2d 1059 (1995), and State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24 , 929 P.2d 132 (1996).

2005In Holmes, this court discussed an exception to this general rule in State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838 , 896 P.2d 1059 (1995), and State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24 , 929 P.2d 132 (1996).

2005In Holmes, this court discussed an exception to this general rule in State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838 , 896 P.2d 1059 (1995), and State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24 , 929 P.2d 132 (1996).

2005In Holmes, this court discussed an exception to this general rule in State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838 , 896 P.2d 1059 (1995), and State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24 , 929 P.2d 132 (1996).

2002This court discussed the standard of review to be applied where allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are raised for the first time on appeal in State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263 , 979 P.2d 1239 (1999): “Kansas does not ordinarily apply the plain error rule, and reversible error normally cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument where no contemporaneous objection is lodged.

2002This court discussed the standard of review to be applied where allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are raised for the first time on appeal in State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263 , 979 P.2d 1239 (1999): “Kansas does not ordinarily apply the plain error rule, and reversible error normally cannot be predicated upon a complaint of misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument where no contemporaneous objection is lodged.

1999In the recent case of State v. Phelps, 266 Kan. 185 , 967 P.2d 304 (1998), this court discussed the standard of review applicable to State prosecutorial appeals.

1999In the recent case of State v. Phelps, 266 Kan. 185 , 967 P.2d 304 (1998), this court discussed the standard of review applicable to State prosecutorial appeals.

1994For instance, in State v. Young, 253 Kan. 28, 31-32 , 852 P.2d 510 (1993), the court discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication as follows: *145 “In State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), this court concluded that PIK Crim. 2d 54.12 is an adequate statement of the statutory provision on voluntary intoxication.

1994For instance, in State v. Young, 253 Kan. 28, 31-32 , 852 P.2d 510 (1993), the court discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication as follows: *145 “In State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), this court concluded that PIK Crim. 2d 54.12 is an adequate statement of the statutory provision on voluntary intoxication.

1994For instance, in State v. Young, 253 Kan. 28, 31-32 , 852 P.2d 510 (1993), the court discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication as follows: *145 “In State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), this court concluded that PIK Crim. 2d 54.12 is an adequate statement of the statutory provision on voluntary intoxication.

1994For instance, in State v. Young, 253 Kan. 28, 31-32 , 852 P.2d 510 (1993), the court discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication as follows: *145 “In State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. 48, 60-61 , 766 P.2d 158 (1988), this court concluded that PIK Crim. 2d 54.12 is an adequate statement of the statutory provision on voluntary intoxication.

1994United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 135 , 814 P.2d 72 (1991), this court discussed the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine which permits “suits of a tort nature for retaliatory discharge based on the theory that dismissal of employees for reasons, violative of a particular public policy are actionable. *518 Conduct of an employer violative of public policy and giving rise to a cause of action has been recognized when an employee is discharged in retaliation for opposing an illegal or unethical activity of the employer, in retaliation for filing workers compensation clai

1991In Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 578 , 665 P.2d 743 (1983), this court discussed the standard for appellate review of a directed verdict motion.

1991In Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 578 , 665 P.2d 743 (1983), this court discussed the standard for appellate review of a directed verdict motion.

1979In Wittke v. Kusel, 215 Kan. 403 , 524 P.2d 774 (1974), this court discussed the doctrine of inverse condemnation and approved its definition as follows: “ ‘[A] remedy available to one whose land has been taken for public use.

1979In Wittke v. Kusel, 215 Kan. 403 , 524 P.2d 774 (1974), this court discussed the doctrine of inverse condemnation and approved its definition as follows: “ ‘[A] remedy available to one whose land has been taken for public use.

1979Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1063 (1977), the court discussed the standard of review to be applied by the district court in determining the release of an insanity acquittee, which is summarized as follows: In both conditional and unconditional release proceedings, the district court must weigh the evidence in the same manner that it does in deciding matters de novo.

1978In Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. 206 , 160 P.2d 683 (1945), the Court discussed the doctrine in some detail before deciding that it should not be applied.

1978In Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. 206 , 160 P.2d 683 (1945), the Court discussed the doctrine in some detail before deciding that it should not be applied.

1975Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 192, p. 695.) In Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corporation, 185 Kan. 61 , 340 P. 2d 396 , 76 ALR 2d 687 , this court discussed the defense as follows: “The term ‘privileged’ as applied to a publication alleged to be libelous means simply that the circumstances under which the publication was made are such as to repel the legal inference or presumption of malice, and to place upon the plaintiff the burden of affirmatively pleading and proving its actual existence beyond the mere falsity of the charge.

1975Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 192, p. 695.) In Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corporation, 185 Kan. 61 , 340 P. 2d 396 , 76 ALR 2d 687 , this court discussed the defense as follows: “The term ‘privileged’ as applied to a publication alleged to be libelous means simply that the circumstances under which the publication was made are such as to repel the legal inference or presumption of malice, and to place upon the plaintiff the burden of affirmatively pleading and proving its actual existence beyond the mere falsity of the charge.

1975(Read v. Ulmer, 308 F. 2d 915 .) While 60-237 (b) (2) applies to all failures to comply, either willful or not, the presence or lack of good faith in the parties is relevant to the orders which should be given and the severity of the sanctions imposed.

1969The existence of a set-off or counterclaim, which is unliquidated, will not prevent the recovery of interest on the balance of the demand found due from the date of its maturity. . . .” (p.554.) The Dickinson case was cited in Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Etc., 45 Wn. (2d) 158, 273 P. 2d 652 , where the court discussed the rule concerning interest in these words: “An unliquidated counterclaim, even when established, does not affect the right to interest prior to judgment on the amount found to be due on a *596 liquidated or determinable claim, since the debtor may not defeat the creditor’s right

1969A. 2d 274, 38 Cal. Rptr. 597 , had this to say on the subject: “. . .

1959One of the first cases in which this court discussed the rule that a demurrer reached only the facts appearing on the face of the petition appears to have been Mayberry v. Kelley, 1 Kan. 116 .