15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2023The Court discussed the requirement that an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge must normally meet the Strickland requirements of deficient performance and prejudice, and that “the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.’” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 299-300 (citation omitted). 2023The Court discussed the requirement that an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge must normally meet the Strickland requirements of deficient performance and prejudice, and that “the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.’” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 299-300 (citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Fuster v. Stategreen2 sentences2017In Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 664-65 , 89 A.3d 1114, 1120 (2014), this Court discussed the standard for interpreting a Maryland Rule: A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a statute. 2017In Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 664-65 , 89 A.3d 1114, 1120 (2014), this Court discussed the standard for interpreting a Maryland Rule: A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a statute. | 1 | 1 |
Hand v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.green2 sentences2016We pointed out in Kendall that the requirement of standing “is an element in the larger question of justiciability and is designed to ensure that a party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to present a court with a dispute that is capable of *506 judicial resolution.” 431 Md. at 603 , 66 A.3d at 691 (quoting from Hand v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 405 Md. 375, 399 , 952 A.2d 240, 254 (2008)). 2016We pointed out in Kendall that the requirement of standing “is an element in the larger question of justiciability and is designed to ensure that a party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to present a court with a dispute that is capable of *506 judicial resolution.” 431 Md. at 603 , 66 A.3d at 691 (quoting from Hand v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 405 Md. 375, 399 , 952 A.2d 240, 254 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Standard of Review Recently, in Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 665-66 , 821 A.2d 1, 18 (2003), this Court discussed the standard for appellate review of the denial of a motion for a new trial: [D]enials of motions for new trials are reviewable on appeal and rulings on such motions are subject to reversal when there is an abuse of discretion. *857 Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 , 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984); Wernsing v. Gen. 2004Standard of Review Recently, in Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 665-66 , 821 A.2d 1, 18 (2003), this Court discussed the standard for appellate review of the denial of a motion for a new trial: [D]enials of motions for new trials are reviewable on appeal and rulings on such motions are subject to reversal when there is an abuse of discretion. *857 Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 , 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984); Wernsing v. Gen. | 1 | 1 |
MacK v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Standard of Review Recently, in Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 665-66 , 821 A.2d 1, 18 (2003), this Court discussed the standard for appellate review of the denial of a motion for a new trial: [D]enials of motions for new trials are reviewable on appeal and rulings on such motions are subject to reversal when there is an abuse of discretion. *857 Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 , 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984); Wernsing v. Gen. 2004Standard of Review Recently, in Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 665-66 , 821 A.2d 1, 18 (2003), this Court discussed the standard for appellate review of the denial of a motion for a new trial: [D]enials of motions for new trials are reviewable on appeal and rulings on such motions are subject to reversal when there is an abuse of discretion. *857 Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 , 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984); Wernsing v. Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Wernsing v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2004Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420 , 470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984). 2004Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420 , 470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2000See id. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2000See id. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 1 | 1 |
Baltimore Transit Employees' Credit Union v. Thornegreen2 sentences1966See Baltimore Transit Employees’ Credit Union v. Thorne, 214 Md. 200 , 134 A. 2d 84 (1957). 1966See Baltimore Transit Employees’ Credit Union v. Thorne, 214 Md. 200 , 134 A. 2d 84 (1957). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners v. City Neighbors Charter School
green
2 sentences2017In City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 342-43 , 929 A.2d at 124 , this Court also discussed the standard of review applicable to a decision by the SBE, stating: [The] SBE has very broad statutory authority over the administration of the public school system in this State, that the totality of its statutory authority constitutes a visitatorial power of such comprehensive character as to invest the [SBE] with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education, that this power is one of general control and supervision, that it authorizes the [ 2017In City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 342-43 , 929 A.2d at 124 , this Court also discussed the standard of review applicable to a decision by the SBE, stating: [The] SBE has very broad statutory authority over the administration of the public school system in this State, that the totality of its statutory authority constitutes a visitatorial power of such comprehensive character as to invest the [SBE] with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education, that this power is one of general control and supervision, that it authorizes the [ | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kendall v. Howard County
green
2 sentences2016DISCUSSION Standing and Laches This Court discussed the doctrine and requirement of standing most recently in Kendall v. Howard Co., 431 Md. 590 , 66 A.3d 684 (2013) and State Center v. Lexington Charles, 438 Md. 451 , 92 A.3d 400 (2014). 2016DISCUSSION Standing and Laches This Court discussed the doctrine and requirement of standing most recently in Kendall v. Howard Co., 431 Md. 590 , 66 A.3d 684 (2013) and State Center v. Lexington Charles, 438 Md. 451 , 92 A.3d 400 (2014). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2016DISCUSSION Standing and Laches This Court discussed the doctrine and requirement of standing most recently in Kendall v. Howard Co., 431 Md. 590 , 66 A.3d 684 (2013) and State Center v. Lexington Charles, 438 Md. 451 , 92 A.3d 400 (2014). 2016DISCUSSION Standing and Laches This Court discussed the doctrine and requirement of standing most recently in Kendall v. Howard Co., 431 Md. 590 , 66 A.3d 684 (2013) and State Center v. Lexington Charles, 438 Md. 451 , 92 A.3d 400 (2014). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wilkinson v. McGill
green
2 sentences2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). 2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Suessmann v. Lamone
green
2 sentences2014As to the remaining element, Penate contends that Appellant has conceded the absence of any other remedy, i.e., that no provision of the Election Law Article explicitly provides for a challenge to a putative candidate’s party affiliation. 9 In Suessmann , this Court discussed the requirement that a challenger show that the act or omission “may change or has changed the outcome of an election.” 383 Md. at 714-21 , 862 A.2d 1 . 2014As to the remaining element, Penate contends that Appellant has conceded the absence of any other remedy, i.e., that no provision of the Election Law Article explicitly provides for a challenge to a putative candidate’s party affiliation. 9 In Suessmann , this Court discussed the requirement that a challenger show that the act or omission “may change or has changed the outcome of an election.” 383 Md. at 714-21 , 862 A.2d 1 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Snyder v. Glusing
green
2 sentences2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). 2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McNulty v. Board of Supervisors of Elections
green
2 sentences2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). 2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pelagatti v. Board of Supervisors of Elections
green
1 sentence2014In reviewing past cases, all of which required us to address claims that an act “may have changed ” the results of an election, we found our precedent to instruct that there is “a high bar for satisfaction of § 12-202(a)(2).” Id. at 715-20, 862 A.2d 1 (discussing Snyder v. Glusing, 308 Md. 411 , 520 A.2d 349 (1987); Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387 , 64 A.2d 266 (1949); McNulty v. Bd. of Elections, 245 Md. 1 , 224 A.2d 844 (1966); Pelagatti v. Bd. of Elections, 343 Md. 425 , 682 A.2d *112 237 (1996)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Harvey v. State
green
2 sentences2009Six months after Poe , this Court discussed the doctrine of transferred intent at length in Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628 (1996). 2009Six months after Poe , this Court discussed the doctrine of transferred intent at length in Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401 , 681 A.2d 628 (1996). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences2008In State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998), this Court discussed the standard to be applied under the 1982 revision to then Rule 735, which subsequently became Rule 42-46. 2008In State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998), this Court discussed the standard to be applied under the 1982 revision to then Rule 735, which subsequently became Rule 42-46. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver
green
2 sentences2006This Court discussed the test for evaluating an attorney’s entitlement to funds in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Braskey, 378 Md. 425 , 836 A.2d 605 (2003), in which we stated: “In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265 , 808 A.2d 1251 (2002), this Court held that an attorney violated Rule 16-607(b)(2)[ 25 ] by removing from an escrow account money to which he believed he was entitled. 2006This Court discussed the test for evaluating an attorney’s entitlement to funds in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Braskey, 378 Md. 425 , 836 A.2d 605 (2003), in which we stated: “In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265 , 808 A.2d 1251 (2002), this Court held that an attorney violated Rule 16-607(b)(2)[ 25 ] by removing from an escrow account money to which he believed he was entitled. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Braskey
green
2 sentences2006This Court discussed the test for evaluating an attorney’s entitlement to funds in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Braskey, 378 Md. 425 , 836 A.2d 605 (2003), in which we stated: “In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265 , 808 A.2d 1251 (2002), this Court held that an attorney violated Rule 16-607(b)(2)[ 25 ] by removing from an escrow account money to which he believed he was entitled. 2006This Court discussed the test for evaluating an attorney’s entitlement to funds in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Braskey, 378 Md. 425 , 836 A.2d 605 (2003), in which we stated: “In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265 , 808 A.2d 1251 (2002), this Court held that an attorney violated Rule 16-607(b)(2)[ 25 ] by removing from an escrow account money to which he believed he was entitled. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
McVicker v. McVicker
green
2 sentences1974In McVicker v. McVicker, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 208 , 130 F. 2d 837 , where the parties were married in Virginia before the end of the six-month waiting period prescribed by the decree, which divorced the husband from his former wife, but relying on the ceremonial marriage lived together as husband and wife in the District of Columbia for more than two years, the Court held that the removal of the impediment to marriage *377 while the parties continued to live together as husband and wife gave rise to a common-law marriage.” The Court discussed the rule further in applying it to the facts of the ca 1974In McVicker v. McVicker, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 208 , 130 F. 2d 837 , where the parties were married in Virginia before the end of the six-month waiting period prescribed by the decree, which divorced the husband from his former wife, but relying on the ceremonial marriage lived together as husband and wife in the District of Columbia for more than two years, the Court held that the removal of the impediment to marriage *377 while the parties continued to live together as husband and wife gave rise to a common-law marriage.” The Court discussed the rule further in applying it to the facts of the ca | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Tender v. State
green
1 sentence1968App. 692 at 698 , 237 A. 2d 65 , this Court discussed the doctrine of merger in detail and found specifically that the offense of assault did not merge into the greater offense of robbery with a deadly weapon where *496 there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the assault was separate and distinct from the robbery. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.