discussed doctrine in Oregon

2021Johns, 301 Or at 552-55 .

2016Conversely, if the constitutional principle is a new one, or if its extension to a particular statute, circumstance, or setting is novel, unprecedented, or surprising, then the more likely the conclusion that the claim reasonably could not have been raised.” Id. at 571 (quoting Long v. Armenakis, 166 Or App 94, 101 , 999 P2d 461 , rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000)). 8 In Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570 , 330 P3d 572 (2014), this court discussed the requirement in ORS 138.580 that materials supporting a post-conviction claim must be attached to the petition.

2016Conversely, if the constitutional principle is a new one, or if its extension to a particular statute, circumstance, or setting is novel, unprecedented, or surprising, then the more likely the conclusion that the claim reasonably could not have been raised.” Id. at 571 (quoting Long v. Armenakis, 166 Or App 94, 101 , 999 P2d 461 , rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000)). 8 In Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570 , 330 P3d 572 (2014), this court discussed the requirement in ORS 138.580 that materials supporting a post-conviction claim must be attached to the petition.

2016Conversely, if the constitutional principle is a new one, or if its extension to a particular statute, circumstance, or setting is novel, unprecedented, or surprising, then the more likely the conclusion that the claim reasonably could not have been raised.” Id. at 571 (quoting Long v. Armenakis, 166 Or App 94, 101 , 999 P2d 461 , rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000)). 8 In Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570 , 330 P3d 572 (2014), this court discussed the requirement in ORS 138.580 that materials supporting a post-conviction claim must be attached to the petition.

2016Conversely, if the constitutional principle is a new one, or if its extension to a particular statute, circumstance, or setting is novel, unprecedented, or surprising, then the more likely the conclusion that the claim reasonably could not have been raised.” Id. at 571 (quoting Long v. Armenakis, 166 Or App 94, 101 , 999 P2d 461 , rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000)). 8 In Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570 , 330 P3d 572 (2014), this court discussed the requirement in ORS 138.580 that materials supporting a post-conviction claim must be attached to the petition.

2016Conversely, if the constitutional principle is a new one, or if its extension to a particular statute, circumstance, or setting is novel, unprecedented, or surprising, then the more likely the conclusion that the claim reasonably could not have been raised.” Id. at 571 (quoting Long v. Armenakis, 166 Or App 94, 101 , 999 P2d 461 , rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000)). 8 In Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570 , 330 P3d 572 (2014), this court discussed the requirement in ORS 138.580 that materials supporting a post-conviction claim must be attached to the petition.

2004The Nielsen court did not explain precisely what factors constitute “adult qualifications.” Citing the Restatement and cases from other jurisdictions, however, the court discussed such factors as skill, knowledge, competence, experience, judgment, and “conscious realization of the probable consequences of [the action].” Nielsen, 232 Or at 447 .

1996In SAIF v. Allen, 320 Or 192, 204-05 , 881 P2d 773 (1994), the court discussed the principle of stare decisis and related concepts that underlie the theory that its interpretations “stand until changed by the legislature.” The court appears to have concluded that those principles do not apply to interpretations that are expressed in dictum.

1996In SAIF v. Allen, 320 Or 192, 204-05 , 881 P2d 773 (1994), the court discussed the principle of stare decisis and related concepts that underlie the theory that its interpretations “stand until changed by the legislature.” The court appears to have concluded that those principles do not apply to interpretations that are expressed in dictum.

1991However, in Panushka v. Panushka, 221 Or 145, 150 , 349 P2d 450 (1960), this court discussed the doctrine of equitable conversion 2 in the context of a decedent’s estate, stating: “The naked legal title, which the vendor holds in trust as security for the payment of the purchase money, descends to his heirs to be held by them for the benefit of the purchaser, but the vendor has no interest in the land which is subject to descent.

1991However, in Panushka v. Panushka, 221 Or 145, 150 , 349 P2d 450 (1960), this court discussed the doctrine of equitable conversion 2 in the context of a decedent’s estate, stating: “The naked legal title, which the vendor holds in trust as security for the payment of the purchase money, descends to his heirs to be held by them for the benefit of the purchaser, but the vendor has no interest in the land which is subject to descent.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1980E.g., Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra; State v. Irving, 268 Or 204 , 520 P2d 354 (1974); Peters et al. v. McKay et al., 195 Or 412 , 238 P2d 225 , 246 P2d 585 (1951); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548 , 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339 , 148 P2d 922 (1944); Public Service Com. v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or 572 , 281 P 125 (1929); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or 101 , 248 P 146 (1926). *571 In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., supra, the court discussed this principle of statutory construction in determining if ORS 12.115 applied to product liability actions.

1978This court has adopted "fairness” as the test of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, a nonresident can be required to litigate in Oregon, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945), as follows: "* * * due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.”

1978This court has adopted "fairness” as the test of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, a nonresident can be required to litigate in Oregon, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945), as follows: "* * * due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.”

1978It is contended by Mr. Hart that in view of these facts Academy Press did engage in "the transaction of * * * business within this state” for the purposes of ORS 14.035(1)(a) and that the decision of this case is controlled by our previous decision in State ex rel White Lbr. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or 121 , 448 P2d 571 (1968), in which this court recognized the doctrine of "economic consequences.” In White this court discussed the doctrine of "economic consequences” as a part of its discussion of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, there had been sufficient "contacts” in Oregon by t

1978It is contended by Mr. Hart that in view of these facts Academy Press did engage in "the transaction of * * * business within this state” for the purposes of ORS 14.035(1)(a) and that the decision of this case is controlled by our previous decision in State ex rel White Lbr. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or 121 , 448 P2d 571 (1968), in which this court recognized the doctrine of "economic consequences.” In White this court discussed the doctrine of "economic consequences” as a part of its discussion of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, there had been sufficient "contacts” in Oregon by t

1978This court has adopted "fairness” as the test of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, a nonresident can be required to litigate in Oregon, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945), as follows: "* * * due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.”

1978This court has adopted "fairness” as the test of whether, as a matter of constitutional due process, a nonresident can be required to litigate in Oregon, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945), as follows: "* * * due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.”

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1976Frishein v. Reavy, [ 263 App. Div. 490 ,] 33 N.Y.S.2d 894 , aff’d by the Court of Appeals of New York in [ 289 N.Y. 712 ,] 45 N.E.2d 921 ; Gollin v. Watson, [ 200 Misc. 96 ,] 102 N.Y.S.2d 935 ; Sloat v. Board of Examiners of Board of Education, [ 274 N.Y. 367 ,] 9 N.E.2d 12 [ 112 A.L.R. 660 ], * * *” In 15 Am Jur 2d 484, Civil Service § 22, the authors discuss the rules applicable to examinations as follows: "With respect to appointments of employees to positions in the competitive class, competitive civil service examinations are ordinarily required by constitutional, statutory, or charter pr

1974In Kincaid v. Peterson et al, 135 Or 619 , 297 P 833 (1931), the court discussed the doctrine of practical location in relation to boundary disputes and said: “The doctrine of practical location is based principally upon agreement, express or implied, of adjoining landowners, whereby for many years they recognize or acquiesce in a certain line as their true boundary line.

1974In Kincaid v. Peterson et al, 135 Or 619 , 297 P 833 (1931), the court discussed the doctrine of practical location in relation to boundary disputes and said: “The doctrine of practical location is based principally upon agreement, express or implied, of adjoining landowners, whereby for many years they recognize or acquiesce in a certain line as their true boundary line.

1974The doctrine is closely akin to that of adverse possession, although the authorities recognize a clear distinction between them: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491 ( 236 P. 517 ).

1974The doctrine is closely akin to that of adverse possession, although the authorities recognize a clear distinction between them: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491 ( 236 P. 517 ).

1971(Italics supplied.) In Highway Com. v. Heintz Constr., 245 Or 530 , 423 P2d 175 (1967), the court discussed the presumption at length, and concluded by saying: “The presumption is usually applied as evidence of the act of a neutral, dispassionate and impartial official, with no interest in the matter except to regularly perform the duties imposed upon him. * * *” 245 Or at 539 .

1971(Italics supplied.) In Highway Com. v. Heintz Constr., 245 Or 530 , 423 P2d 175 (1967), the court discussed the presumption at length, and concluded by saying: “The presumption is usually applied as evidence of the act of a neutral, dispassionate and impartial official, with no interest in the matter except to regularly perform the duties imposed upon him. * * *” 245 Or at 539 .