discussed rule in Indiana

2025As articulated in Babyback’s, prior cases have examined “the ‘problem’ when ‘it is the very promise which the statute declares unenforceable that the [plaintiffs] assert should remove their claim from the statute’s operation.’” Id. (quoting Whiteco, 514 N.E.2d at 844 ).

2025As articulated in Babyback’s, prior cases have examined “the ‘problem’ when ‘it is the very promise which the statute declares unenforceable that the [plaintiffs] assert should remove their claim from the statute’s operation.’” Id. (quoting Whiteco, 514 N.E.2d at 844 ).

2017Id. at 1015 . [17] In rendering its decision, the Court discussed the presumption applicable to family members living together: We recognize that in general, “[w]here one accepts valuable services from another the law implies a promise to pay for them.” Schwartz v. Schwartz, 773 N.E.2d 348, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Estate of Hann v. Hann, 614 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)).

2015Based on the discussed factors above, Motsch’s various offenses warrant her sentence. [16] This case is distinguishable from the recent case of Norris v. State, 27 N.E.3d 333 , (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), upon which Motsch relies.

2000In Laws v. Lee, 471 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), this court discussed the rule set forth in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457 , 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946): In Fidelity Trust a building permit was issued and construction begun when another party brought suit to enjoin the erection of the building on grounds that its construction violated local zoning provisions.

2000In Laws v. Lee, 471 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), this court discussed the rule set forth in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457 , 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946): In Fidelity Trust a building permit was issued and construction begun when another party brought suit to enjoin the erection of the building on grounds that its construction violated local zoning provisions.

1991We will examine each of the alleged inadequacies under the two-part test in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .

1991We will examine each of the alleged inadequacies under the two-part test in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .

1991In Aubrey v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 70 , this Court discussed the standard of review for effective assistance of counsel.

1990Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corp., 324 Mo. 992 , 25 S.W.2d 777 , 78 A.L.R. 722 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1930); Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls, Iowa v. Sinclair Refining Co., 59 F.Supp. 911, 919 (Iowa Dist.Ct.1945) Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W.Va. 346 , 118 S.E. 521 , 31 A.L.R. 283, 292 (W.Va.Sup.Ct.1923); Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 104 N.J.L. 136, 183 , 139 A. 9 , 56 A.L.R. 590 (E. & A.1927) 22 Am.Jur.

1990Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corp., 324 Mo. 992 , 25 S.W.2d 777 , 78 A.L.R. 722 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1930); Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls, Iowa v. Sinclair Refining Co., 59 F.Supp. 911, 919 (Iowa Dist.Ct.1945) Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W.Va. 346 , 118 S.E. 521 , 31 A.L.R. 283, 292 (W.Va.Sup.Ct.1923); Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 104 N.J.L. 136, 183 , 139 A. 9 , 56 A.L.R. 590 (E. & A.1927) 22 Am.Jur.

1990Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corp., 324 Mo. 992 , 25 S.W.2d 777 , 78 A.L.R. 722 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1930); Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls, Iowa v. Sinclair Refining Co., 59 F.Supp. 911, 919 (Iowa Dist.Ct.1945) Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W.Va. 346 , 118 S.E. 521 , 31 A.L.R. 283, 292 (W.Va.Sup.Ct.1923); Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 104 N.J.L. 136, 183 , 139 A. 9 , 56 A.L.R. 590 (E. & A.1927) 22 Am.Jur.

1990Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corp., 324 Mo. 992 , 25 S.W.2d 777 , 78 A.L.R. 722 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1930); Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls, Iowa v. Sinclair Refining Co., 59 F.Supp. 911, 919 (Iowa Dist.Ct.1945) Keyser Canning Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 94 W.Va. 346 , 118 S.E. 521 , 31 A.L.R. 283, 292 (W.Va.Sup.Ct.1923); Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 104 N.J.L. 136, 183 , 139 A. 9 , 56 A.L.R. 590 (E. & A.1927) 22 Am.Jur.

1988In examining the affidavit we note that in Layman the court discussed the analysis utilized to review a judge’s determination of probable cause for a search warrant as follows: While the quantity and nature of the constituent elements necessary to establish probable cause are inextricably related to each given set of facts, there are two basic questions pertinent to the determination of probable cause for a search under any set of facts: (1) whether the particular items sought to be seized are sufficiently connected with criminal activity and (2) whether the items are to be found in a particul

1988In examining the affidavit we note that in Layman the court discussed the analysis utilized to review a judge's determination of probable cause for a search warrant as follows: *499 While the quantity and nature of the constituent elements necessary to establish probable cause are inextricably related to each given set of facts, there are two basic questions pertinent to the determination of probable cause for a search under any set of facts: (1) whether the particular items sought to be seized are sufficiently connected with criminal activity and (2) whether the items are to be found in a par

1985This Court discussed the rule in EFnmund in Resnover v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 922 , where we said: "Enmund therefore dictates the rule that although vicarious liability for crimes perpetrated by one's confederates can justify one's conviction for said crimes, the imposition of death upon a vicariously guilty defendant must be based on 'kis culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for [the United States Supreme Court] insists] on "individual consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence." ' Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798

1985This Court discussed the rule in EFnmund in Resnover v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 922 , where we said: "Enmund therefore dictates the rule that although vicarious liability for crimes perpetrated by one's confederates can justify one's conviction for said crimes, the imposition of death upon a vicariously guilty defendant must be based on 'kis culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for [the United States Supreme Court] insists] on "individual consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence." ' Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798

1985This Court discussed the rule in EFnmund in Resnover v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 922 , where we said: "Enmund therefore dictates the rule that although vicarious liability for crimes perpetrated by one's confederates can justify one's conviction for said crimes, the imposition of death upon a vicariously guilty defendant must be based on 'kis culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for [the United States Supreme Court] insists] on "individual consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence." ' Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798

1985Ortho, supra, 180 Ind.App. at 38 , 388 N.E.2d at 545, 546 .

1974In the case of Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield (1973), 155 Ind. App. 422 , 293 N.E.2d 210, 219 , this court discussed waiver as follows: “In the same vein Judge Cooper, speaking for the Appellate Court in Snyder v. International Harvester Credit Corp. [147] Ind. App. [364], 261 N.E.2d 71, 75 (1970) said: ‘Thus, when appellee accepted payments made by appellant on July 20 and August 11, it recognized the contract as still in effect and waived any right it might have had for foreclosure.

1974In the case of Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield (1973), 155 Ind. App. 422 , 293 N.E.2d 210, 219 , this court discussed waiver as follows: “In the same vein Judge Cooper, speaking for the Appellate Court in Snyder v. International Harvester Credit Corp. [147] Ind. App. [364], 261 N.E.2d 71, 75 (1970) said: ‘Thus, when appellee accepted payments made by appellant on July 20 and August 11, it recognized the contract as still in effect and waived any right it might have had for foreclosure.

1974In the case of Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel (1973), 158 Ind. App. 43 , 301 N.E.2d 671, 679 , Judge Buchanan of this court discussed the doctrine of res judicata and concluded as follows: “So, assuming without deciding that there were the same ‘parties’ to these two ‘actions’, the same subject matter *544 or claim must also be involved for res judicata to apply.” (Our emphasis.) In the case at bar the same parties are involved in this litigaas were litigants before the Vanderburgh Court, which was and is a court of competent jurisdiction.

1974In the case of Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel (1973), 158 Ind. App. 43 , 301 N.E.2d 671, 679 , Judge Buchanan of this court discussed the doctrine of res judicata and concluded as follows: “So, assuming without deciding that there were the same ‘parties’ to these two ‘actions’, the same subject matter *544 or claim must also be involved for res judicata to apply.” (Our emphasis.) In the case at bar the same parties are involved in this litigaas were litigants before the Vanderburgh Court, which was and is a court of competent jurisdiction.

1945Appellant again cites and relies upon Brush v. Public, etc., supra, Kent v. Interstate, etc., supra; and Bottorff v. South, etc., supra, to sustain its contention with reference to said instruction No. 10, supra. In the case of Cole v. Searfoss (1912), 49 Ind. App. 334 , 97 N. E. 345 , this court discussed the standard, or degree of care, which a child who is sui juris must exercise for its own safety in order to avoid being guilty of contributory negligence.

1945Appellant again cites and relies upon Brush v. Public, etc., supra, Kent v. Interstate, etc., supra; and Bottorff v. South, etc., supra, to sustain its contention with reference to said instruction No. 10, supra. In the case of Cole v. Searfoss (1912), 49 Ind. App. 334 , 97 N. E. 345 , this court discussed the standard, or degree of care, which a child who is sui juris must exercise for its own safety in order to avoid being guilty of contributory negligence.