discussed standard in Montana

2000STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 In Lee v. Kane (1995), 270 Mont. 505 , 893 P.2d 854 , this Court discussed our standard of review of a jury verdict in a civil case: Our scope of review of jury verdicts is necessarily very limited.

2000STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 In Lee v. Kane (1995), 270 Mont. 505 , 893 P.2d 854 , this Court discussed our standard of review of a jury verdict in a civil case: Our scope of review of jury verdicts is necessarily very limited.

1994In In the Matter of Stevenson (1975), 167 Mont. 220, 228 , 538 P.2d 5, 9 , the Court discussed the requirement of what is now § 41-5-206(1)(d)(ii), MCA, in a similar factual situation where the Youth Court had waived jurisdiction because of the seriousness of the offense.

1994In In the Matter of Stevenson (1975), 167 Mont. 220, 228 , 538 P.2d 5, 9 , the Court discussed the requirement of what is now § 41-5-206(1)(d)(ii), MCA, in a similar factual situation where the Youth Court had waived jurisdiction because of the seriousness of the offense.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 387 U.S. 920 , 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 18 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: “The application of the doctrine of ‘the law of the case’ is limited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 387 U.S. 920 , 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 18 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: “The application of the doctrine of ‘the law of the case’ is limited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 387 U.S. 920 , 1 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: 8 "The application of the doctrine of 'the law of the case' is 1 imited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 387 U.S. 920 , 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 18 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: “The application of the doctrine of ‘the law of the case’ is limited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 387 U.S. 920 , 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 18 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: “The application of the doctrine of ‘the law of the case’ is limited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

1972Co., 148 Mont. 429 , 421 P.2d 710 , cert. den. 387 U.S. 920 , 87 S.Ct. 2034 , 18 L.Ed.2d 974 , wherein we stated: “The application of the doctrine of ‘the law of the case’ is limited to those issues which were actually decided and were necessary to the decision.

2008In Silver Bow Mining & Milling Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont. 378 , 5 P. 570 (1885), the Court discussed an exception that the Land Department had inserted into the patent for the Pawnbroker Lode Claim.

2008In Silver Bow Mining & Milling Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont. 378 , 5 P. 570 (1885), the Court discussed an exception that the Land Department had inserted into the patent for the Pawnbroker Lode Claim.

1996Reynolds [v. Pacific Telecom, Inc. (1993), 259 Mont. 309, 314 ], 856 P.2d [1365] at 1368.

1996Reynolds [ v. Pacific Telecom, Inc. (1993), 259 Mont. 309, 314 ], 856 P.2d [1365] at 1368.

1996Under the standard of § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, the factual findings of the Board of Labor Appeals, “if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive.” This Court discussed this standard in Stine v. Western Federal Savings Bank (1994), 266 Mont. 83, 86 , 879 P.2d 53 , 55 as follows: Under § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, a district court is not permitted to balance conflicting evidence in support of and in opposition to the Board’s findings, determine which is the more substantial evidence, or consider where the preponderance of the evidence lies; to do so would substitute the distri

1996Under the standard of § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, the factual findings of the Board of Labor Appeals, “if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive.” This Court discussed this standard in Stine v. Western Federal Savings Bank (1994), 266 Mont. 83, 86 , 879 P.2d 53 , 55 as follows: Under § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, a district court is not permitted to balance conflicting evidence in support of and in opposition to the Board’s findings, determine which is the more substantial evidence, or consider where the preponderance of the evidence lies; to do so would substitute the distri

1993Ark. 1991), 771 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 , the court discussed a requirement in a disability insurance policy coming within the ambit of ERISA which prevented the plaintiff from qualifying as “totally disabled” under the policy.

1940It is subject to the limitation that a contract will be treated as entire, even when *151 the obligations of the one party consist of different acts to be separately paid for, where the nature and character of the agreement show that it was intended to be entire.” (See, also, Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526 , 78 Pac. (2d) 490 .) This court in Purdin v. Westwood Ranch & Livestock Co., 67 Mont. 553 , at page 557, 216 Pac. 326 , at page 327, said: “Whether or not a contract is severable is a matter of intention, and the intention is determined from the language used and the subject-matter.

1940It is subject to the limitation that a contract will be treated as entire, even when *151 the obligations of the one party consist of different acts to be separately paid for, where the nature and character of the agreement show that it was intended to be entire.” (See, also, Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526 , 78 Pac. (2d) 490 .) This court in Purdin v. Westwood Ranch & Livestock Co., 67 Mont. 553 , at page 557, 216 Pac. 326 , at page 327, said: “Whether or not a contract is severable is a matter of intention, and the intention is determined from the language used and the subject-matter.

1940It is subject to the limitation that a contract will be treated as entire, even when *151 the obligations of the one party consist of different acts to be separately paid for, where the nature and character of the agreement show that it was intended to be entire.” (See, also, Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526 , 78 Pac. (2d) 490 .) This court in Purdin v. Westwood Ranch & Livestock Co., 67 Mont. 553 , at page 557, 216 Pac. 326 , at page 327, said: “Whether or not a contract is severable is a matter of intention, and the intention is determined from the language used and the subject-matter.

1940It is subject to the limitation that a contract will be treated as entire, even when *151 the obligations of the one party consist of different acts to be separately paid for, where the nature and character of the agreement show that it was intended to be entire.” (See, also, Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526 , 78 Pac. (2d) 490 .) This court in Purdin v. Westwood Ranch & Livestock Co., 67 Mont. 553 , at page 557, 216 Pac. 326 , at page 327, said: “Whether or not a contract is severable is a matter of intention, and the intention is determined from the language used and the subject-matter.

1940Co. v. Amalgamated Oil Co., 156 Cal. 776 , 106 Pac. 55, 57 , the court discussed the rule and concluded: “It is, no doubt, well settled * * * that ‘when the price is expressly apportioned by the contract, or the apportionment may be implied by law, to each item to be performed, the contract will generally be held to be severable.’ [Citing eases.] But this 'rule is not universal.

1940Co. v. Amalgamated Oil Co., 156 Cal. 776 , 106 Pac. 55, 57 , the court discussed the rule and concluded: “It is, no doubt, well settled * * * that ‘when the price is expressly apportioned by the contract, or the apportionment may be implied by law, to each item to be performed, the contract will generally be held to be severable.’ [Citing eases.] But this 'rule is not universal.