discussed standard in Illinois

2014As the Cousins court observed, in Phillips, this court “sustained a provision of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act [citation] which required the consent of a defendant’s probation officer before the defendant could be allowed to avoid a pending criminal proceeding charging the unlawful possession of a controlled substance.” Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 83 In Hammond, a unanimous decision, this court discussed the principle that the legislature may “define[ ] and restrict[ ] the circumstances in which a State’s Attorney may exercise his prosecutorial authority,” and cited Phillips, and the statute

2014As the Cousins court observed, in Phillips, this court “sustained a provision of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act [citation] which required the consent of a defendant’s probation officer before the defendant could be allowed to avoid a pending criminal proceeding charging the unlawful possession of a controlled substance.” Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 83 In Hammond, a unanimous decision, this court discussed the principle that the legislature may “define[ ] and restrict[ ] the circumstances in which a State’s Attorney may exercise his prosecutorial authority,” and cited Phillips, and the statute

2014As the Cousins court observed, in Phillips, this court “sustained a provision of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act [citation] which required the consent of a defendant’s probation officer before the defendant could be allowed to avoid a pending criminal proceeding charging the unlawful possession of a controlled substance.” Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 83 In Hammond, a unanimous decision, this court discussed the principle that the legislature may “define[ ] and restrict[ ] the circumstances in which a State’s Attorney may exercise his prosecutorial authority,” and cited Phillips, and the statute

2014As the Cousins court observed, in Phillips, this court “sustained a provision of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act [citation] which required the consent of a defendant’s probation officer before the defendant could be allowed to avoid a pending criminal proceeding charging the unlawful possession of a controlled substance.” Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 83 In Hammond, a unanimous decision, this court discussed the principle that the legislature may “define[ ] and restrict[ ] the circumstances in which a State’s Attorney may exercise his prosecutorial authority,” and cited Phillips, and the statute

2014In Hammond, this court addressed its prior decision in Phillips: “Acknowledging that the power to impose sentence is exclusively a function of the judiciary (Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d at 415 ), this court noted that the situation at hand concerned a defendant who had been charged with, but not convicted of, a crime.

2014In Hammond, this court addressed its prior decision in Phillips: “Acknowledging that the power to impose sentence is exclusively a function of the judiciary (Phillips, 66 Ill. 2d at 415 ), this court noted that the situation at hand concerned a defendant who had been charged with, but not convicted of, a - 25 - crime.

2009App. 3d 444 , 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375 , 1387 (1991), this court discussed the standard of “reasonable progress” in the context of terminating parental rights and wrote the following: “ ‘Reasonable progress’ is an objective standard which exists when the court, based on the evidence before it, can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.

2009Over 17 years ago, in the seminal case of In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444 , 461, 160 Ill.Dec. 804 , 577 N.E.2d 1375 , 1387 (1991), this court discussed the standard of "reasonable progress" in the context of terminating parental rights and wrote the following: "`Reasonable progress' is an objective standard which exists when the court, based on the evidence before it, can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such quality *182 that the court, in the near future, will be able to order th

2009Keith C., 378 Ill.

2009Keith C., 378 Ill.

2006A trial court's discretion on such determinations will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.]" In re Marriage of Blunda, 299 Ill.

2006A trial court’s discretion on such determinations will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.]” In re Marriage of Blunda, 299 Ill.

2005The second case relied upon by defendant is People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397 (1995), in which this court discussed the challenge of proving a defendant’s intent to deliver a controlled substance.

2005The second case relied upon by defendant is People v. Robinson , 167 Ill. 2d 397 (1995), in which this court discussed the challenge of proving a defendant’s intent to deliver a controlled substance.

1997Kearney , 263 Ill.

1997Kearney, 263 Ill.

2011DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 250-51 . ¶ 31 During the discussion of the involuntary manslaughter instruction at the jury instruction conference, the trial court discussed the factors outlined in DiVincenzo and concluded that the facts of this case simply did not warrant an involuntary manslaughter instruction: “In this case we have a defenseless victim by all accounts.

2009Johnson, 389 Ill.

1995App. 2d 132 , 170 N.E.2d 650 , the court discussed the doctrine of conventional subrogation at length and defined it in the following manner: "Conventional subrogation gives a third party, who loans a landowner money with which to discharge a prior lien, with the express (though not necessarily written) agreement that the third party will then be in the position of the prior lienor, priority over intervening lienors to the extent of the discharged lien.” Western United, 28 Ill.

1995App. 2d 132 , 170 N.E.2d 650 , the court discussed the doctrine of conventional subrogation at length and defined it in the following manner: "Conventional subrogation gives a third party, who loans a landowner money with which to discharge a prior lien, with the express (though not necessarily written) agreement that the third party will then be in the position of the prior lienor, priority over intervening lienors to the extent of the discharged lien.” Western United, 28 Ill.

1995(Rosengard, 205 Ill.

1994App. 3d 340, 343 , 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1341 , this court discussed the standard of review in summary judgment cases as follows: " 'The entry of summary judgment is not a matter within the discretion of the trial court.

1994In Hudson, however, the court also discussed the standard of review and stated that "[b]ecause the trial judge’s finding constitutes a credibility determination, it should be given great deference [citation] and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous [citation].” (Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 428 , 626 N.E.2d at 172 .) Hudson thus used the same analysis to articulate "clearly erroneous” as the correct standard of review.

1994In Hudson, however, the court also discussed the standard of review and stated that "[b]ecause the trial judge’s finding constitutes a credibility determination, it should be given great deference [citation] and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous [citation].” (Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 428 , 626 N.E.2d at 172 .) Hudson thus used the same analysis to articulate "clearly erroneous” as the correct standard of review.

1994In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court should consider anew the facts and law related to the case and determine whether the trial court was correct.’ (Shull v. Harristown Township (1992), 223 Ill.

1991App. 3d 1087, 1092 , 550 N.E.2d 1032 , the court discussed the framework within which we are to analyze whether Nationwide had a duty to defend this case: “The allegations in the underlying complaint in the context of relevant policy provisions determine whether an insurer owes a duty to defend an action brought against the insured. [Citation.] If the complaint alleges facts potentially within the coverage of the policy, the duty to defend has been established. [Citation.] ‘At the duty to defend stage *** the court [cannot] adjudicate disputed facts.

1990App. 3d 1087, 1093 , 492 N.E.2d 929 , 933: “ ‘That an opposite conclusion might be reasonable or that the court might have reached a different conclusion is not adequate to set aside the agency’s decision.’ (O’Boyle v. Personnel Board (1983), 119 Ill.

1990App.3d 705 , 480 N.E.2d 1189 , the court discussed the factors which should be considered in deciding whether a statement qualifies as a spontaneous declaration and stated the following: "Whether a statement was sufficiently spontaneous to qualify for admission and evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule is a preliminary question for determination by the trial court. [Citation.] The court's ruling will be held an abuse of discretion only if the statements are not so intimately connected with the event as to indicate a lack of premeditation. [Citation.] In deciding whether the declara

1990App. 3d 705 , 480 N.E.2d 1189 , the court discussed the factors which should be considered in deciding whether a statement qualifies as a spontaneous declaration and stated the following: “Whether a statement was sufficiently spontaneous to qualify for admission and evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule is a preliminary question for determination by the trial court. [Citation.] The court’s ruling will be held an abuse of discretion only if the statements are not so intimately connected with the event as to indicate a lack of premeditation. [Citation.] In deciding whether the declar

1990This court discussed the standard of review applicable to administrative review actions in Agans v. Edgar (1986), 142 Ill.

1990App. 3d 1087, 1093 , 492 N.E.2d 929 , 933: “ ‘That an opposite conclusion might be reasonable or that the court might have reached a different conclusion is not adequate to set aside the agency’s decision.’ (O’Boyle v. Personnel Board (1983), 119 Ill.

1989In one case the court discussed the history of the rule governing the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases (Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146 , 421 N.E.2d 869 ), and the other discussed the rule in strict liability cases (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161 , 421 N.E.2d 864 ).

1989In one case the court discussed the history of the rule governing the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases (Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146 , 421 N.E.2d 869 ), and the other discussed the rule in strict liability cases (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161 , 421 N.E.2d 864 ).

1989In one case the court discussed the history of the rule governing the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases (Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146 , 421 N.E.2d 869 ), and the other discussed the rule in strict liability cases (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161 , 421 N.E.2d 864 ).

1989In one case the court discussed the history of the rule governing the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases (Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146 , 421 N.E.2d 869 ), and the other discussed the rule in strict liability cases (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161 , 421 N.E.2d 864 ).

1989App. 3d 957, 961 , 361 N.E.2d 618, 620 , a case similar to the one before us, the court discussed the doctrine of estoppel due to election under a will and stated the following: “This proposition has been reiterated many times and emanates from the case of Wilbanks v. Wilbanks (1856), 18 Ill. 17 .

1989App. 3d 957, 961 , 361 N.E.2d 618, 620 , a case similar to the one before us, the court discussed the doctrine of estoppel due to election under a will and stated the following: “This proposition has been reiterated many times and emanates from the case of Wilbanks v. Wilbanks (1856), 18 Ill. 17 .