discussed instruction in California

2021The “Nullity Exception” and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Parr-Richmond Our Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the exhaustion rule in the property tax context where a tax assessment “is ‘a nullity as a matter of law.’ ” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1264 .) The court discussed this exception most recently in Williams, in the context of escape assessments imposed by the County of Fresno.

2021The “Nullity Exception” and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Parr-Richmond Our Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the exhaustion rule in the property tax context where a tax assessment “is ‘a nullity as a matter of law.’ ” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1264 .) The court discussed this exception most recently in Williams, in the context of escape assessments imposed by the County of Fresno.

1958(Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111 [ 47 P.2d 709 ]; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ].)’ “In Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ], the court discussed an instruction similar to that here under review, to wit: ‘From apparently conflicting opinions of appellate courts of California, the following rules may be adduced: “ ‘ (1) It is error for the trial court to give an instruction such as that set forth above where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at the time of the a

1958(Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111 [ 47 P.2d 709 ]; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ].)’ “In Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ], the court discussed an instruction similar to that here under review, to wit: ‘From apparently conflicting opinions of appellate courts of California, the following rules may be adduced: “ ‘ (1) It is error for the trial court to give an instruction such as that set forth above where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at the time of the a

1958(Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111 [ 47 P.2d 709 ]; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ].)’ “In Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ], the court discussed an instruction similar to that here under review, to wit: ‘From apparently conflicting opinions of appellate courts of California, the following rules may be adduced: “ ‘ (1) It is error for the trial court to give an instruction such as that set forth above where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at the time of the a

1958(Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111 [ 47 P.2d 709 ]; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294 [ 65 P.2d 65 ].)’ “In Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [ 135 P.2d 573 ], the court discussed an instruction similar to that here under review, to wit: ‘From apparently conflicting opinions of appellate courts of California, the following rules may be adduced: “ ‘ (1) It is error for the trial court to give an instruction such as that set forth above where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at the time of the a

2025(People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1312 .) Torres argues remand is necessary because although the trial court referenced criteria affecting probation under rule 4.414, it did not address all the criteria applicable to Torres9 and did not appropriately weigh the criteria.

2024But Khamo forfeited his claim of error because if he “believed the instruction . . . required elaboration or clarification, he was obliged to request such elaboration or clarification in the trial court.” (Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 638 .) When the court discussed the instruction with the parties, neither party objected.

2022Cindy L., in turn, cited to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , which discussed these factors in connection with the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.

2022Brodit identifies four nonexclusive factors regarding the “sufficient indicia of reliability” prong contained in section 1360, subdivision (a)(2): “(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.” (Brodit, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329 .) This is derived from the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Cindy L., wherein the court discussed these factors as “relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases.” (Cindy L., su

2022Brodit identifies four nonexclusive factors regarding the “sufficient indicia of reliability” prong contained in section 1360, subdivision (a)(2): “(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.” (Brodit, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329 .) This is derived from the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Cindy L., wherein the court discussed these factors as “relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases.” (Cindy L., su

2022Legal Principles Applicable to Review of Anti-SLAPP Motions “Enacted by the Legislature in 1992, the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.” ( Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 883–884.) “To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with 10 a public issue.’

2021(Id. at p. 774.) In Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173 (Garrett), the court discussed the standard for admitting expert opinions in a motion for summary judgment or adjudication.

2018(See id . at p. 234, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 582 , 407 P.3d 423 .) The court first noted that the Reform Act applies prospectively to *1014 defendants who have not yet been sentenced and retrospectively to petitioners who have already been sentenced. " '[T]he parallel structure of the Act's amendments to the sentencing provisions and the Act's resentencing provisions reflects an intent that sentences imposed on individuals with the same criminal history be the same, regardless of whether they are being sentenced or resentenced .

2018(See id . at p. 234, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 582 , 407 P.3d 423 .) The court first noted that the Reform Act applies prospectively to *1014 defendants who have not yet been sentenced and retrospectively to petitioners who have already been sentenced. " '[T]he parallel structure of the Act's amendments to the sentencing provisions and the Act's resentencing provisions reflects an intent that sentences imposed on individuals with the same criminal history be the same, regardless of whether they are being sentenced or resentenced .

2015It noted the comments for CACI No. 2512 quoted from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 (Harris), which held, “when we refer to a same-decision showing, we mean proof that the employer, in the absence of any discrimination, would have made the same decision at the time it made its actual decision.” (Harris, at p. 224, original italics.) The trial court suggested they rely on Harris to answer the jury’s question.

2013(Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206 , 227 . . . ; see also Daily Journal Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550 , 1557 . . . [case moot where contract with county had expired and court could not award it to disappointed bidder].) If events have made such relief impracticable, the controversy has become ‘overripe’ and is therefore moot. [Citations.] “Thus, ‘ “[m]ootness has been described as ‘ “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its exist

2013(Id. at p. 1563.) In the course of its analysis, the court discussed the doctrine of mootness, and its applicability to that case: “A case is considered moot when ‘the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case,’ but has been deprived of life ‘because of events occurring after the judicial process was initiated.’ (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 3 120 . . . .) Because ‘ “the duty of . . . every . . . judicial tribunal . . . is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or . . . to

2013(Id. at p. 1563.) In the course of its analysis, the court discussed the doctrine of mootness, and its applicability to that case: “A case is considered moot when ‘the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case,’ but has been deprived of life ‘because of events occurring after the judicial process was initiated.’ (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 3 120 . . . .) Because ‘ “the duty of . . . every . . . judicial tribunal . . . is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or . . . to

2008We address these questions in that order. (a) Abuse of Discretion In Rhaburn v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1566 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ( Rhaburn ), this court discussed the factors to be considered in disqualifying the public defender's office from representing a defendant.

2008We address these questions in that order. (a) Abuse of Discretion In Rhaburn v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1566 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ( Rhaburn ), this court discussed the factors to be considered in disqualifying the public defender's office from representing a defendant.

2001(Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 563 .) The court discussed the test to be used when deciding whether to enjoin a trespass caused by an encroachment.

2001Overarching the analysis is the principle that since the defendant is the trespasser, he or she is the wrongdoer; therefore, “doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the plaintiff.” (Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 562 .) To deny an injunction, three factors must be present.

2000In Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis), the court discussed the test for establishing liability under section 815.6.

2000In Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 , 993 P.2d 983 ] (Haggis), the court discussed the test for establishing liability under section 815.6.

2000“First and foremost,” the court wrote, “application of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its direction to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken. [Citation.] It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity . . . ha[s] been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion. [Citation.]” ( 22 Cal.4th at p. 498 , first and second italics in original.) The opinion in Haggis , in t

2000“First and foremost,” the court wrote, “application of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its direction to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken. [Citation.] It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity . . . ha[s] been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion. [Citation.]” ( 22 Cal.4th at p. 498 , first and second italics in original.) The opinion in Haggis , in t

1999Argument Appellant contends that the court and the prosecutor violated People v. Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d 754 , which held that a court may not consider the facts underlying charges dismissed as part of a plea bargain to aggravate or enhance the defendant’s sentence.